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APPROACH AND ANALYSIS
For established manufacturing nations, increased competitive pressure has
been the way of life since the late 1970s. For the most part however,
production decision making in manufacturing industry has not changed to
meet these new challenges. It usually takes a subordinate strategic role to
the marketing and finance functions with the consequence that it accepts a
reactive role in the corporate debate.
The outcome is that strategic initiatives and developments are predominantly
based on corporate marketing-decisions at the "front end" with
manufacturing being forced to react at the "back end" of the debate. Since
manufacturing managers come late into these discussions, it is difficult for
them to successfully influence corporate decisions. All too often, the result is
the formulation and later development of strategies which manufacturing is
unable to successfully support. That is not to say that this happens for want
of trying - strong is the work ethic in the manufacturing culture. However, if
the basic link between the manufacturing processes and infrastructure (ie
manufacturing strategy) and the market is not strategically sound, then the
business will suffer.
There are many reasons why manufacturing is typically reactive in the
strategic debate. One important factor is the lack of appropriate concepts and
language with which to explain or contribute to corporate decisions. This
research has been undertaken to help redress this deficiency.
The work began in the early 1980s. Upto that time, both the professional and
academic contributions to the field of manufacturing strategy principally
concerned statements which highlighted the problem and alerted
manufacturing industry as a whole to its size and potential. However, there
were in addition some important early pointers as to ways of overcoming the
inadequacy of production's contribution to strategy formulation as well as
some alternative approaches which firms needed to consider as ways of
improving their overall performance. The inability of the production
executive to contribute appropriate functional inputs provided the stimulus
to undertake this work and to endeavour to build on initial insights as a way
of taking forward the subject area of manufacturing strategy.
The core of this thesis concerns these developments. Reported here are three
contributions to this field of study all of which have been tested in different
firms and are increasingly being used by academics, consultants and
businesses as a way of helping to gain essential insights into what is a
complex problem.
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The three facets are:
• Typically, corporate strategies are composites of functional statements
which are inadequately debated one with another in order to under-
stand and test the coherence of the approaches proposed. The result
is that the opportunity to fashion corporate strategies supported by
all the functions within a business is not adequately pursued. In
addition, the necessity to develop corporate strategy in this way and
the advantages which ensue have gone unrecognised
• The reactive role of manufacturing results in a lack of strategic
direction within this function. As a result, typical developments and
investments tend to take the form of operational responses undertaken
without strategic context. One outcome of the research is a methodology
which provides a way in which a business can develop a manufacturing
strategy which links manufacturing developments and investments
to the needs of its agreed markets. Two applications of this are provided
in Chapter 4
• It is most important for an industrial company to recognise that it is
attempting to support the inherently changing nature of its markets
with manufacturing investments the characteristics of which are fixed
in nature and will not change without further investments and develop-
ments. Product profiling is a methodology for enabling companies to
assess the current level of match between its markets and manufacturing
and to recognise the extent to which decisions will effect this in the future.
Examples of its application illustrating different sources of mismatch
are given in Chapter 5
11 INTRODUCTION
The research reported here was undertaken in the 1980s. During that time the
whole area of manufacturing strategy was developing and changing rapidly.
The work completed in this period was, therefore, in parallel with these
changes and designed to be of practical value in the development of a
manufacturing strategy for a business. It concerns the provision of a
conceptual base and the detailing of practical ways for businesses to increase
the degree of match between manufacturing process and infrastructure
developments and investments, and the corporate marketing decisions taken
within a company. This would not only lead to helping the production function
play its rightful part in developing corporate strategies, but would also
improve a company's strategic outcomes as a consequence. -
Given the increasingly competitive pressures since the early 1970s, companies,
in order to succeed, have needed and will continue to need to harness all their
strengths and capabilities and then give them coherent and appropriate
strategic direction. One function which has tended to do this inadequately is
manufacturing and this research has been directed at trying to improve this
function's strategic contribution.
In order to help explain the rationale of the research approach adopted, the
thesis is written to follow the sequence of the research itself. This first chapter
is designed to set the scene.* It includes statements on relative manufacturing
performance, offers views on why some nations have outperformed others,
explains the reasons for the research and concludes with a statement on
research objectives.
* Here, as throughout the thesis, many statements and examples are drawn
from my published work to date, a principle allowed for in the University
of Warwick's regulations
2Chapter 2 is a literature review which, in order to provide sequence, covers the
period upto and including the start of the research and so helps to explain the
position at the beginning. However, in order to map the parallel developments of
other researchers in the 1980s, a review of their work is provided at the start of
Chapter 4.
Chapter 3 deals with the research methodology used, while Chapters 4 and 5
overview some of the principal research findings. The final chapter is a short
summary and presents my concluding statements.
I_1 THE ISSUES ADDRESSED IN THE THESIS WITHIN THE CONTEXT
OF MY OVERALL MANUFACTURING STRATEGY RESEARCH FINDINGS
As explained in the opening paragraph, the research reported in this thesis
was undertaken during the 1980s. It is opportune to also explain that during
this time I published several major statements within this field which
covered aspects of manufacturing strategy development not addressed in this
thesis. Many of my articles and books are referenced appropriately in the
pages which follow. However, it seems relevant to provide a short review of
some of these to give context in terms of the whole of my research activity
within the field of manufacturing strategy.
1.11 SELECTED PAPERS
My early statements were made in various papers. Two initial papers (1980
and 1983a) reported developments in methodology. They contained early
developments of the framework which reviews the principle of linkage
between marketing and manufacturing through a shared understanding of
the markets in which a particular business competes. This aspect of my
research forms one of the two areas which are addrssed in the chapters
which follow.
3An important development in manufacturing strategy (and one not covered
in this thesis) concerns the concept of focus. An initial contribution to this
aspect was made in a jointly written paper (1983b). This built on the earlier
work of others and emphasised the evolving nature of manufacturing's
support for a company's chosen markets.
1.12 BOOKS
My principal contribution to the field of manufacturing strategy has been
made in the two books published since the mid 1980s (1985 and 1989).
Whilst addressing the selected issues within this thesis they also report
research findings in other key areas in manufacturing strategy including
focus, process positioning and infrastructure developments.
The first book collected the various concepts and methodologies which I had
identified in the period upto the mid-1980s. In that way it provided a
comprehensive review of the principal ideas and developments which I had
made upto that time. Of the two areas of research reported in detail in this
thesis, the methdology used to develop a manufacturing strategy was, by this
time, a well-formulated contribution to the field of manufacturing strategy
and one which was fully documanted in this book. The second area reported
in this thesis is that of product profiling. By the time of writing the 1985
book, the conceptual base for this approach was established but, as later
research revealed, not fully explored.
The 1989 book, as would be expected, represented my thinking and research
a few years on. The methodology for developing a manufacturing strategy
had, by that time, been refined. Further ways to help to more clearly
understand markets had been identified (for example, order-losing, sensitive
qualifiers) and were reported here. The developments to the concept of
4product profiling were clearly marked as these outcomes of my research now
warranted a chapter on their own.
L2 NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS
The year 1984, for so long the centre of attention created by Orwell's forecast
of the future, symbolised a new stark reality - the significant impact of
industrial competition. This chapter provides some national and international
comparisons. It shows how some nations with strong industrial traditions
have come to be outperformed, consistently and over a long period of time.
For the UK, the outcome has been significant.
1 21 MANUFACTURING OUTPUT
The UK's position as a leading manufacturing nation was never in doubt for
over 200 years. However, as shown in Figure 1.1 since the mid 1970s it has
fallen consistently behind its major competitors in terms of manufacturing
output.
To shed further light on these differences, Table 1.1 gives the percentage share
for some of the principal manufacturing countries exports of manufacturing
goods during the years 1969-87. On the whole, this reinforces the main
message in Figure 1.1. It illustrates the consistent improvement in the
manufacturing sector showing of some countries (for example Japan) and the
strong and continued performance of others throughout the period (notably,
West Germany, France and Italy). In the same period, however, the UK's
twenty-nine point decline is only matched by the USA.
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Figure 1.1 Comparative Manufacturing Output 1975-87 (1975 100)
Year
Percentage Share of Total
U.S. Canada France Italy Japan U.K.
--...
West
Germany
1969 19.2 6.3 8.2 7.3 11.2 11.2 19.1
1974 17.0 4.5 9.2 6.8 14.4 8.8 21.6
1979 16.0 4.2 10.5 8.4 13.7 9.1 20.8
1980 17.0 4.0 10.0 7.9 14.9 9.7 19.9
1981 18.6 4.6 9.2 7.7 17.9 8.5 18.4
1982 17.7 4.9 9.2 8.0 17.4 8.5 19.5
1983 16.9 5.5 8.9 8.1 18.5 7.9 19.0
1984 17.2 6.3 8.6 7.7 20.1 7.6 18.1
1985 16.5 6.2 8.5 7.8 19.7 7.9 18.7
1986 14.0 5.4 8.8 8.2 19.4 7.6 10.7
1987 13.7 4.9 9.1 8.2 17.9 7.9 21.5
+ or - percent
change.2 -28.6 -22.2 11.0 12.3 59.8 -29.5 9.7
I. The figures for 1987 are based on Quarters 1 and 2 only.
2. + or - percent change is the difference between 1969 and 1987, as a percentage of 1969.
3. Included in the definition of main manufacturing countries, but not listed here, are Belgium, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland.
Source: Monthly Review of External Trade Statistics. Department of Trade and Industry (U.K.). Issue no. 145, January 88. Table
E2.
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To complete this initial review, the export-import trade ratios of
manufacturing industry within selected countries provides an insight into the
relative performance of the major world competitors (see Table 1.2).
Country
Export-import ratio, total
manufacturing industries
1972 1982	 .
Canada 0.9 1.1
France 1.1 1.0
Italy 1.3 1.3
Japan 2.8 3.0
United Kingdom 1.1 0.9
United States 0.8 0.9
West Germany 1.5 1.5
,. Source: OECD Science and Technology Indi6ators Unit,
Newsletter No. 8 (1984) pp. 6, 7.
Table 1.2 Export/Import Ratios of Trade for Total Manufacturing Industries,
1972 and 1982
The figures reinforce the strong position held by Japan and West Germany
and the absolute decline in the UK performance. The year 1983 Witnessed the
culmination of these trends when, for the first time in over 200 years in fact,
since the Industrial Revolution, the UK became a net importer of
manufactured goods. This trade balance has remained firmly in deficit ever
since (see Figure 1.2), with the UK incurring £20bn deficit in 1989.
150
Sbn
150 —
I 	 I	 I	 I	 I I	 I	 111111111.1. 
1970 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86
Source: OECD
Figure 1.2 Trends in the Balance of Manufacturing Trade for Selected
Industrial Nations
7The decline in the UK's competitive position in the world industrial markets is
there for all to see. Loss of market share abroad, increased imports at home.
UK industry has performed badly for a long time, whatever measure is used.
A more in-depth review of her trading performance confirms the picture. It
shows that from 1973, imports took an increasing market share for
manufactured goods overall whilst making significant and very worrying
inroads into certain sectors - see Table 1.3.
Manufacturing sector
1973
Imports/home demand ratio
1979	 1980	 1981 1982 1983
1983
(1973=100)
Motor vehicles and their parts 23 41 39 42 46 51 222
Paper, printing and publishing 19 19 19 20 20 - 20 105
Engineering
mechanical 26 29 29 32 32 36 138
electrical and electronic 27 31 31 36 40 43 159
instruments 46 53 52 55 56 56 122
Chemicals and man-made fibres 22 30 29 31 34 33 150
Food, drink and tobacco 19 18 16 16 16 17 89
Textile industry 21 33 34 39 39 41 195
Clothing and footwear 18 29 29 33 33 34 189
Total manufacturing industry 21 27 26 28 29 31 148
Source: Central Statistical Office (CSO), Annual Abstract of Statistics, Table 12.1 'Import Penetration Ratio for Products of Manufacturing
Industry', no. 121 (1985).
Table 1.3 Ratio of UK Imports to Home Demand for all Manufacturing and for
Selected Sectors (1973 - 1983)
Against this background of decline it is interesting to note that successive UK
Governments have tended to act on the sometimes painful premise that
exposure to overseas competition is a necessary ingredient for the
development of a strong, domestic manufacturing base.
What is of deep concern, however, is that manufacturing industry's response
has been woefully slow. Many firms have tended to keep their corporate eye
on domestic rather than overseas competitors. The result is that they have
adopted inadequate, reactive strategies because the consequences for
manufacturing have not been appreciated.
8Typically, they have filled capacity by chasing orders, increasing variety and
reducing batch sizes, leaving overseas competitors with substantial
advantages in the higher-volume segments of their markets. Many
businesses had failed to recognise until too late in the day, that the sellers'
markets of the 1950s and 1960s had long since passed and that the 1980s
required new strategies aimed at gaining and maintaining some specific and
significant advantage against the most, not least, powerful of their
competitors.
Whereas the UK in particular was being buffeted by this new competitive
surge, that was not so for some nations which moved from strength to
strength. The exhibits given earlier in this chapter have illustrated how
Japan, West Germany and others are showing up well in the international
league tables. Of deeper concern for the UK, however, were the facts
underlying these trends, especially that of competitive productivity.
1.22 PRODUCTIVITY : NATIONAL COMPARISONS
The prosperity of a nation is generally recognised as being significatly
influenced by its comparative productivity. In two decades of increasing
competition, this has been brought sharply into focus. Although productivity
does not provide a precise measure of performance (nor is it a simple
measure, due to the global nature of the figures involved), it does offer an
overview that is useful in assessing the trends in a country's own
performance and in its relative position in world rankings.
There are two important dimensions of a productivity slowdown for any
nation. The first is the rate of the slowdown itself and the second is the
cumulative effect of the slowdown on the comparative level of productivity
between a country and its competitors.
9Productivity measures the relationship between outputs (in the form of goods
and services provided) and inputs (in the form of capital, material, labour,
energy and other resources). Although it is difficult to get a consensus on the
quantitative dimensions of productivity measurement (Appendix 2 offers a
short discussion), the qualitative conclusions on the size and duration of the
problem for the UK are clearly shown.
Table 1.4 provides an overall review of performance in terms of gross
domestic product per employee between 1973-85. Except for the US and
Canada, the UK has consistently achieved lower growth rates than other
leading industrial nations even taking into account the improved performance
in the last 5 years of this period.
Gross Domestic Product per Employee
Relative Level Annual Growth
Nation 1960 1977 1985 1986 1973-85 1981-85
United States 100 100 100.0 100.0 0.4 1.0
Canada 86 92 99.8 101.9 1.1 1.6
France 57 85 93.6 93.2 2.1 1.7
Japan 25 63 75.5 75.2 2.9 2.9
Korea NA NA NA 33.9 4.9 6.0
United Kingdom 53 56 76.1 76.5 1.6 2.6
West Germany 53 79 93.4 93.0 2.2 2.1
Notes: 1. American Productivity Center "Productivity Perspectives" 1987 Edition
with supporting information supplied by the Center for 1973.
2. NA means not available.
Table 1.4 Trends in Gross Domestic Product per Employee 1973-85
The UK's failure to maintain similar improvements in productivity over time
is further illustrated by Table 1.5 which traces the output per hour in the
manufacturing sector for the UK and other leading industrial nations since
1950. While the UK and US have remained static between 1950 and 1984
other industrial countries have forged further ahead or overtaken the UK
during this period. The productivity slowdown and the picture that emerges
10
when comparisons are made with other leading industrial nations point to
justifiable concern.
Manufacturing Sector
Output per Hour
Average Annual% Change
in Output/Hour
Nation 1950 1973 1981 1984 1950-60 1960-73 1973-81 1981-84
United States 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 2.0 3.2 1.3 4.6
Canada 51.8 77.0 77.8 74.6 3.8 4.7 1.6 2.3
France NA NA NA NA 4.9 6.5 4.4 5.3
Japan 11.3 56.1 82.1 92.1 9.5 10.3 5.5 6.2
United Kingdom 40.8 47.5 40.0 42.0 2.0 4.3 1.6 5.5
West Germany 33.4 78.0 80.6 81.4 7.4 5.8 3.5 4.1
Notes: I. Data on real output per hour is based on constant 1975 U.S. dollars.
2. Actual output per hour is shown for the other 5 countries relative to the U.S. 1950, 1973, and 1984
figures.
3. NA means not available.
Source: International Productivity Comparisons-Economics, Sectors, Manufacturing Industry Group by G. E. Sadler, Amer-
ican Productivity Center, 1986.
Table 1.5 Output and Average Percentage Change in Output Pattern in the
Manufacturing Sector from 1950 to 1984
1.23 PRODUCTIVITY : PLANT LEVEL COMPARISONS
The argument that national level productivity levels can be misleading is not
unreasonable. Such an analysis will include industries at different stages in
different life cycles which may distort results. To obviate this possible
distortion there is a case for making assessment at the plant or industry level.
A report on the toolmaking sector assessed the relative performance of 17 UK
and West German companies in the product sectors of mould, large press and
assembly equipment manufacturers. A performance ratio based upon added
value divided by total employment costs and adjusted for employee cost
differences was used to compare companies within three sectors. The
average performance of UK companies and their West German counterparts is
provided in Figure 1.3 and shows a consistent underperformance by the
former of between 20 to 30 percent.
Mould makers Makers of large
press tools
:Makers of
lassembly equipment
i	
•
WG(3)
•
WG(2)
WG(3)
•
•
GB(4)
•
G B(2)
GB(3)
160
150
41 140
a)
130
110
100
11
Number of companies concerned
UK
West	 •
Germany
4
3
3
3
.2
2
1 Base of 100 for the lowest performing company in the total sample
Note:	 In each column the figure shown is the average for the companies
in that sector in the country concerned, and the number in brackets is the
firms involved.
Sotuce: Gauge and Tool Sector Working Party's Report (1981), p.vii, Figure 1.
Figure 1.3 Relative performance of UK and West Germany companies by
sector (National Economic Development Office, 1981)
These differences were again illustrated by a 1983-4 Anglo German survey
(Daly et al 1985) of twenty-five UK and twenty West German firms in the
metal-working trades, From within the larger survey, six pairs of firms,
selected on the basis of matched and simple, products were analysed. In all
six comparisons, the West German firms showed higher labour productivity
varying from 10 to 130 percent with an average of 63 per cent.
The third illustration is taken from a Ford Motor Company series of
presentations to suppliers in the early 1980s. The purpose of these were to
highlight the size of the productivity gap beween European and Japanese car
plants. The figures in Table 1.6 speak for themselves and illustrate not only
the significant difference between Japan and Europe but also beween the UK
and other European plants.
12
Aspect Ford Transit Toyota Hiace
UK Belgium
Number per shift
at similar build rate
Directs 1024 643 350
Inspectors 83 68 15
Other indirects 929 287 45
Total 2036 998 410
Total manpower per unit build 12.5 7.21 2.4
This' partac• ular figure related to West Germany, not to Belgium.
Table 1.6 Assembly Plant Productivity Comparisons, Toyota and Ford
The results were illustrated in Table 1.3 and more recent figures show the
continuation of this trend - the outcome of being outperformed by our
competitors (see Table 1.1 and Figure 1.2 given earlier).
1.24 WHY HAS THIS HAPPENED?
The reasons why this has happened are many and varied. Some are
unsubstantiated opinions, others supported by fact. Some will be more
relevant to some industrial sectors and companies and others, less. However,
learning from past failure is a step toward determining how to build a more
successful, competitive future.
1.241 Failure to recognise the size of the competitive challenge
There has been a failure, conscious or otherwise, of industry and society at
large to recognise the size of the competitive challenge, the impact it was
having and would have on our very way of life, and to recognise the need to
change.
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One illustration of UK industry's lack of awareness is provided in a selection
from the corporate reponses to the 1976 Select Committee of Science and
Technology (Japan Subcommittee) seeking evidence on several aspects of
Japanese industry. The subcommittee wrote in September 1977 to many
leading British manufacturing companies and related associations seeking
their views on a number of perspectives within Japanese industry. There
follows a précis of some of the points raised in the replies received, with the
name of the organisation, and particlar aspect(s) to be addressed.
Ford Motor Company's comments on the success with which Japanese industry has
handled its process and product development (Select Committee on Science and
Technology, 1977/78)
I am not sure that we have anything useful to contribute on
this issue so far as the motor industry is concerned because
all the processes and products used by the Japanese motor
industry are known to us and their success depends on
achieving economies of scale based on a large home market,
on a different attitude adopted by labour in their industry
and also on their apparent success in containing inflation
more effectively that we have been able to do in this country.
In short, as far as the motor industry is concerned the general
superiority of the Japanese seems to me to be in the area of
attitudes and economies rather than technology.
Ford's comments also mention that the Japanese "are very competitive in
their strategic thinking and their marketing plans, but ... there is nothing they
do in these areas either that is not known and practised by some of us at
least in the motor industry in the West".
Yet, less than three years later, the Ford Motor Company was holding
seminars within all its major suppliers to detail the critical nature of the
Japanese challenge and examining the stark comparisons of performance,
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amongst others, which were provided earlier in the chapter. Based on the
improving percentage of the Japanese free world vehicle production (10 to 26
per cent from 1966 to 1979) and the decline in the European percentage (38
to 34 per cent) in the same period, Ford concentrated much of its discussion
on the manufacturing perspective as the foundation for this challenge. As the
Ford Report admitted, the extent and nature of the superiority was not
appreciated until Ford went to see for themselves.
But Ford were not the only company which failed to appreciate the extent of
the challenge.
Rank Organisation commented on the introduction of new products and
improved production methods used by Japanese industry, as follows:
Whilst subscribing "on the whole to the generalisation that Japanese industry
has performed in the ways described, better than the UK", Rank considered
that Japan "would seem to have the following advantages compared with the
UK, at least in the products/markets where they are conspicuously
successful".
The reply then lists seven advantages which were, in summary form:
(1) High prestige of industrial activity and careers in management and
technology.
(2) Ample supply of potential managers, engineers and technologists.
(3) Full support by operatives and trade unions to productivity
increases and high quality attainment.
(4) Better personal motivation through taxes, rewards and strong
work ethic.
(5) Unique relationship between government, banking and industry.
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(6) Home market highly protected.
(7) Buoyant economy helps exploit new technologies and inventions.
Rank's reply then detailed three steps to be taken to help redress the
stituation. These related to points (1), (2), (4) and (6) above. Thus, like Ford,
Rank in late 1977 was stressing not the key manufacturing and business
issues (that is, aspects over which the company had substantial and
significant control and direction) but aspects which were governmental or
cultural in origin (that is, aspects over which they had little control and
direction).
Yet in the early 1980s, the Rank/Toshiba television plant in Plymouth
illustrated how the initial failure of the joint venture was turned into a
successful manufacturing unit when Toshiba took full control. And, this is not
the only example of initial failure being turned into success when Japanese
management took over. Similar cases are provided from elsewhere including
Motorola's TV assembly plan in Illinois taken over in the early 1970s by
Matsushita, the Sony TV plant at San Diego, and the Sanyo Electric plants in
Arkansas and California.
Further, apparent misunderstandings or lack of awareness of the nature and
extent of competition were displayed in the content, tone and extent of other
replies, for example, the Motor Industry Research Association.
These views, however, were not shared by all contributors. Many were
aware of the differences in corporate attitude and priorities, thus providing a
sharp contrast to the earlier examples:
Electrical Research Association replied:
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"Japanese industry is successful in those products it has chosen
for world-wide marketing because there is a total commitment
to manufacturing high quality, reliable goods on a very large
scale, as much effort being committed to the production process
and technology as the products themselves. In the United
Kingdom we have very large resources and our best talent
locked up in irrelevant basic research. Manufacturing industry
attempts to survive with the minimum resources and too little
skill and investment in the production and quality control
process".
EMI's response was similarly biased towards a recognition of the Japanese
manufacturer's approach to markets and production. For instance,
• Japanese manufacturers study competitors products, technologies and
market needs in much greater depth than their European counterparts.
• Advanced developments are embodied in the products and in the
manufacturing processes. This gives the commercial products a
technological lead and a cost advantage - two significant factors
in establishing a significant market position.
Some companies even recognised the gravity of the problem and the speed of
response which must be made. For instance, in the mid 1970s BOC Ltd
identified "certain technical aspects of small batch manufacturing in which
considerable practical experience has been obtained in Japan and for which
no equivalent knowedge exists in the UK". Linked machining centres which
had been in operation for five years in Japan were not known to exist in the
UK or even being contemplated by any British machine tool manufacturer. In
summary, BOC's reply concludes that "the action we in Britain take in the next
two years can be critical in ensuring a continuing viable manufacturing
industry in this field, and especially the machine tool aspect".
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1.242 Failure to appreciate the impact of increasing manufacturing capacity
World manufacturing capacity up to the mid 1960s was, by and large, less
than demand and in this period firms could sell all they could make and none
moreso than the UK with its traditional Commonwealth markets. The
redressing of this capacity/demand imbalance heralded the growing
prominence of the marketing function: the recession of the late 1970s and
earlier 1980s saw the accounting/finance function further increase its
influence. During this time, the manufaturing perspective within the
corporate strategy resolution diminished. The result has been that many
companes have become almost entirely marketing-orientated. New product
introduction and product differentiation have, therefore, become the
predominant corporate approach to strategy development. Opportunities are
explored leaving the aftermath for manufacturing to resolve. Couple this
with the increasing pre-eminence of financial measures and the results has
been a corporate policy in many UK companies where investment for product
innovation and associated manufacturing requirements has been relatively
plentiful, whilst that for process innovation has been relatively scarce. This is
not so in Japan. A survey in the early 1980s (Boston University, 1983)
revealed that, whereas process engineering functions in North American and
European companies were, respectively 6 and 5 per cent likely to get their
project proposals approved, in Japan it was 27 per cent. The consequences of
this have been several:
(1) For many companies, it has resulted in a widening inability to
meet changing patterns of demand. Clasically, whilst manufacturing
technology and the perceived manufacturing task were moving
towards even more mass production and the economies associated
with that direction, markets were responding to greater competitive
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pressures which, in turn, led to wider product ranges and resultant
lower volumes.
(2) Strategic investment in manufacturing has, overall, been discouraged
with the result that the process technology advantage enjoyed by
our competitors continues to increase:
• Corporate performance is measured predominantly in terms
of return on investment. In addition, the need to demonstrate
(sometimes twice yearly) the expected progress to the business, its
shareholders and the stock market puts unwise and unnecessary
pressure on short-term performance. This, in turn, adds weight
to the argument to keep investment low as a way of keeping
returns relatively high.
• Top management's inexperience in manufaturing provides an
unreceptive climate in which to consider strategic process
investment. Risk aversion, so much a part of the corporate
financial argument, also favours holding-off.
(3)	 The diminishing role of production in strategy has led to a corres-
ponding lack of involvement in the corporate debate. One
consequence has been that the engineering dimensions has been
the predominant basis on which process choices have been made.
This has led to situations where processes have been installed which,
though excellent in themselves, were not appropriate to the
business needs. Tripping over white elephants from the past, has
made managements wary of the future.
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1.243 Top Management's lack of manufacturing experience
Top management's lack of experience in manufacturing has further
ramifications for a business. Considering the fact that manufacturing
accounts for some 70-80 per cent of assets, expenditure and people, then it is
imperative that senior executives fully appreciate the arguments and
counter-arguments in manufacturing so as to ensure that the accompanying
wide range of perspectives are taken into account when making important
manufacturing decisions. Once large investments have been made then
rarely does a company invest a second time to correct the mistake. This lack
of experience is certainly not so in Japan and West Germany where a full and
perceptive insight into manufacturing is seen as a prerequsite for top
management.
A survey (Wall Street Journal (Europe) and Booz-Allen Hamilton, 1984) on
'The Management of Technology' based on over 200 chief executives in 16
European countries, listed amongst its "significant findings" that there was a
surprising emphasis by European executives on cost reduction as a primary
objective of technology". The European Panel members "rank cost reduction
in the factory as by far their most important objectives for technology". That
attitude clashes significantly with the findings of comparable studies among
US and Japanese executives. Those business leaders display a far more
aggressive attitude, ranking innovation in the form of new products,
improved product performance or improved customer service higher. It goes
on to quote one view, which was supported by a number of Europe's leading
executives, that there is "a desire to extend the life of the smoke stack
industry. Many view technology as a way to extend the current product line
past the point where it could go otherwise".
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1.244 The Production Manager's obsession with short-term performance
issues
The emphasis within the production manager's role has, in turn, been
directed towards short-term issues and tasks. The overriding pressures to
meet day-to-day targets and the highly quantifiable nature of the role have
reinforced the tendency of manufacturing executives to concern themselves
with this feature to the exclusion of the important long-term. The skills of
production managers are high on short-term tasks such as scheduling,
maintaining efficiency levels, controls, delivery, quality and resolving labour
problems.
Skinner (1982) rightly believes that
most factories were not managed very differently in the 1970s
than in the 1940s and 1950s. Manufacturing management was
dominated by engineering and a technical point of view.
This may have been adequate when production management
issues centred largely on efficiency and productivity and the
answers came from industrial engineering and process
engineering. But, the problems of operations managers in
the 70s had moved far beyond mere physical efficiency."
However, this predominance of the short-term is reinforced by the view
which companies have of the production management role. An analysis of job
advertisements in the period 1970-9 (Hill et al, 1981) revealed that of all the
aspects mentioned concerning job content, 50 per cent for managers and 52
per cent for directors concerned the need for day-to-day management and a
knowledge of support functions. Similarly, the appropriate work experience
mix which a suitable applicant would need revealed that for managers, 54
per cent of all mentions referred to their experience record as production
managers and use of management controls and techniques. For directors it
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accounted for 51 per cent of all mentions. In contrast, the same ten-year
analysis revealed a correspondingly low emphasis on, or requirement for, the
long-term, corporate contribution. The job content mentions were 8 per cent
and 13 per cent for managers and directors with typical work experience of
applicants at 3 per cent and 4 per cent respectively.
But, the production job has changed from one which concerns maintaining
steady state manufacturing by sound day-to-day husbandry to one which is
multidimensional. It is now increasingly concerned with managing greater
complexity in product range, product mix, volume changes, process flexibility,
inventory, cost and financial controls and employee awareness due to the
more intensive level of domestic and international competition.
This is the nature of the new task. No longer are the key issues solely
confined to operational control and fine-tuning the system. The need is for
broad, business-orientated manufacturing managers but companies have too
few of them. The use of specialists as the way to control our businesses has
increasingly led to a reduction in the breadth of a line manager's
responsibilities which has narrowed the experience base. Furthermore,
many manufacturing managers have been outgunned by specialist argument
and found themselves unable to cope with the variety of demands placed
upon them. The response by many has been to revert increasingly to their
strengths. This has, therefore, reinforced their short-term and their
inherently reactive stance to corporate strategic resolution.
Manufacturing executives do not, on the whole, explain the important,
conceptual aspects of manufacturing to others in the organisation. Seldom do
they evaluate and expose the implications for manufacturing of corporate
decisions, so that alternatives can be considered and more soundly based,
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corporate decisions agreed. Part of the reason for this is that there is a lack
of developed language to help provide a way of explaining the corporate
production issues involved. Lacking, therefore, in strategic dimension,
manufacturing has often been forced into piecemeal change achieving what it
can as and when it has been able. The result has been a series of intermittent
responses lacking corporate coordination.
1_3 REASONS FOR UNDERTAKING THE RESEARCH
In many companies there is an ineffective handling of cross-functional issues
at the strategic level. The use of functionalisation and specialists as part of
the basic control mechanisms within organisational structures reinforces the
lack of business coordination which typifies business reality and increases the
tendency to base corporate decisions on single functional dimensions. Within
this environment, production managers tend to take a reactive role in
formulating corporate strategy. Yet, how can the perspectives of that
function which controls such a large part of the assets, costs and people be
omitted?
The fact that manufacturing executives have an exacting and critical role to
play is undisputed. Why then, do they adopt their current role, and why does
this situation exist and not appear to improve? There are several reasons,
the more important of which are detailed below:
• Production Managers' view of themselves : one of the major
contributions to this situation appears to be that Production Managers also
see themselves holding a reactive corporate brief. They too define their
role as being one which requires them to react as well as possible to all
that is asked of the production system. They see their role as:
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a) the exercise of skill and experience in effectively coping with the
exacting and varying demands placed on manufacturing
b) to reconcile the trade-offs inherent in these demands as best they can.
Thus, rarely do they adequately contribute to the making of corporate
decisions, which result in a demand on manufacturing. They do not explain
the different sets of manufacturing implications created by alternative
policy decisions and changes in direction. They fail, by default, to
contribute as the corporate level, and hence to help the company arrive at
decisions which embrace all the important business perspectives.
• The Company's view of the Production Manager's Role : Production
management's perceived role of reacting to the demands placed upon it
and a prime concern for the short-term that this implies is reinforced by
the corporate view of this function's contribution, and hence the qualities
incumbents should possess. Many companies typically promote operators
to foremen, foremen to managers, managers to executives with scant
regard for the change in emphasis that needs to take place and with little
help to make this transition a success. One major company, recognising the
important corporate contribution to be made by its manufacturing
executives, undertook a series of tailor-made courses in manufacturing
strategy. The first of these comprised 16 factory managers who, during the
course, reflected that as a group their aggregate company service exceeded
300 years, yet the collective training they had received to help them
prepare for their manufacturing executive role was less than 30 days.
On a broader front, the survey of UK recruitment referred to earlier
(Hill et al, 1980) further confirmed this view. In terms of the appropriate
work experience of suitable applicants, or the content of the job being
advertised, the number of mentions concerning the day-to-day
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management tasks was relatively high, compared with the low number
of mentions concerning the corporate or long-term contribution given
earlier (see Table 1.7).
Mentions as a Percentage of the Total in U.K.
Advertisements 1970-79
Corporate Policy
Long-Terml	 Day-to-Day Management!
Corporate	 Record of Production
Job Category	 Contribution	 Management
Production managers
Work experience
	 3	 34
Job content	 8	 23
Production directors
Work experience	 4	 32
Job content	 13	 27
Table 1.7 Perception of Long-Term Versus Day-to-Day Aspects of Production
Executives Jobs and Applicants Qualifications
• Top Management's view of strategy : the authors of business plans
and corporate marketing reviews look outward from the business. Top
executives associate themselves with these activities, seeing them as
legitimate, corporate strategy issues. They concentrate their attention of
the external environment in which the business operates.
Manufacturing plans are built in line with the stated business needs and
are based upon the internal dimensions of the processes involved, and top
executives are less likely to associate themselves with these activities.
Typically, they request a manufacturing strategy statement from the
production executive without being involved in its structure and
development. They assume that it is not an inherent part of their role
which increases the difficulties in establishing a corporate strategy through
dialogue and understanding. This tendency highlights the failure of top
executives to recognise the external dimension of manufacturing. The
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function's internal perspective tends to dominate the broad view of the
contribution that it can and needs to be making.
However, the key task in corporate strategy is matching the external
requirement (the market) and the internal capability (of which
manufacturing typically provides a significant part). One consequence is
that the resolution of these issues has been abdicated by top managment,
or at best has occurred outside the boundaries of their business
awareness.
• Production Managers are too late in the corporate debate :
Production managers are often not involved in corporate policy decisions,
until these decisions have started to take shape. The result is that
production executives have less opportunity to contribute to decisions on
strategy alternatives and as a consequence always appear to be
complaining about the unrealistic demands made of them and the
problems that invariably ensue.
• A Lack of language and concepts : on the whole, production managers
do not have a history of explaining their function clearly and effectively to
others in the organisation. This is particularly the case in terms of the
manufacturing strategy issues that need to be considered and the
production consequences that will arise from the corporate decisions under
discussion. On the other hand, marketing and financial executives have
explained their functions comparatively well. They can talk about policy
alternatives in a straightforward and intelligible manner.
The reasons for this difference cannot, however, be wholly placed at the
production manager's door. The knowledge base, concepts, and language
have not been developed in the same way. Consequently, shared
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perspectives within manufacturing are few - a point well
illustrated in the next chapter where the sparsity of contribution becomes
apparent.
1.4 PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH
The purpose of this research is, therefore, directed towards helping to
improve the conceptual base of manufacturing strategy. It is directed
towards translating some of the intuitive perspectives which typify the
approach adopted by production managers at both the operational and
strategic levels of their role into relevant and useable concepts and
methodologies. Until the manufacturing function is able to explain the
implications for production (and hence the business) of strategic alternatives
then other executives will be unable to partake in this essential debate and
agree relevant strategic outcomes which are best for the business as a whole.
Manufacturing strategy concerns reflecting in the investments within the
production function the different market pressures of a business. A
methodology to bring about this strategic development would need to
recognise that -
a) the 'market-related' inputs to manufacturing strategy formulation
are more relevant to this process when expressed in manufacturing,
rather than conventional marketing terms
b) invesments in manufacturing will embody different sets of trade-offs
between major process and infrastructure characteristics (for example,
process flexibility, inventory levels, manufacturing planning and
control systems and capacity increases)
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c) strategy formulation is more effective when the process recognises that
whereas markets are inherently dynamic, manufacturing investments
are inherently fixed. Thus, relevant process and infrastructure
investments today may not adequately support the markets of tomorrow
The above are 'research questions rather than hypotheses in the strict
'testable' sense. Their purpose is to focus the broad basis of the research
around some central issues in the manufacturing strategy formulation
process. The research has then been directed at testing whether the above
issues are meaningful in themselves and pertinent to businesses in terms of
providing relevant manufacturing perspectives which would need to form
part of the corporate strategy debate.
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW
As explained in the last chapter, the review of relevant literature in the field
of manufacturing strategy covers the period upto and including the start of
my research which began in the early 1980s. In this way it gives an overview
of the position which prevailed at the time and thus provides an
understanding of the context against which the research reported in later
chapters can be placed. However, its principal role is to identify areas where
further work needed to be completed and to signal priorities in terms of those
aspects of manufacturing strategy which needed to be developed.
Before detailing specific contributions to the development of this field, a look
back at the major phases in corporate strategy development with particular
regard to manufacturing inputs would give general insights into why many
UK companies had got themselves into a position of formulating corporate
decisions without embracing the necessary inputs from its major functions.
Phase 1: the period from the end of the second World War until the early
1960s was one characterised by a general world under-capacity in most areas
of manufacturing. The consequence was that manufacturing held a
"dominant" role within many companies. As most products made could be
sold, the key to overall corporate success was in the hands of manufacturing.
Phase 2 : the early to mid 60s saw a significant change. The world demand/
supply imbalance of the previous period was increasingly being corrected.
The result was the growing emergence of marketing as a strategic force as
this function's role in overall corporate success was being recognised.
Phase 3 : the 1973 oil crisis and particularly the recession of the late 1970s
and early 1980s brought the importance of the financial function sharply into
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view. Its growing role in corporate argument was increasingly (and still is)
being felt.
Although the phases described above are general in nature and the timings
may well be questioned, they do illustrate an important trend in strategy
development. From 1945 onwards, the corporate strategy decisions in many
firms has been unduly influenced by the dominance of different functions at
different times. By the early 1980s (the time when my research began)
manufacturing had tended increasingly to adopt a reactive role as described
in the last chapter. But, the logic of any company which fails to embrace the
inputs from all its major functions is highly questionable, particularly with
the characteristics of world markets leaning towards becoming increasingly
more dynamic and competitive.
Within this scenario there had been a small clutch of contributors working in
the field of manufacturing strategy. They clearly recognised the inadequacy
of formulating major decisions without the inputs from the production
function where investments in both process and infrastructure were the most
significant and that, given the UK trends illustrated in Chapter 1, this position
could not be sustained. However, as the literature review will illustrate the
main contributors, those who offered concepts to help move the area forward,
were few in number.
The literature review which follows is primarily chronological in order to help
trace developments and also to distinguish between the level and nature of
contributions over time. References are provided throughout and the chapter
is supplemented by the additional material given in Appendix A.
The three phases of functional dominance suggested earlier are my own.
They are based partly on my own views and in part it reflect developments
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in the literature. An example of the latter is provided by the initial reference
which has been chosen for this and other reasons. Wickham Skinner is
recognised by many as the person who has made the largest, contribution to
this field. Although wistfully describing himself at a recent conference as
"Johnny One Note" you will, I hope, agree by the end of this section that he
provided a symphony of ideas from statement definitions to major insights
pointing the way forward.
As early as the mid 1960s, Skinner (1966) had a clear insight into the
magnitude of the problem facing the US and other countries with long
manufacturing traditions, the source of those problems and how
manufacturing needed to, and how it would be able to, contribute to
improving overall corporate performance. In fact, a brief review of the
major points within his 1966 article offers adequate context for the initial
phase of manufacturing strategy. He identified for the US
1) New pressures from outside the firm in the form of increasing competition
and marketing pressures of cost, quality and delivery lead times
2) Problems from within - plants geared up for characteristics of yesterday's
markets including:-
a) long runs
b) stabilised engineering designs
c) style of production management
d) intensive use of labour standards and incentives
Appendix A.1 provides a complete list.
This, he explained, had resulted in a second "set of problems which are
complicting life in the factory". He reflected that "by and large these are
actually old problems made critical by the outside pressure and the
accelerating rate of technology. It is their urgency which makes them new"
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(1966, p141). He then identified the following issues -
1 "Re-evaluating cost control" due to the changes in cost structure and the
failure of companies to modify existing concepts, systems and procedures
2 Changes in the mix and base of skills required
3 Increased paperwork resulting from "increasingly complex information
systems"
4 Accelerating technology developments which highlighted the need to
consider equipment decisions in terms of skills and investment costs,
engineering's response to product change, the need for shorter lead
times and the opportunities and problems brought about by a flood
of new developments in materials and processes.
5 He highlighted the changing nature of relevant markets and the failure to
respond in manufacturing. He pointed out some of the then more recent
developments in manufacturing including statistical process control and
experience-curve phenomenon while emphasising the need for
manufacturing managers to think differently.
6 Finally, he argued the view that there was a growing corporate need to
recognise the increasing role of production in strategy development due
to more rapidly changing market requirements. This resulted in a failure
by companies to recognise production as a competitive weapon in terms
of improving overall business performance (1966, pp140 and 145).
So, the scene was set! The principal elements were signalled - the weight of
competition, the recognition of the new order and of the need to re-orientate
manufacturing's role in terms of its corporate contribution. But, these early
signals were only broad statements of the need for change and the nature of
manufacturing's revised role. Understandably it is often necessary to first
point oneself in a more appropriate direction - a stage which normally
precedes action. But, exaltation is not, in itself, enough.
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However, it was an important start. And, others too were becoming aware of
the growing problems for manufacturing and alerted to the need to re-think
current approaches which were, at least in part, contributing to the overall
decline of several large industrial nations with sound, well-established
manufacturing pedigrees.
The style and contribution from other academics and practitioners outside the
immediate area of manufacturing was understandably less forthright in
highlighting the production function's role change. Some, for example,
included manufacturing's contribution by implication or as part of a general,
all-embracing statement of the need for a business to look afresh at market
opportunities and traditional approaches (Levitt, 1965). While others
identified the specific need within companies for "downstream coupling"
between R & ll, manufacturing and marketing (Ansoff and Stewart, 1967).
However, in these formative years the more precise statements of need and
the early developments within manufacturing strategy came principally from
the Harvard Business School stable and particularly from Wickham Skinner.
His bellweather article in 1969 represented a bold statement of the
importance and nature of the manufacturing contribution to the corporate
strategy debate. This statement began by reinforcing the failure of
companies to embrace the production dimension within corporate strategy
formulation and clearly ephasised manufacturing's critical contribution which
emanates from its organisational size. The outcome, he emphasised, was one
of the strategic alternatives "competitive weapon or corporate millstone".
The rest of his article, however, introduces some key facets within the field -
a) the need for integrative mechanisms
b) cause and effect factors which determine linkage between strategy
and production (p139)
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c) the concept of trade-offs within manufacturing investments
d) a "process of manufacturing policy determination" as shown in Figure
2.1
What Skinner (1969) clearly recognised was that "manufacturing policy must
come from corporate strategy and that the process of determining this policy
is the means by which the management can actually manage production"
(p144).
This Skinner article at the end of the 1960s heralded a new decade, one
however, where the performance of some major manufacturing nations
continued to decline. The literature contributions throughout the next ten
years were understandably mixed and fall within a number of different
themes. It is within these that the major contributions in this period are now
reviewed.
2.1 STATEMENTS OF THE PROBLEM
Although most contributions in any field include statements of the perceived
problem or need, there are some whose principal theme concerns this
perspective. In UK terms, however, the development of PROMAG (Production
Management Action Group) by leading academics signalled a most positive
statement of need which was ably compiled by Gallagher and Wild (1976)
from contributions by six leading POM academics of the time. It provided a
clear statement of the problem highlighting the reactive as opposed to
proactive nature of production management in terms of corporate
contributions. Elsewhere in the UK the few statements on these issues
confined themselves to statements of the problem, for example Lockyer
(1976) and Gill (1979). In the US there were similar examples comprising
statements of the problem (Hanan, 1974; Hobbs and Heaney, 1977) but more
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1.What the others are doing
2. What we have got or can get to compete with
3. How we can compete
4. What we must accomplish in manufacturing in order
to compete
5. Economic constraints and opportunities common to
the industry
6. Constraints and opportunities common to the technology
7. Our resources evaluated
8.How we should set ourselves up to match resources,
economics, and technology to meet the tasks required
by our competitive strategy
9. The implementation requirements of our
manufacturing policies
10.Basic systems in manufacturing (e.g., production
planning, use of inventories, use of standards, and
-wage systems)
11.Controls of cost, quality, flows, inventory, and time
12.Selection of operations or ingredients critical to success
(e.g., labor skills, equipment utilization, and yields)
13.How we are performing
14.Changes in what we have got, effects on competitive
situation, and review of strategy
15.Analysis and review of manufacturing operations and
policies
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Figure 2.1 Skinner's Process of Manufacturing Policy
Determination (1969, Exhibit II, p143)
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significantly there was a growing volume of work which was breaking new
ground.
2.2 DEVELOPING EXISTING IDEAS
The principal source of developments of existing ideas was without doubt
Harvard Business School.
Incorporating and building on earlier work with Utterback (1975) and
Townsend (1975) , Abernathy's research (1976) led to propositions
concerning production process selection, inherent trade-offs associated with
these choices, and links to product life cycles. In this he provided more
detailed insights into the stated need to reconcile "production policies and
other functional polices" by proposing the hypothesised relationships among
aspects of a plant as shown in Figure 2.2.
However, it is about this time that the issue of trade-offs began to be
highlighted and developed on a more widespread basis as exemplified by its
position in Harvard Business School's Production/Operations courses and
related papers as illustrated below -
• 1975 Process Analysis: Harvard Business School Paper
• 1978 POM courses - well-established, indicating movement away from
the traditional, quantitative base for teaching POM (sometimes
referred to as the Buffa-era) to the management of the area
• 1978 Manufacturing Strategy course - this provided a capstone
programme for the Harvard Business School production/operations
management areas supported by a series of case books by Skinner
and Rogers (1968) which were devoted to a particular sector of
manufacturing eg furniture, oil and chemicals.
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Figure 2.2 Summary of hypothesised relationships among
aspects of a plant (Abernathy and Utterback, 1975)
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In addition to these extensions to some of the early ideas, there were also two
important developments to the core issue of manufacturing strategy itself in
terms of its role and composition.
The first was the work of Hayes and Schmenner (1978). The key feature of
their statement was the enlargement of the principal features of
manufacturing strategy proposed earlier by Skinner, the most important of
which were -
I) heavy emphasis on the need to recognise corporate strategy differences
as part of the rationale on which to base manufacturing investments.
It also signified and discussed some of the key alternatives as part of
this emphasis, including the dominant company orientation, the pattern
of corporate diversification and the firm's attitude towards growth
ii) highlighting, with details, the competitive priorities which, by
implication, reflect manufacturing tasks. These are specified as
embracing
• dependability	 • quality
• price	 • volume flexibility
• product flexibility
iii) establishes clear links between (ii) above and manufacturing strategy.
They saw the manufacturing mission as "once its attitudes and
competitive priorities are identified then the task of manufacturing
is to arrange its structure and management so to mesh with and
reinforce the strategy" (Hayes and Schmenner, 1978, p108)
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iv) They listed the detailed components of manufacturing as involving
- processes
	 • capacity
• size and location of plants
• kind of equipment and production technology
• span of process
- infrastructure • inventory control
• manufacturing planning and control system
• process design
• workforce
• quality control
• manufacturing organisational design
v) They emphasised the problems associated with delegating key
manufacturing decisions to "manufacturing specialists". They
argued that the more this happened the more likely it was that
manufacturing's priorities would be different from corporate
priorities in that "they will reflect engineering priorities (and) not
the needs of the business" (Hayes and Schmenner, 1978, p108)
vi) Finally, they provided insight into product and process focus which
reflected and added to the focus work of Skinner (1974) a development
which is discussed in the following section
The second important contribution was by Wheelwright (1978). This in many
ways paralleled the earlier work of Hayes and Schmenner (1978) which is
understandable given the fact that they were all at that time from the
Harvard stable. Again, he identified the most important performance criteria
as -
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• efficiency - both cost and capital
• dependability - delivery and price promise
• quality - the product quality and reliability, service quality, speed of
delivery and maintenance quality forming aspects of this criterion.
A key factor, Wheelwright believed, is how the market evaluates quality
• flexibility - changes in products and volumes
He introduced a framework which illustrates the need to identify corporate
strategy in a context of its resources and industry environment and through
the performance criteria arrive at decisions in manufacturing concerning the
important areas of responsibility within this function. Some of these are
below while a full list is given in Appendix A.2 -
• processes	 • vertical integration
• capacity	 • infrastructure
• plants
Furthermore, he introduced an important refinement, that of weighting each
criteria from a total of 100 points as illustrated in Appendix A.3. However,
the use of this discriminating procedure was used by Wheelwright to show
discrepancies between a number of vice-presidents within a company and the
manufacturing manager in terms of current and required priorities for
operations. Later, a similar exercise was carried out involving just
manufacturing department heads. The result was to "identify a number of
areas in need of a change in emphasis so that manufacturing and its
performance priorities would be more supportive of the corporate strategy"
(Wheelwright, 1978, p64-5). In the same article, Wheelwright also outlined
the procedure to be used in the "application of manufacturing criteria by
corporate manufacturing staff" for each business unit. Through the medium
of the performance criteria already detailed, the procedure identified major
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operating decisions and their relative contributions to improving business
performance. Appendix A.4 provides details of the procedural steps as
detailed by Wheelwright from his research.
2.3 NEW PERSPECTIVES IN MANUFACTURING STRATEGY
During the 1970s, although there were not many contributions to the field of
manufacturing strategy there emerged several new dimensions which were
critical in themselves and also added to the overall significance of this area.
In addition, they all reinforced the argument that a company needed to
develop the strategic inputs from manufacturing as an integral part of
corporate strategy formulation and that this should then form the basis for
selecting appropriate process and infrastructure investments. Without this
context it has become increasingly clear from my own research that the
resulting vacuum then became the target for a rafter of solutions chosen, by
definition, without strategic context and perceived as panaceas irrespective of
market need and the firm's requirements.
In 1974, Skinner developed his arguments concerning the focused factory.
These perspectives emanated from a need to recognise that factories, facing
markets the relevant dimensions of which had typically and significantly
changed, could not "perform well on every yardstick". And, though changing
markets had led to changing competitive forces the strategic issues being
addressed within manufacturing still did not reflect this fundamental
difference. He powerfully argued that the problem which companies needed to
address was not "how can we increase productivity?" but "how do we
compete?" This stark observation challenged and continues to challenge many
firms (and manufacturing function's) view of what constitutes the relevant
role of production within an organisation's current corporate strategy. To this
he added a further three "basic changes" (Skinner, 1974, p117)
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• "seeing the problem as encompassing the efficiency of the 'entire
manufacturing organisation and not only the efficiency of the direct
labour or the workforce." (In most plants, direct labour and the
workforce represent only a small percentage of the total costs).
• "learning to focus each plant on a limited, concise, manageable set
of products, technologies, volumes and markets"
• "learning to structure basic manufacturing policies and supporting
services so that they focus on one explicit manufacturing task instead
of on many inconsistent, conflicting, implicit tasks"
His conclusions were that "a factory that focuses on a narrow product mix for
a particular market niche will outperform the conventional plant which
attempts a broader mission .... such a plant can become a competitive weapon
because its entire apparatus is focused to accomplish the particular
manufacturing task demanded by the company's overall strategy and market
objectives".
In this same paper Skinner recognised the need for different manufacturing
policies to meet the demands of different products and, within this context,
restated some of the elements within production which would constitute a
firm's manufacturing strategy. The list he suggested is detailed in Appendix
A.5 and covers the prinicipal elements of a manufacturing function's set of
responsibilities.
The second development of significance within this decade came from the
work of the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) (1972) and concerns the
phenomenon of experience curves. The BCG provided evidence to show that
as experience accumulates, performance improves, and the experience curve
is the quantification of this improvement. The basic phenomenon of the
experience curve is that the cost to manufacture a given item falls in a
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regular and predictable way as the total quantity produced increases. As can
be readily appreciated, this relationship offered an important dimension to
the formulation of manufacturing strategy. It enabled companies to evaluate
and anticipate reductions in cost as the characteristic pattern is that the cost
declines (in constant f,․ ) by a consistent percentage each time cumulative unit
production is doubled.
The final substantial contribution to the development of concepts within this
field came from the Hayes and Wheelwright (1979) article entitled "Linking
Manufacturing Processes to Product Life Cycles". The title provides an insight
into the particular dimensions addressed here. It took the concepts of trade-
offs within manufacturing processes and related them to varying market
needs as exemplified by the product life cycle as a way of illustrating the
importance for a business of linking the choice of manufacturing process to
the market characteristics to its products. Figure 2.3 is a reproduction of
the relevant exhibit from their article by which they illustrated the "matching
of major stages of product and process life cycles".
The article also gives an example of the use of this concept (see Appendix
A.6) and explores "three issues that follow from the product-process life
cycle"
• the concept of distinctive competence
• the management implications of selecting a particular product-process
combination, considering the competition
• the organising of different operating units so that they can specialise
on separate portions of the total manuacturing task while still maintaining
overall coordination
Product structure
Product life cycle stage
Low volume—low
standardization,
one of a kind
I I
Multiple products
low volume
Process structure
Process life cycle stage
Ill
Connected line
flow (assembly line)
Jumbled flow
(job shop)
IV
Continuous flow
Disconnected line
flow (batch)
45
My own research in the area of manufacturing strategy had commenced in
the late 1970s. By the early 1980s I had summarised many of my views on
manufacturing which reflected the tenor and arguments of the early
contributors referred to in this chapter. As the field was still virgin territory
and, as contributors such as Skinner, Hayes and Wheelwright had provided
outline maps offering some directions, then there were many opportunities to
undertake relevant research.
I l l	 IV
Few major products High volume—high
higher volume	 standardization,
commodity products
Figure 2.3 Hayes and Wheelwrights exhibit to illustrate the
"matching of major stages of product and process life cycles" (1979, p135)
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2.4 DEVELOPMENTS IN MANUFACTURING STRATEGY AS PART OF
THE OUTPUTS OF RESEARCHERS WORKING IN OTHER AREAS
This section assesses on the work of other researchers in related fields in
terms of the extent to which they contributed to or highlighted the need for
developments in manufacturing strategy. The purpose of this review was
principally to check other potential research sources in order to provide a
more complete picture. As Figures 2.4 and 2.5 illustrate, a review of several
articles and books in the areas of marketing management, strategic marketing
and corporate strategy revealed that little mention was made of the
manufacturing function itself, let alone contributions to or identifying the
need for developments in manufacturing strategy. Porter (1980) gave most
space to manufacturing-related issues. However, while these addressed the
important areas of "buyers and suppliers", "vertical integration" and
capacity", the issue of the manufacturing/marketing interface was not part of
what was covered. The only other author (Aaker, 1988) in this review to
devote a sizeable space to manufacturing confined much of what he included
to the aspect of experience curves.
The spread of articles and books reviewed covered the pre and during
periods of the research. But, as Figures 2.4 and 2.5 show, the level of
coverage was consistently low throughout the whole period.
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Number of
Author (date)
chapters
pages
total
re
manufacturing
Marketing Management
Kotler (1984) 24 794 1.5
Frain (1986) 24 510 1
Oliver (1986) 23 425 1
Poliwoda (1986) 18 308 0
Watkins (1986) 9 161 0
Stern et al (1989) 13 514 0
Total 111 2712 3.5
Strategic Marketing
,
Johnson (1971)
Kotler (1977)
Levitt (1977)
Schoeffer (1977)
Abell (1978)
-
-
-
-
6
9
19
6
5
0
0
0
0
0
Choffray and Lilian (1978)
-
13 .5
Oxenfeldt and Moore (1978)
-
6 0
Kotler and Singh (1981) - 12 0
Boyd and Larreche (1982)
-
10 0
0Shaughnessey (1984) 17 372 0
Weitz and Wensley (1984) 30 500 0
Kotler (1986) 12 292 8
Total 59 1250 8.5
Figure 2.4 An analysis of a number of books and articles in marketing
management and strategic marketing in respect of the orientation towards
manufacturing-related issues
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Number of
Author (date)
chapters
pages
re
total manufacturing
Hofer and Schendel (1978) 8 219 0
Galbraith and Nathanson (1978) 10 155 0
Porter (1980) 16 396 55
Glueck and Jauch (1984) 10 875 1.5
Hax and Majluf (1984) 21 466 4
Ansoff (1987) 19 284 3
Below et al (1987) 10 136 0
Aaker (1988) 18 364 19.5
Morrisey et al (1988) 9 130 0
Quinn et al (1988) 16 998 0
Total 137 4023 83
Figure 2.5 An analysis of a number of books in the field of corporate strategy
in respect of the orientation towards manufacturing-related issues
2.5 A SUMMARY OF THE DEVELOPMENTS BEFORE THE START OF THE
RESEARCH
In very broad terms the work up until the start of my research can be
summarised as follows -
• Some traditional manufacturing companies had increasingly been out-
performed by others
• There was an increasing need for the manufacturing function to play its
relevant part in corporate strategy decisions given the changing nature
of markets and the fixed nature of manufacturing investment
• When companies invested in manufacturing (either process or infra-
structure) there were trade-offs which needed to be understood
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• Markets which were different and also changing. There was a need
therefore to link what manufacturing could do well (or what it would be
able to do well) with appropriate investment to the appropriate market
need.
One key theme emering from the literature was that the essential linkage
between the principal functions in a business was not adequately undertaken
in corporate strategy development. Although my personal research has
extended into several areas within manufacturing, the core of the research
with regard to this thesis centres on this issue and addresses two
perspectives -
• How does a firm provide meaningful linkage between manufacturing and
marketing?
• Are there ways of illustrating past, current and/or future mismatches
between the characteristics of a company's markets and those of
its manufacturing investments?
In the chapters which deal with my research findings, I will link my own
work to that of the early contributors detailed in this chapter and also the
continuing work of these and other contributors throughout the 1980s. In this
way, it is hoped, to illustrate areas of similarity and difference as well as
showing how manufacturing strategy, as a field of study, has continued to
develop.
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APPENDIX A
EARLY (PRE-RESEARCH START) WARNINGS OF AND INSIGHTS INTO
THE NEED TO CHANGE MANUFACTURING'S STRATEGIC
CONTRIBUTION
Appendix A provides more detailed material from the work of the principal
contributors in the manufacturing strategy field upto 1980. As with other
appendices, it has been placed here rather than in the body of the
dissertation in order to increase the narrative flow in a chapter. A short
description or detailed heading preceeds each part of each appendix in order
to provide appropriate context. Finally, all material within this appendix is
prefixed with the letter A to indicate that it is part of this particular aspect.
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APPENDIX A.1
SKINNER'S LIST OF THE TYPICAL OUTMODED CONCEPTS
OF MANUFACTURING'S CORPORATE CONTRIBUTION
Skinner (1966)lists the characteristics of the "already outmoded concept of
production" (p139) as follows -
• Long runs
• Stabilised engineering designs
• Concise product lines
• Repetitive operations by each worker
• A high proportion of the total costs spent for direct labour
• Intensive use of labour standards and incentives
• Many identical machines in the factory
• Batch process, job-shop layout, disconnected flows, and a substantial
amount of materials handling done by employees
• Industrial engineering based on breaking a job down into its parts
• Production management selected and promoted largely on the basis of
experience and proven supervisory talents
Corporate
resources
Corporate
strategy and
objectives
Efficiency
Dependability
Quality
Fleiib ility
Environment
and industry
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APPENDIX Al
WHEELWRIGHTS FRAMEWORK FOR LINKING CORPORATE
DIMENSIONS THROUGH KEY PERFORMANCE CRITERIA
TO COMPONENTS OF "MANUFACTURING STRATEGY AND
OPERATING DECISIONS**
Process: Capacity: Plants: Vertical integration: Infrastructure:
Automation Loading Size Supplier control Planning and
Product Lead/lag Location Customer control control
specificity Shifts Focus Interdependencies Work force
Intercon-
nectedness
Quality control
Manufacturing interface with other functions
PRODUCT 1
As is
Should be
Needs more (less) (14)
PRODUCT 2
42 44
4
17
24
7
15
IA
12
As is 26 20 37 43
Should be 26 30 3_6_ 31
Needs more (Iess) 0 10 (1) (5)
PRODUCT 3
As is 34 36 27 28
Should be 34 31 29 24
Needs more (less) 0 2 2 (4)
PRODUCT 4
As is 24 34 30 22
Should be 3.9. 44 20 2.5_
Needs more (less) 15 10 (10) 3
PRODUCT 5 (Parts)
As is 45 37 21 14
Should be 22. a 24 13_
Needs more (less) (23) (6) 3 (1)
	25 	 26
31 a
	6 	 0
16 15
12 12_
1 (3)
	
24	 22	 13	 15
	
a	 20	 12. ii
	
2	 (2)	 (1)	 (3)
19 16 17
20 13_ 11
1 (3) 1
17 27 27
15_ 18 _l_EI
(2) (9) (11)
31 16 18
3.1 19. 21.
4 3 3
23
24
1
19
23_
4
18
3_1
17
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APPENDIX A.3
EXAMPLE PROVIDED BY WHEELWRIGHT OF PERFORMANCE
CRITERIA DIFFERENTIATION BY ALLOCATING PERCENTAGE
WEIGHTINGS
The table below constitutes the "Current and required priorities as assessed
by vice-presidents (VP)* and manufacturing managers*."
Cost	 Quality	 Dependability	 Flexibility
VP MM VP MM VP MM	 VP MM
*Criteria totals for VP and MM for each priority - 100
Step 1
Definition of
strategic
business unit
Ak.
Define the criteria and their measurement:
Cost! price
Quality! performance
Flexibility - volume and product
Step 2
For
each
business
unit
V
Identify major operating decisions
Evaluate, using required priorities
1
Identify historical priorities
Determine required prioritiesStep 3
Step 4
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APPENDIX A.4
WHEELWRIGHT'S PROCEDURE FOR IDENTIFYING MANUFACTURING
STRATEGY DECISIONS FOR EACH BUSINESS UNIT
 
APPLICATION OF MANUFACTURING CRITERIA BY CORPORATE
MANUFACTURING STAFF
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APPENDIX A.5
SKINNER'S LIST OF SOME OF THE ELEMENTS OF MANUFACTURING
POLICY
• Size of plant and its capacity
• Location of plant
• Choice of equipment
• Plant layout
• Selection of production process
• Production scheduling system
• Use of inventories
• Wage system
• Training and supervisory approaches
• Control systems
• Organisational structure
Jumbled flow
(job shop)
Flexibility—
quality
Low volume—low
standardization.
one of a kind
Process structure
Process life cycle
stage
Multiple products
low volume
Few major products
higher volume
II
Disconnected line
flow (batch)
Ill
Connected line
flow (assembly line)
IV
Continuous flow
Dependability —
cost
•
IV
High volume— high
standardization.
commodity products
Flexibility— quality Dependability—cost
Key managemen
tasks
• Fast reaction
• Loading plant,
estimating cepa,
• Estimating costs
delivery times
• Breaking bottle°
• Order tracing an
expediting
• Systematizing
diverse element
• Developing
standards and
methods.
improvement
• Balancing proce
stages
• Managing large,
specialized, anc
complex operati.
• Meeting materia*
requirements
• Running equipm
at peak etticienc
• Timing expansio.
and technologic:
change
• Raising require°
capital
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APPENDIX A.6
ILLUSTRATION PROVIDED BY HAYES AND WHEELWRIGHT ON THE
USE OF "PRODUCT - PROCESS MATRIX"
Expanded product — process matrix
Product structure
Product life cycle stage
Dominant	 • Custom design
competitive mode • General purpose
• High margins
• Custom design
• Quality control
• Service
• High margins
• Standardized
design
• Volume
manufacturing
• Finished goods
inventory
• Distribution
• Backup suppliers
• Vertical integration
• Long runs
• Specialized
equipment and
processes
• Economies of scale
• Standardized
material
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3 METHODOLOGY
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Undertaking research in a field which is substantial in nature and yet where
at the time relatively few major developments had been made has, like any
other situation, its own mix of trade-offs. Whilst the opportunity to complete
research which may be central to some of the major issues is relatively high,
tried and tested approaches will be understandably small in number and
short on rigour.
At the start of the research programme, manufacturing strategy fell into this
type of scenario. Most of the key researchers had at the time explained little
about the methodologies they had used and what refinements, if any, would
need to be made in general or with regard to specific fields of research or
particular manufacturing sectors or firms.
The need for research was clear. The fact that the role of manufacturing was,
in part, to provide a functional response on how best to meet the
requirements of a business was agreed. Typical issues and key facets of this
functional statement had also been identified and, amongst some of the key
researchers at the time, there was a measure of agreement on what these
dimensions should be, as illustrated in Appendix B.1.
But, how these were to be identified and the way in which relative
importance was to be established had not been articulated. However,
agreement upon some of the key issues involved and the important
dimensions to be addressed had focused attention upon the link between the
market and the nature of the manufacturing investments undertaken to
support these. In itself there is nothing startling in these issues. Their
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relevance, therefore, concerned the fact that the research work had confirmed
perspectives which could be arrived at both intuitively and logically.
Intuitively in that the very essence of strategy concerns functional linkage to
the market place. Logically because the raison d'etre for manufaturing
investment is to help a company to become more competitive.
3.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES - ALTERNATIVES AND CHOICES
There are a range of research designs and methods which may be used to
undertake research into management-related fields of study. This section
briefly outlines the more important of these and concludes with an
explanation of why the methodology adopted was chosen.
3.21 RESEARCH DESIGNS AND METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION
Research designs concern the overall structure and orientation of the
research investigation (Bryman (1989). It thus provides a structure within
which data can be collected and analysed. Although several structures and
data collection methods are associated one with another, this is not always so.
For this reason, therefore, a distinction will be drawn between these two
aspects of research methodology.
a) Research designs
1 Experimental research : this comprises laboratory and field
experiments. Orpen's (1979) study illustrates the basic framework of
an experiment. There are two or more groups involved - in his work,
one was given enriched work and the other not. In this way the latter
acts as a datum point for comparison. Research work of this kind needs
to be undertaken in controlled conditions which implies the elimination
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of alternative explanations of the observed outcomes.
2 Survey research : in this method of research, data are collected,
usually by interview or questionnaire, on a range of variables. The
objective then is to assess both the importance of particular facets
and to identify relationships between two or more variables. The
degree of causality has to be inferred. Unlike experimental research,
the researcher does not intervene in an organisation.
Most survey-based researach collects data at a single point in time.
Where further questioning of respondents takes place then the research
takes on the form of a longitudinal survey.
3 Qualitative research : advocates of qualitative or interpretive method-
ologies hold misgivings about the scientific pretensions of quantitative
research (Downey and Ireland, 1979). While both quantitative and
qualitative research designs typically contain elements of each approach,
what distinguishes them is that in the latter, the emphasis tends to be on
an individuals interpretations of their enrivonment and on their own and
others' behaviour and on understanding what is going on in organisations
in participant's own terms rather than those of the researcher.
4 Case study research : case studies entail the detailed study of one or
a small number of cases. The units of anlalysis is the business or part
of a business. What distinguishes this design from qualitiative research
is the review of relevant data as a principal course of understanding
and definition.
Researchers can select as their basis of analysis a single plant or
business multiple case studies. The former provides a detailed review of
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relevant research issues aimed at agreed objectives. In multiple case
study-based research, detailed information is gathered at several sites.
In analysing the data, similarities and differences are noted to form the
basis of research evidence concerning relevant issues and objectives.
5 Action research : in action research both the researcher and members
of the organisation being studied are involved in dealing with an
acknowledged problem. The researcher structures arguments and
perspectives and helps those involved to identify preferred courses of
action to follow. The impact of implementing the agreed actions are
observed as part of the field of study.
b) Methods of data collection
Within these designs, several methods of data collection may be used. As
explained earlier, some designs are associated with certain data collection
methods while others typically use two or more approaches as part of the
research investigation. The sections which follow outline the principal
methods
1 Self-administered questionnaires : this method requires participants
to complete a collection of questions on their own and without the
opportunity to discuss or clarify any aspects embodied in the question-
naire.
2 Unstructured interviews : interviews are undertaken in an informal
style in that respondents are allowed considerable latitude in the
aspects addressed in the discussion. There may even not be a pre-
determined set of questions or aspects to be systematically discussed
during an interview.
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3 Structured interviews : unlike the last method, structured interviews
comprise specific and precisely formulated questions around which
discussion is built.
4 Observation : the researcher observes relevant activities within an
organisation in either a structured or unstructured format.
5 Archival information analysis : this method concerns the systematic
analysis of existing materials. Typically, this constitutes prime data which
are records of transacations and activities together with contemporary and
historical controls and measures of performance per se or derived from
source data.
3.22 CHOSEN RESEARCH DESIGNS AND METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION
The alternative research designs and data collection methods embody their
own rationale. Sound arguments could, therefore, be made for a number of
combinations as being suitable to meet the anticipated outcomes from
research into the area of manufacturing strategy. In deciding which
approahces to use, it was essential to select research design(s) and data
collection method(s) which would highlight the need for the research data to
be both relevant and representative. Relevant in terms of reflecting the
important issues involved and representative in terms of reflecting the
balance and relative importance of the issues addressed.
Given that manufacturing strategy is an applied field of research, the
inherent complexity within manufacturing plants does not make
investigation easy. And, even more so when the representative and relevant
dimensions relate to issues within manufacturing (itself a complex function)
and at the strategy level.
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On reviewing approaches, therefore, these factors were uppermost in my
mind. The eventual choice was based on a case study design and data
collection methods which combined structured interviews and the systematic
analysis of archival information. The principal reason was that this appeared
to be the best way of securing the necessary level of understanding of those
areas embodied in this field of research. In fact, the in-depth nature of this
type of research appears difficult to secure by alternative data collection
methods.
However, the review of alternatives raised one important issue, that of the
generalisable nature of the research outcomes. The argument that more
broadly based research designs and data collection methods lead to outcomes
which are more generalisable in nature is well articulated. The premise for
this view concerns the fact that as the research base from which the data is
collected is wider then the level of general applicability will tend also to be
wider, That case study designs normally have a relatively narrow research
base was recognised at the outset. In order, therefore, to test issues (in this
instance both methodology and product profiling applications) I decided
against using a longitudial base for a small number of case studies and
instead elected for an application of the approaches over many more
companies (ie multiple case studies).*
In summary then, the major advantages of the research method chosen was
that it combined in-depth data collection with generalisability of outcomes.
The structured interviews and systematic analysis of archival information
provided an effective way of researching the complex areas of manufacturing
and strategy. The multiple case studies then in turn redressed, at least in
* Note - the analysis of company reviews given as Appendix H.1 only
identifies core applications. The methodology was, in fact, used in
each of the 33 companies and the issues underpinning product profiling
were observed in a total of 14 applications.
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part, the narrow research base associated with some forms of in-depth
and strategy. The multiple case studies then in turn redressed, at least in
part, the narrow research base associated with some forms of in-depth
research methods. In this way, the trade-off on generalisability was
countered whilst the essential need for relevant and representative analysis
had been secured.
3.3 INITIAL METHODOLOGY ADOPTED AND USED IN THE FIELD
RESEARCH
As is common with other fields, the methodologies used in this research have
been modified over time in the light of application and a deeper appreciation
of the relevant dimensions involved. However, much of the approach has
remained unchanged in philosophy if not in detail and presentation. The
underlying feature has been to create the wherewithall to link manufacturing
decisions to the marketing strategy of a firm. Consistent with the argument of
others in the field (Skinner, 1974; Hayes and Schmenner, 1978 and
Wheelwright, 1978) the linking mechanism concerned the "performance
criteria" which reflected the nature of competition within the relevant
markets of a business. However, conscious even at the early stages of the
research that explaining the approach and issues to those involved was of
prime importance, a framework was developed to reflect this linkage and to
offer a diagramatic explanation of the steps involved (see Figure 3.1).
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Figure 3.1 Framework to reflect manufacturing strategy
issues in corporate decisions
First published by the author in article form in late 1980 (Hill), this provides a
formal record of the methodology used at the very start of the research
period. In addition to its diagramatic form, the steps to be followed were also
detailed in the same article. As with the work of earlier researchers (Skinner,
1974 and Wheelwright, 1978) frameworks and methodologies are an essential
prerequisite in the explanation to others and in the understanding by oneself.
It was recognised and appropriately stressed in the detail of the narrative of
the same article (Hill, 1980) that several important issues needed to be
recognised as being critical in these developments. The sections below clearly
illustrate this point.
•
	
"Although the steps to be followed are given as finite points
in a stated procedure, in reality the process will involve
statement and restatement, for several of these aspects
will impinge on each other. This has been indicated by
the dotted and continuous circles and shapes shown in
Figure 3.1. It should not simply be a process of determining
the manufacturing implications of stated marketing
requirements. To get the best corporate decision different
sets of decisions are considered in terms of marketing strategy
and the manufacturing implications and financial considerations
involved. This process of weighing alternatives against
each other will lead to a better corporate judgement, an
essential step in the process of determining corporate
policy.
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• "Manufacturing is concerned with detail. This does not
mean that production executives carry this perspective
into the corporate debate. It does, however, mean that
in order to understand the implications of product change,
the detailed implictions of such changes need to be
assessed.
"Whilst acknowledging the need for a broader statement
of the manufacturing task it is essential that the implications
are analysed in detail. In manufacturing, the building of
policy or manufacturing responses to corporate needs is a
two-way process; from both the top down and bottom up.
Without this two-way approach the process will be of
significantly less value." (Hill, 1980, p8)
S	 In Step 3 of Figure 3.1, "it is necessary to agree the
performance criteria which marketing considers necessary
to compete effectively. This, like Step 2, is difficult to
resolve and, as shown in Figure 3.1 by the oval shape in
the centre of the diagram, will be part of a whole series of
adjustments and alternatives. Marketing in going through
this discussion will be required to differentiate between
what is preferred and what is required, and the manu-
facturing plant and infrastructure investment alternatives
will be an important part of that debate. In simple terms,
the demands made on manufacturing are a direct
consequence of what marketing wants and how it wants it."
(Hill, 1980, p9)
•
	
"Some of the performance criteria which may be necessary
to compete successfully and hence to be provided to the
fullest extent possible are given below.
(1) Output-rated performance - embraces both cost
effectiveness and the effective use of capacity and
other production investments. This important
criterion is concerned with meeting the corporate
requirement in terms of cost (and hence price), of
which throughput is normally an important
ingredient. It would include the investment in the
process to bring this about.
(2) Delivery performance- this is both in terms of
response to the market demand and the reliability
of the delivery promise. It involves decisions on
capacity, degree of product standardisation, product
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definition, degree of customer orientation in the
product and inventory investment throughout the
system. The control of the work flow is an important
feature of the task but often has significant trade-
offs with investment and cost.
(3) Quality- product quality and reliability which includes,
in certain instances, design and development,
manufacture and after-sales service considerations.
The cost/quality tie up is an essential and fundamental
debate. This aspect also includes features such as
changes in technology both in the product and the process.
(4) Response to product demand- involves both aggregate
and timing considerations related to capacity in terms of
how well the manufacturing facilities can respond to
sales volume and product mix changes.
•	 Even though the last point listed some of the performance criteria
typically involved and recognised that the application of these on a
universal basis across all products was not implied, the need to
reinforce difference was clearly identified and articulated in the same
article. The following statement which has been taken from the same
source and follows on immediately from the last point.
"the key point here is that different products will demand
different types of performance criteria (and different
levels within each type) in order to compete successfully
within a sector of the market. This in turn will reflect the
type of performance support required from the manu-
facturing function. Over time, however, this will change
and consequently will have to be reviewed and revised
on a regular basis. How mangeable this proves to be
will depend on the range of performance demands which
are intended to be placed on the production system
Rarely can a company be run solely for manufacturing
efficiency or aimed specifically to increase productivity.
Similarly, seldom can a company be run to meet a wide
range of fluctuating demands from marketing. The
theoretical ideal posed for production of running a limited
range of products in a few colours and in high volumes and
the opposite ideal posed for marketing which reverses
these preferences are both far from the reality facing most
companies. In many instances the adjustments away from
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these extreme positions have been made intuitively often
by a give and take, commonsense mechanism.
"What is advocated here is very different to this informal
system which is often epitomised by frustration and
accusation. Initially it requires careful and detailed
working to test the trade-offs and implications of these
performance demands with one another. Then, a check is
made on the difference these demands have between the
impact on marketing effectiveness and the impact on the
overall performance or resultant consequences within the
production system. From this a best corporate fit can
then be established and worked to. Furthermore the often
ad hoc or unilateral decisions which will be made at some
future time can now be avoided and resolved, not only in
themsleves but within the total corporate framework."
(Hill, 1980, p10)
Manufacturing strategy is the final outcome of the procedure and concerns
"the investment implications of these discussions and the manufacturing
infrastructure needed to underpin these decisions. Given unlimited resources in
terms of capacity, capability, inventory investment and so on, manufacturing could
meet any marketing demands made within the bounds of commonsense.
However, there is no way in which this situation could be to the corporate
benefit even in the short-term. Consequently in the process of resolving the
marketing alternatives to meet the corporate objectives, the financial implications
of these options will loom as an important consideration. Strategies of chase or
level demand, capacity/capability changes, inventory investment, flexibility
within the process, degree of focus or range of product demands made of a
manufacturing plant will be discussed and resolved through, amongst other things,
the financial considerations involved. In addition, this aspect involves specifying
the control systems required and the work force management and labour policies
to best support the production system. These again will need to be evaluated
in financial investment terms .
 (Hill, 1980, pp 10-11)
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3A APPLYING THE BASIC METHODOLOGY WITHIN A FIRM
The following sections detail modifications to the original framework (given
as Figure 3.1) which were a result of applications within the research process.
However, though important, they are refinements rather than fundamental
changes to the core of the methodology used throughout.
In this thesis, five plant applications are discussed in detail. Two are in
Chapter 4 which concern the application of methodology explained earlier in
this chapter and three applications which concern the concepts explained in
Chapter 5. However, applications in addition to these five are referred to in
this chapter to further illustrate particular points and developments (for
example in Appendix C).
The research procedure which was followed constituted a series of steps
within the context of the approach embodied in the framework described
earlier. This part of the procedure was designed to agree, through discussion
and checked by relevant analysis, the different market segments served by a
company, the way in which orders were won within each segment, the
implications for manufacturing of supporting the relevant criteria and
assessing how well the current decisions and approaches within the
production function matched this task. The steps, in detail, are as follows
1 Marketing is asked to review the company's business and identify the
different segments perceived to exist within each of its markets
2 Marketing is then required to select a number of products which
represent the characteristics of each segment. These then form the
initial basis for the research analysis to be undertaken.
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3 As manufacturing investments are both inherently large and fixed
then it is of paramount importance that a company understands the
nature of these investments not only in terms of the technology
dimenson but also in terms of their business fit. In order to help
assess the latter, marketing were asked to review the products in
terms of the question "How does the company win orders for a
particular product within its market place?"
4 This initial view of the business serves as a mechanism to stimulate
debate within a company in terms of its markets and the competitive
forces within various segments. In addition, the representative products
give direction to the collection of data as part of the testing procedure.
The outcome is that the initial views are challenged which invariably
leads to the identification of different segments and different
criteria for winning orders both in terms of different dimensions and
the weighting given to relevant criteria. Illustrations of these outcomes
are given in a later section of this chapter.
5 For any new segments, representative products are identified and
these now form part of the overall review.
6 The procedure eventually leads a company to have a clearer under-
standing of its markets, the competive forces which operate within
relevant segments and one platform for helping to link the marketing
and manufacturing functions of the business.
3.5 APPLICATION LEADING TO CHANGES IN METHODOLOGY
The sections above not only provided an overview of the methodology used
in the early applications of the research but also detailed some of the
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important facets to be emphasised and key features to be recognised in their
application.
As with most research, procedures and relative weightings within these
approaches were refined with use. Application led to an increased level of
clarity between and within issues and highlighted key points which were
essential in nature and intrinsic to the conceptual base on which the approach
was derived. What follows is a synopsis of the important changes identified.
In addition, and where relevant, they are cross-checked to the work of and
developments made by other researchers. These, understandably, display
differing degrees of similarity with the ones detailed below which represent,
in principle, outcomes of the process of applied research.
3.51 THE COMPONENTS OF MANUFACTURING STRATEGY
At the start of the research, while the need to break out the component parts
of the manufacturing function was recognised as being an inherent part of the
approach, the need to provide structure for the wide range of tasks in
manufacturing was not fully appreciated. The simple change was to separate
process-related and infrastructure-related aspects as shown in Figure 3.2.
I 2 3 4	 1 5
Corporate
objectives
Marketing
strategy
How do products
win orders in the
market place
Manufacturing strategy
f
process choice infrastructure
•	 growth
•	 profit
•	 return on investment
•	 other financial
measures
•	 product markets
and segments
•	 range
•	 mix
•	 volumes
•	 standardisation versus
customisation
•	 level of innovation
•	 leader versus follower
alternatives
•	 price
•	 quality
•	 delivery
speed
reliability
•	 colour range
•	 product range
•	 design leadership
•	 choice of alternative
processes
•	 trade-offs embodied
in the process choice
•	 role of inventory in
the process con-
figuration
•	 function support
•	 manufacturing
systems
•	 controls and
procedures
•	 work structuring
•	 organisational
structure
Note: Although the steps to be followed are given as funte points in a stated procedure, in reality the process will involve statement and
restatement, for several of these aspects will impinge on each other.
Figure 3.2 Revised framework for reflecting manufacturing strategy issues in
corporate decisions (Hill, 1981)
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The nature of this refinement was more subtle than fundamental. However,
it provided clearer insights when explaining the research approach whilst
demanding a higher level of clarity within the research process itself. An
example of this important clarifying process is provided by the positioning of
inventory (often associated with infrastructure provision) within the segment
of process-related investments. It became clear that inventory has a distinct
relationship to the choice of process in that it "oils the wheels" of
manufacturing by facilitating the process involved to meet the needs of the
business. Developments of this kind took place throughout the period of
research and were eventually identified as sub-headings within the process-
related and infrastructure-related steps as shown in Figure 3.3. In the early
stages of the research Steps 4 and 5 in Figures 3.2 and 3.3 were not part of
the diagrams used but formed part of the narrative of articles or as part of
the explanation within an organisation. In both instances, narrative was
necessary to support the broad statements given in Figure 3.2, rather than
being provided as explicit detailed points shown in Figure 3.3 (Hill, 1989).
Corporate
Objectives
'
Marketing
Strategy
Holt , Do Products
Win Orders in the
Market Place?
Manufacturing Strategy
Process Choice Infrastructure
Growth
Survival
Profit
Return on investment
Other financial
measures
Product markets and
segments
Range
Mix
Volumes
Standardization versus
Customization
Level of innovation
Leader versus follower
alternatives
Price
Quality
Delivery
speed
reliability
Demand increases
Color range
Product range
Design leadership
Technical support
being supplied
Choice of alternative
processes
Trade-offs embodied in
the process choice
Process positioning
Capacity
size
timing
location
Role of inventory in
the process
configuration
Function support
Manufacturing
planning and contro
systems
Quality assurance and
control
Manufacturing
systems engineering
Clerical procedures
Payment systems
Work structuring
Organizational
structure
Note: Although the steps to be followed are given as finite points in a stated procedure, in reality the process will involve statement a
restatement, for several of these aspects will impinge on each other.
Figure 3.3 Framework for reflecting manufacturing stategy issues in
corporate decisions (steps involved)
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Other researchers in the field had similarly modified their original statements
concerning the approach to developing a manufacturing strategy whilst
additional insights were being put forward by others.
Skinner's research (1985) confirmed the problem of developing focused
manufacturing strategies as including the"excessively general" nature of the
manufacturing task which fails to "clearly state its implications and its
disclaimers (ie what we will not do)." In this book he also provides the
detailed stages in the development of a manufacturing task from the initial
"collection of goals" to the phase of where "the name of the game is explicit".
Also provided are examples of "explicit" targets for manufacturing against the
criteria of cost, quality/reliability, delivery performance, asset utilisation and
employee relations (Skinner, 1985, pp88-9) , a list similar to that highlighted
in his earlier statements. Throughout, Skinner, as before, emphasised the
need for a manufacturing organisation to "explicitly identify its
manufacturing task - to be explicit with and supportive of the corporation's
competition strategy and then organise manufacturing structure to
accomplish a sharp focus for that task" (Skinner, 1989, p95). In addition, he
supported this statement of requirements by advocating a more detailed
review of the components of the design of a production system in terms of
• What to make and what to buy, ie the integration issue
• Production planning, scheduling and inventory contol
• Workforce management
• Quality control
• The formal organisation
• Controls, reports and information systems
• Purchasing
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In turn, these seven dimensions were given further detail by Skinner in his
"manufacturing audit checklist process" an outline of which is given in
Appendix B.2 (Skinner, 1985, pp95-101).
Two other notable researchers (Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984) also provided
a major contribution with their book entitled "Restoring our Competitive
Edge". Many of their earlier statements on the methodology for developing a
manufacturing strategy were reinforced, for example, Table 2.1 on p31 gives
a list of the manufacturing decision categories similar to those contained in
their earlier work. However, they clearly stress the need to recognise that
strategy responses for individual businesses will often (and appropriately) be
different from one another thus reflecting the different business strategies
which exist. The idea of developing a common manufacturing strategy
implies that all businesses within a company are similar. Hayes and
Wheelwright understandably query this and set to one side the logic of this
notion (1984, pp33-35).
In addition to the work of early researchers, contributions were also made by
a number of others in the field. Many played a useful role at the forefront of
developments in the production/operations management field. Other
contributors put forward more prescriptive alternatives as a view of strategy
and argued for the application of approaches which had been successfully
applied elsewhere. These solution-orientated arguments were panacea-
driven which could take the form of supporting particular techniques or
systems or particular approaches or philosophies. Details of these
contributions are addressed at the beginning of the next chapter as a prelude
to the analysis phase of the dissertation.
Some of the major statements tended more to re-state existing proposals and
approaches in the field. Buffa (1984) for instance reinforced existing content
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statements by listing the components of manufacturing strategy . Gunn
(1987), on the other hand, challenged Hayes and Wheelwright's statement of
manufacturing strategy content and argued that "today's manufacturing
strategy objectives" comprised ones of performance as illustrated in Figure
3.4 on the next page.
The difference, however, between these lists is one of content rather than
approach. Hayes and Wheelwright identify the principal functions of
production whereas Gunn identifies a mix of outcomes to be achieved.
However, both argue that manuacturing strategy should comprise a strategic
statement for each item in the list (whether the review of a function or the
achievement of an outcome). The approaches to manufacturing put forward
by both are similar in that they comprise a view of the major components of
manufacturing and that each of these, in turn, needs to be addressed as part
of the formulation. The essential nature of manufacturing strategy, however,
as perceived through my research is derived from the need for a company to
first understand its markets. Until this has taken place the key differences
(and hence the key tasks within manufacturing) cannot be identified. Only
with these insights can companies understand the relevance of their current
and past process and infrastructure investments and identify the key tasks to
be undertaken - those which constitute the essence of strategy for this
function.
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Manufacturing Strategy
Classic factors Today's objectives
Capacity
Facilities
Technology
Vertical Integration
Workforce
Quality
Production planning/
materials control
Organisation
Shorter, new-product lead time
More inventory turnovers
Shorter manufacturing lead time
Highest quality
More flexibility
Better customer service
Less waste
Higher return on assets
Figure 3.4 Gunn's view of the change required in setting suitable
manufacturing strategy objectives
3.52 KEY ROLE OF PERFORMANCE CRITERIA
In the businesses researched, the steps which they undertook to develop a
corporate strategy principally consisted of Steps 1 and 2 of Figures 3.2 and
3.3 given earlier on pages 66 and 67 respectively. Whether by Group head
office decree or expectation, internal derivation or a combination of the two,
companies formalised a statement of their objectives (see Step 1, Figures 3.2
and 3.3). The next (and appropriate) step is to turn to the marketing function
and seek a statement of its strategy to achieve this. Typically, this manifests
itself as a build up of forecast sales revenue (Step 2, Figures 3.2 and 3.3)
which becomes the basis for potentially achieving the performance-related
objectives set in Step 1. In all the companies researched these steps were
undertaken and an iterative debate not only linked the two stages but also
ensured a fuller understanding of the issues involved in this corporate
marketing phase. The problem was that for most firms, this is where the
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strategy debate ended. The assumption was that manufacturing could
support these corporate marketing decisions. The difficulty was, therefore,
how to introduce the dimensions of manufacturing into the corporate strategy
debate at the right time and the right level.
The key to this was the role of the performance criteria. Securing an
understanding of how a company won orders in its respective market
segments provided a mechanism for bringing the functions of a business (and
particularly marketing and manufacturing) into common debate - see Figure
3.5 which is based on an outline version of Figure 3.4.
Figure 3.5 How order-winning criteria link corporate marketing decisions
with manufacturing strategy (Hill, 1985, p44)
• For marketing, it focuses appropriate attention on a firm's markets while
adding new perspectives to those classically held by this function
• It enables manufacturing to ask marketing questions about the company's
markets which required manufacturing answers
• For the firm it offers the chance to bring two of the principal functions
together and provides a mechanism enabling these key parts of a
business to replace functional arguments with corporate debate and to
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resolve functional disagreement by settling differences at the next
higher level in the organisation, that of the business. In this way,
it enables companies to agree an outcome where functional perspectives
characteristically differ by establishing what was best for the business
as a whole. In this way, an agreed set of decisions are made providing
common rules for the business as a whole. In turn, this helps set
aside differences, improves the quality of corporate strategy decisions
and enables the principal players to conduct their functional debate
and undertake their functional decisions in a business context and using
the same set of rules. Singing off the same hymn sheet is found to help
keep corporate performance in time.
3.53 DIFFERENT ROLES OF PERFORMANCE CRITERIA
Applications of the framework brought a recognition of the need to
distinguish between performance criteria both in terms of their different
roles and levels of importance.
• order winners and qualifiers - when businesses discussed the question
"How do products win orders in their market place?" it became apparent
that the role of some criteria differed one with another. This realisation
was also part of a recognition that the failure by companies to clarify
their markets was one fundamental factor in their inability to determine
corporate strategies which were multi-functional in origin, sensitive to
segment differences and built to support the particular performance
criteria within each facet of a business. Part of these role differences
was explained by the separation of two sets of criteria (Hill, 1984)
- qualifiers which get a product into and maintain a product within
a market
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- order-winners which, having qualified, are those criteria which have
to be provided to win an order from competitors who have also
qualified
The use of these distinctions facilitates discussion on markets and
enables companies to separate segments one from another as they
become sensitive to performance criteria differences. Key character-
istics included
- qualifiers get a company into and maintain it in a market but do
not win orders
- qualifiers, therefore, have order-losing rather than order-winning
characteristics
- not all order-winners are manufacturing-related (eg design and
after-sales service)
- however, as a product goes through its life cycle then typically
order-winners become increasingly a manufacturing task (eg price
and delivery speed)
• relevant criteria 'weightings - initial applications attempted to
distinguish the relative importance of criteria by asking firms to award
none through to three stars reflecting low to high importance. However,
it soon became clear that this was unsatisfactory because it failed to force
those involved to distinguish clearly, through debate and anlysis, the
relative importance of criteria. As the source of stars was endless the
result was that relative importance was not identified as too many issues
were identified as being important. The distinction between qualifiers
and order-winners was a first step. A second, was to require a company
to distribute 100 points between the order-winning criteria involved. In
this way companies were forced to distinguish the relative importance of
Product A
	 Product B	 Product C
1985	 1986	 1988	 1985	 1986	 1988	 1985	 1986	 1988
Order-Winning and
Qualifying Criteria
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different order-winners. Finally, it became important to identify any
qualifers which were order-losing sensitive. These were aspects of a
market segment which, if the company failed to continue to provide
(ie to continue to qualify) would be more sensitive in terms of being order-
losing than other qualifers. An example of the detailed outcome is given
as Figure 3.6 with further illustrations provided as Appendix C.1
Product, Time-Scale, Order-Winners, and Qualifiers
Design capability — — — 40 — — — — —
Handling design modifications — — — — 20 — 20 — —
Technical liaison support — — — 20 20 — 20 — —
Nationally based supplier 10 — — 10 10 10 20 — —
Existing supplier 10 60 90 10 20 30 — 30 30
Price 60 40 10 20 30 60 30 40 40
Delivery speed 20 — — — — — 10 30 30
Delivery reliability QQ Q - - QQ QQ QQ QQ QQ
Quality Q Q Q - QQ Q Q Q Q
Weekly volumes 2500 1500 50 — 300 700 3000 4000 4000
Note: Q denotes a qualifier and QQ: an order-losing sensitive qualifier.
Figure 3.6 The Weekly volumes, order-winners and qualifiers for products
considered representative of the three product ranges
3.54 PHASES IN MANUFACTURING STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT
The last set of developments concerned the phases in manufacturing strategy
formulation. Figure 3.7 (Hill, 1985, p52 and Hill, 1989, p47) reinforces the
iterative nature of manufacturing strategy developments which concerns
identifying the relevant order-winners and qualifiers for each segment and
then testing the level of support for the current and future criteria to be
provided by manufacturing. This checking process identifies the level of
support re q uired and the areas where current and past decisions need to be
modified in terms of both process and infrastructure investments.
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Figure 3.7 Assessing the implications for manufacturing processes and
infrastructure of order-winning criteria
However, as shown by Figure 3.8 (Hill, 1985, p55 and Hill, 1989, p50) there is
also a need to link the marketing and manufaturing strategy decisions
together, an interface which concerns the debate about the business itself.
This is one of the outcomes of developing a manufacturing strategy and is
principally designed to provide part of the essential corporate check on the
levels of consistency between the functional strategies of marketing and
manufacturing and to enable differences to be discussed and resolved within
the context of the business as as whole.
Figure 3.8 Manufacturing's input into the corporte strategy debate
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3.6 EXAMPLES OF APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK, THE NATURE
AND PURPOSE OF THE DATA COLLECTION AND TYPICAL
OUTCOMES
Although the core of Chapter 4 provides two examples and outcomes from
applying the methodology outlined earlier in this chapter, it is opportune to
give a flavour of how the framework was applied, the data collected and
typical outcomes in order to enhance the explanations used throughout the
research. What follows, therefore, are illustrations from the research which
will be described from a methodological point of view with the aim of
providing additional explanation while offering context for the next chapter.
Also, earlier in this chapter I explained that I would draw upon other plant-
based applications to further illustrate some of the points raised here.
As explained before, the key steps followed were -
• Marketing needs to provide a view of the segments served by the
business, products which represent each segment and time scales
which reflect the life cycles of these products/segments
• In addition, marketing also needs to identify the performance criteria
(order-winners and qualifiers) for each of those representative product
groups together with relative weightings over agreed time periods
The purpose of this is to offer the firm a view of its business by that function
which typically is more concerned with customer-related perspectives, and
for this to be the start of a debate about the company's markets. What
follows is a discussion which is intended to check, modify and agree the
different segments served by the business and what competing effectively in
each of these means (including discussion and additional analysis).
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This procedure although apparently simple in nature usually takes between
two and four months to complete. In fact, it is now apparent that the need to
allow adequate calendar time is a feature of strategic development which
should not be short circuited. It is essential to allow adequate debate, and
thinking time besides analysis. The stimulus for discussion is from three
sources -
• The initial statements by the marketing function in terms of segments,
order-winners, qualifiers and time scales
• The counter (or confirming) views of other functions
• Analyses relating to the performance criteria and based on the
representative products determined earlier
The debate which follows understandably generates further debate, insights
and perspectives leading to additional analyses all of which feed into
corporate discussions.
Analyses relate to relevant order-winners and qualifiers as, for example,
shown in Figure 3.6 These are further illustrated in Appendix C
whichincludes other plant-based applications other than those covered in
detail in Chapters 4 and 5. It is important, however, to bear in mind that
analyses reflect relevant aspects of the different market segments within a
business. As will be illustrated in the next two chapters, manufacturing
strategy identifies those priority areas and tasks within production that are
most pertinent to current and future customer needs. In no way is it a
blanket application to all facets of manufacturing which leads to statements
which are apparently strategic in nature but in practice are insignificant in
terms of improving overall corporate performance. Typical examples
include-
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• contribution per machine or labour hour (especially where there is a
scarce resource/bottleneck) which allows insights into price sensitivity
and the relative weightings attributed to particular representative
products
• delivery reliability - measures against agreed lead times
• delivery speed - relating customer lead times to a combination of
order backlog/material lead times and process lead times
• capacity reviews in terms of delivery reliability and speed and also
relating to stepped changes for products with seasonal sales profiles
• quality - internal and external measures, checking reject rates and
customer complaints/returns
• supplier relations in terms of all or some of the points above
In addition to these analyses, there are other manufacturing-related insights
which would be checked where relevant and in relation to the performance
criteria identified for particular market segments.
In this way, the essential analyses need to reflect the particular features of a
segment in terms of the competitive priorities which prevail and the way in
which they relate to particular aspects of manufacturing process and infra-
structure developments and investments. The outcome is the two-fold
debate illustrated by Figures 3.7 and 3.8 and an identification of the key
adjustments which need to be made, strategic directions to follow and
developments and investments to pursue. Detailed examples are provided in
the next two chapters which concern the outcomes of the research and the
conceptual developments which resulted.
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3.7 DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO OTHER METHODOLOGIES USED IN
THE RESEARCH
As explained earlier and illustrated in Figures 3.2 and 3.3, manufaturing
strategy concerns developing process and infrastructure capabilities
appropriate to a business. Furthermore, because companies typically
compete in several markets then all-embracing investments, though common
in practice, are simplistic in concept. The rationale for single solutions,
though fundamentally inappropriate in reality, is understandable in origin.
Single solutions are less costly in terms of initial investments and are easier
to comprehend when explained. The lower cost argument falls in line with
traditional economies of scale thinking. Single solution arguments are
attractive, in part, by their apparent simplicity and, in part, because they
overcome the inherent complexity derived from the need for different
manufacturing approaches to be developed which relate to the differences
which typically exist in the various markets of a firm. The costs of
inappropriateness and lack of fit are rarely gathered. Lost in the day-to-day
costs of running a business these sizeable by-products of single solutions go
undetected while adding to the complexity of managing the
production/operations function and the lack of clarity in identifying the
direction of the business overall and the functional strategies in particular.
At the operational level the additional on-costs are substantial and at the
strategic level, the lost opportunities are immeasurable.
Manufacturing's continued failure to develop an adequate and appropriate
understanding of the business and hence arrive at the conceptual base from
which it can trace its current position and from which it can build its
statements of strategic direction in the future has created a strategic vacuum.
As problems arise, companies have had no alternative but to treat symptoms
rather than causes. Furthermore, as symptoms are often apparently similar
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the result has been a solution-driven approach rather than one based on
understanding and the particular needs of a business. Panaceas have,
therefore, become the order of the day and their use, universal in its
application.
3.71 THE USE OF PANACEAS
Examples of panaceas abound. The rise and fall of preferred manufacturing
planning and control systems is a recent example. Arguments for Just-in-
time developments have replaced the advocates for materials requirements
planning with the core arguments implying that one is always the preferred
approach in any given situation. Recent collaborative research by the author
has attempted to clarify the key differences in manufacturing planning and
control systems as they relate to the differing needs of different market
segments - see Appendix D.
A further illustration concerns the concept of flexibility. For many
businesses, past investments in dedicated procsses have proved
inappropriate in terms of current markets. While this has, in part, been
brought about by pressures of competition, faced with new investment
requirements the response has often been to purchase new equipment with a
high level of flexibility. However, where such decisions are not based on an
assessment of the marketplace and an evalution of alternatives, then they
have degenerated into what is tantamount to a strategic "cop-out". "If in
doubt, resolve the doubt" has become, "if in doubt buy flexibility".
The strategic outcomes from this panacea-driven approach are often
significant due to the investment trends (even where government grants
have, or still do, reduce the capital costs involved), and the time-scales,
management attention and energy involved. These substantial
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disadvantages are further compounded by a corporate belief that the
problem has been resolved. However, there are two fundamental issues to be
resolved. The first concerns the task of clearly identifying customers needs
and the second is identifying which dimensions of flexibility are relevant
(Slack ) 1989). Without these, the hallmarks of panacea approaches prevail
where companies make relatively large investments which do not fit their
market needs or which provide dimensons of flexibility which are not
relevant to the business requirement (Hill ) 1989, pp83-4).
3.72 THE BUSINESS TRADE-OFFS EMBODIED IN PROCESS CHOICE
The final illustration concerns process choice. Firms invest in processes to
make products. Although fundamental differences between processes are
recognised, most companies fail to understand the impact on the business of
the various options which can be chosen. In addition, academics (Gaither
(1980), Tersine (1980), Stevenson (1982), Dilworth (1983), Evans, Anderson,
Sweeney and Williams (1984), Schmenner (1984), Schonberger (1985), Adam
and Ebert (1986), Buffa and Sarin (1987), Krajewski and Ritzman (1987),
Heizer and Render (1988) and Schermerhorn (1980)) have often reinforced
the technical rather than business implications of processes by adding further
light on the process similarity/dissimilarity in a technical sense whilst failing
to add anything which gives insights on the business-related dimension.
Creating groups under headings similar to intermittent and flow, machine-
paced and worker-paced or product as opposed to process-focused systems
illustrate these developments. In addition, hybrid processes such as group
technology have been described solely in a technical sense without either the
essential context or illustrating the resulting dimensions so critical to their
evaluation (Evans, Anderson, Sweeney and Williams (1984), Wild (1984),
Schonberger (1985), Adam and Ebert (1986), Krajerski and Rtizman (1987),
Heizer and Render (1988), Chase and Aquilano (1989).
Technical
specification
Business
specification
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My research clearly illustrated the need for a firm to evaluate these major
investments in terms of both the technical and business dimensions. Unless
processes are chosen for reasons based upon an understanding of the need to
meet a business as well as a technical specification (see Figure 3.9) then the
essential requirement for a process to meet the needs of the market place
rather than just the technical dimensions of a product will neither be
recognised nor fulfilled.
\ Joint dimensions in
? evaluating process
investment decisions
-/
Figure 3.9 The need to develop a business as well as a technical
specification to help in the selection of appropriate processes
Just as the technical specification of a product can be translated into a
technical specification for a process, the business specification needs a similar
translation. While the technical dimensions lend themselves to more precise
statements of requirement, the business specification concerns trade-offs.
An early recognition of this was made by Skinner (1969, p139) who
highlighted the fact that "what is not always realized is that different
marketing strategies and approaches to gaining a competitive advantage
place different demands on the manufacturing arm of the company." Thus, as
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long ago as the late 1960's, Skinner clearly and appropriately identified
manufacturing strategy as comprising appropriate support for the particular
and different market segments of a business. "The purpose of manufacturing
is to serve the company - to meet its needs for survival, profit and growth.
Manufacturing is part of the strategic concept that relates a company's
strengths and resources to opportunities in the market. Each strategy creates
a unique manufacturing task. Manufacturing management's ability to meet
that task is the key measure of its success" (Skinner, 1969, p140). In this
context, he also developed the notion of trade-offs within manufacturing and
listed some of these within the principal decision areas within this function
(Skinner, 1969, Exhibit 1, p141).
Whereas, Skinner introduced the concept of trade-offs, it was a Harvard
Business School Note first published in 1973 which more clearly recognised
the fact that process types have different characteristics to one another
across a whole range of dimensions. The differences highlighted and
dimensions selected indicated a clear recognition of the business dimension
underpinning process investments. These are summarised in Appendix E
which also gives an example of the detailed trade-offs involved thereby
extending whilst also complementing Skinner's earlier work.
These ideas were also built on by others. Abernathy and Utterback (1975)
included the concept of functional differences in their work on evolving
structures of the firm. Abernathy provided a fuller treatment of these issues
in further publications (Abernathy and Townsend, 1975; Utterback and
Abernathy, 1975; Abernathy, 1976 and Abernathy, 1978) which gave more
detailed explanations of production process structures and how they related
to technical and business changes.
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3.73 APPLYING THE CONCEPT OF TRADE-OFFS
There then followed two applications of these concepts which underscored
the principles involved on the one hand and extended the conceptual base of
manufacturing strategy on the other. The first concerned Skinner's concept of
the focused factory. Finding that "non congruent manufacturing structures
appear to be common" he posed the question of why "a fully consistent set of
manufacturing policies resulting in a congruent system is highly rare". Of the
five reasons he gave, the presence and recognition of inconsistencies between
manufacturing and the market accounted, at least in part, for four of these.
This gave rise to his argument that businesses needed to recognise the
strategic requirement to provide manufacturing with a consistent set of tasks
thereby highlighting the implications of trade-offs.
The second application was the work of Hayes and Wheelwright (1978) who
linked manufacturing process and product life cycles. By extending the
principle of trade-offs, they provided a matrix to show how to match the
major stages of product and process life cycles (see Figure 3.10). This
provided a direct link between the market place and manufacturing
processes while illustrating the need to match market needs with the
relevant set of trade-offs within manufacturing.
Others have since built on these early contributions. Schmenner (1981)
developed the concept of trade-offs still further. On the one hand he
attempted to distinguish processes more clearly than Hayes and
Wheelwrights job-shop, batch, assembly line and continuous flow. This was
illustrated by recognising the difference between machine and worker-paced
assembly lines and illustrating other developments such as a batch/
continuous flow hybrid. In addition, he extensively embellished the Harvard
Business School Note's on process characteristics as illustrated in Appendix E.
00
I
Low volume—low
standardization,
one of a kind
II
Multiple products
low volume
Ill
Few major products
higher volume
IV
High volume—high
standardization,
commodity products
Process structure
Process life cycle
stage
Flexibility— .
quality
III
Connected line
flow (assembly line)
IV
Continuous flow
Dependability —
cost
Flexibility—quality Dependability—cost
Commercial
printer
Key management
tasks
• Fast reaction
• Loading plant,
estimating capacity
• Estimating costs and
delivery times
• Breaking bottlenecks
• Order tracing and
expediting
• Systematizing
diverse elements
• Developing
standards and
methods,
Improvement
• Balancing process
stages
• Managing large,
specialized, and
complex operations
• Meeting material
requirements
• Running equipment
at peak efficiency
• Timing expansion
and technological
change
• Raising required
capital
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Product structure
Product life cycle stage
Dominant	 • Custom design
competitive mode • General purpose
• High margins
• Custom design
• Quality control
• Service
• High margins
• Standardized
design
• Volume
manufacturing
• Finished goods
Inventory
• Distribution
• Backup suppliers
• Vertical integration
• Long runs
• Specialized
equipment and
processes
• Economies of scale
• Standardized
material
Figure 3.10 A matrix to match product with process life cycles
(Hayes and Wheelwright, Exhibits I and II, pp 135 and 137)
3.74 DEVELOPMENTS FROM MY RESEARCH
The early stages of my research built on these concepts and led to my own
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developments within this aspect of methodology. These comprised a two-fold
contribution.
The first was a precise definition of processes - just as there are strong and
appropriate arguments for precision in determining the manufacturing task
within a business, then equally there is a need for a clear understanding of
relevant differences between one process and another. In terms of
manufacturing and the resulting trade-offs within a business, it became clear
that there are five classic types of processes. While there are many hybrids,
each will have its root in one of these five. Defined more fully in Appendix F
(Hill, 1983, p39, the five processes and their key differences are given below
Project - companies that produce large scale, unique products which are not
feasible to move, do so using a project process. As the product cannot be
moved, the resources have to be brought to and taken from the site where
the product is being made.
Jobbing - where the unique requirements for a customer need to be met but
where the product can now be moved, companies normally select the jobbing
process. Once the design has been specified, one skilled employee (or if the
job is of long duration, possibly a small number of skilled employees) is
assigned to the task and is responsible for the planning as well as evaluation
of the work on hand.
Batch - with an increase in volume and the repeat nature of a product, batch
is typically selected as the appropriate process. With processes laid out by
function, manufacturing begins to invest in the process as reducing costs
increasingly becomes an important task. To achieve this, product routings are
determined, jigs and fixtures made and process investments chosen to reflect
the relative increase in volumes.
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Line - a further increase in volumes will lead a company to consider line as
the appropriate process. Laid out to reflect the sequential steps in making
the product or products involved, this and related relevant investments are
designed to reduce costs in order to support price as the typical, most
important, manufacturing-related order-winner.
Continuous process - with a further increase in volumes, companies
producing certain products will select continuous process as the appropriate
method of manufacture. In this situation, a basic material is passed through
successive stages or operations and refined or processed into one or more
products, for example petrochemicals. This process is based upon two
features. The first is very high volume demand and the second is that the
materials involved lend themselves to be moved easily from one part of the
process to another; for example, fluids, gases and foodstuffs.
Furthermore, it also became apparent that batch as a process was used to
meet the needs of a very wide range of volumes which were between the
"extremes" of an order size of one (or a handful at the most) in jobbing and
the very high volumes reflected in line, a factor clearly shown in Figure 3.11.
The reality is that when products are repeated then an opportunity to reduce
costs through learning curve and process investment gains becomes available.
However, for most companies this increase in volumes does not justify going
to a line process as the volume involved (quantity x work content) is not of
the order to fully utilise a process.
The second contribution from my research concerned the nature of trade-
offs. Leading directly from the elongated nature of batch came a recognition
that to describe the trade-offs associated with this process as a single
statement failed to show the transitional nature of each characteristic as it
Project
Jobbing
unit or
one-off
Batch
Line
Continuous
process
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went from jobbing to line. In order to reflect this, a description under batch
was replaced by an arrow. However, although this was an accurate
representation in most instances, for some dimensions the transition
described earlier did not take place as batch in fact was higher than the other
processes with which it was being compared.
Low	 High
Volume
Figure 3.11 Choice of process related to volume (Hill, 1983, p39)
The significance of these issues is not just the clarity brought to a review of
manufacturing but also they were to lay the foundations for developing the
concept of product profiling, the subject of Chapter 5.
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APPENDIX  B
This appendix contains details of the content and issues of manufacturing
strategy as put forward by the principal researchers at the beginning of the
research period. Appendix BA provides a comparison between three major
contributors whilst Appendix B.2 reviews Skinner's manufacturing audit
approach.
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THE SIMILARITY OF TYPICAL ISSUES AND MANUFACTURING
DIMENSIONS WITHIN A MANUFACTURING STRATEGY
Performance criteria
Criteria
Research source
Skinner
(1969)
Hayes & Schmenner
(Jan 1978)
Wheelwright
(Feb 1978)
Price -I 1 1
Quality 1 -I ;
Volume
flexibility
W .1
Product .1 .1 .1
delivery .1 41 1
Dependability
service ; ;
Dimensions of manufacturing strategy
Dimensions
Skinner
(1974)
Hayes & Schmenner
(Jan 1978)
Wheelwright
(Feb 1978)
Plant
size and
capacity
location
Choice of equipment 1
Plant layout/logistics ;
Production process .1 1 1
Production scheduling
system ; ;
-I
Inventories ; 1
Wage system ; ; •
Supervision
Control system
Organisational structure
supplier
Vertical
integration customer
Ninlitv remit-ill J -I
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SKINNER'S MANUFACTURING AUDIT CHECKLIST PROCESS -
AN OVERVIEW OF THE KEY ISSUES
1 Make/Buy Choices
• Examine items which could be made or bought
• What does the present make or buy position imply
2 Capacity Decision
• Compared with past, present and forecast demand
• Under/over provision
• Implications of provisioning decision
3 Plant Decisions
• Number
• Size
• Location
• Focus and organisation
• Implication of these decisions
4 Equipment and process technology
• Industry comparison
• Key process review
• Implications and alternatives
5 Production planning and control
• Present systems
• Alternatives
• Implications and alternatives
6 Work-force management
• Selection
• Training
• Pay systems
• Implications and alternatives
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7 Quality control
• Quality levels
• Process design and control
• Training
• Implications and alternatives
8 Manufacturing and industrial engineering and maintenance
• Present systems and choices
• Implications and alternatives
9 Cost and Information Systems
• Present systems and choices
• Implications and alternatives
10 Purchasing
• Present systems
• Vendor selection
• Implications and alternatives
11 Formal organisation
• Present organisation
• Rank order of functions in terms of organisational emphasis
• Performance measurement and evaluation
• Implications and alternatives
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FURTHER EXAMPLES OF THE ORDER-WINNERS AND QUALIFIERS
EMINATING FROM THE RESEARCH TO ILLUSTRATE HOW SEGMENTS
DIFFER WITHIN THE MARKETS OF A COMPANY
Appendix C provides a number of examples of the outcome of applying the
framework shown as Figures 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 in the narrative. As also
explained in Chapter 3, the examples given here (and also as Figure 3.6) are
not those which are discussed in detail in Chapters 4 and 5. The purpose of
introducing these examples is to
• illustrate the extensive applications of the framework in the UK and the
USA
• reinforce the argument that as market (and segments within markets)
differ, so will appropriate manufacturing strategies
• underscore the fact that as a manufacturing strategy concerns supporting
a company's markets in a consistent way then the starting point is to
understand the nature of these markets in terms of what role
manufacturing has to provide in order to help make a company more
successful
Notes
1 Where the work was completed as part of a research team (and this is
indicated on the examples which follow), the leadership role was
always undertaken by myself
2 As throughout the research, the names of the particular companies
(where given) have been disguised
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US FURNITURE COMPANY : THE RELEVANT ORDER-WINNERS AND
QUALIFERS FOR HIGH VOLUME. MEDIUM VOLUME AND LOW
VOLUME OAK FURNITURE FOR THE STRATFORD RAND
Small Chain
1987 1989 1991
Large
Independent.
1987 1989 1991
Small
Independent_
1987 1989 1991
Large Chain
1987 1988 1989
Oak Chairs, Case
Goods and Tables
High Volume
Quality 50 50 40 50 50 40 60 60 60	 60
Price 40 40 50 40 40 50 20 20 30	 30
After Sales Service 10 10 10 10 10 10 20 20 10	 10
Delivery Reliability QQ QQ QQ QQ QQ QQ 0 00 QQ	 QQ
Design Q 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Q	 0
Design changes
New Products
Customer Relations Q Q Q Q Q Q QQ QQ	 QQ
Representative products: A1106, A1126
Oak Kitchen
Medium volume
Quality 55 50 45 55 50 45 60 55 50
Price 35 40 45 35 40 45 20 30 40
After Sales Service 10 10 10 10 10 10 20 15 10
Delivery Reliability 00 00 00 00 00 OQ 0 Q 0
Design 0 0 0 Q 00 00
Design changes
New Products
Customer Relations QQ 00 0 QQ 00 0 04
Representative product: A1085
Oak Kitchen/
Dining Room
Low volume
Quality 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
Price QQQ QQ Q Q QQ
After Sales Service 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Delivery Reliability Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q
Design 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
Design changes
New Products
Customer Relations 0 Q Q Q Q
Representative products,
A1145, A1073
Notes 1 Q denotes a qualifier
2 00 denotes an order-losing sensitive qualifier
3 The large chain did not purchase these medium or low volume items
4 Joint research undertaking
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EUROPEAN BATTERY COMPANY : ORDER-WINNERS
AND QUALIFIERS FOR SELECTED MARKETS
Product Type Al0
1986 1991 1993
Design 10 20 40
Quality 20 20 -
Delivery - speed 70 40 30
- reliability Q Q4 QQ
Price Q 20 30
Representative products A10 - 60, 82 and 110
Product Type B40
Quality
Delivery - speed
- reliability
20
20
QQ
30
20
QQ
10
20
QQ
Price 50 50 70
Technical field support 10 - -
Representative products B4016
Product Type B500
Design 50 50 50
Quality 40 40 30
Delivery - speed 10 10 20
- reliability
	 QQ	 QQ	 QQ
Price	 Q	 Q	 Q
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UK FOOD PRODUCER : ORDER-WINNERS AND QUALIFIERS FOR
SELECTED PRODUCTS
Product - Beverage (A)
1988 1991
Brand - image 50 60
- support QQ QQ
Product range 10 10
Packaging 10 -
Design 30 30
Price QQ QQ
Quality QQ QQ
Delivery-speed QQ QQ
- reliability QQ QQ
Product - Food (B)
Brand - image 35 30
- support 5 5
Product performance 20 20
Price 40 45
Quality Q Q
Delivery - speed Q QQ
- reliability QQ QQ
Product - Food (C)
Brand - image 20 30
- support 5 10
Consumer packaging Q Q
Product performance 35 35
Price 40 25
Quality Q Q
Delivery - speed Q Q
- reliability Q Q
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NORTH AMERICAN PACKAGING COMPANY : ORDER WINNERS
AND QUALIFERES FOR SELECTED MARKETS
Representative
Products Year Price
Design
Support
Technical	 Delivery
Competence	 Speed
Delivery
Reliability Quality
Sales
Support
Nationally
Based
Marketing
Market A
6 87 30 40 —	 — Q 20 — 10
88 .40 20 —	 — Q 1 o 20 10
89 70 — —	 — Q 10 20 —
12 87 70 — —	 10 Q Q 20 -
88 50 — —	 20 Q Q 30 -
89 50 — —	 20 Q Q 30 -
3	 4and 87 90 lo— —	 — Q - -
88 90 — —	 — 10 Q - -
89 90 — —	 — 10 Q - -
Market B
10 87 40 — Q	 40 QQ Q — 20
88 40 — Q	 40 QQ Q 10 10
89 60 — —	 30 QQ Q 10 —
23 and 25 87 60 — —	 20 10 10 - -
88 65 — —	 15 10 10 - -
89 75 — —	 10 5 10 - -
Note: Q denotes a qualifier and QQ. an order-losing sensitive qualifier.
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MANUFACTURING STRATEGY. PROCESS CHOICE AND
MANUFACTURING PLANNING AND CONTROL SYSTEMS
The framework developed as Figures 3.1 to 3.3 emphasises the need to link
the characteristics of markets to the investments in manufacturing. The
argument developed in Section 3.6 of the thesis narrative is that this
essential linkage characteristically fails to be established. The result is that
companies typically invest in solutions, the stimulus for which is the solution
itself rather than the business requirement which the particular investment
is intended to provide. One such area where this occurs is that of
manufacturing planning and control systems.
Collaborative research* has led to establishing a conceptual link between
manufacturing strategy, process choice and appropriate manufacturing
planning and control systems. An illustration of the results of this work is
provided as Appendix D.1.
* Undertaken with Professor W L Berry, School of Business, University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill
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APPENDIX E
TYPICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF PROCESSES:
OVERVIEW AND DEVELOPMENTS
As explained in the thesis narrative, when companies invest in processes
they also invest (knowingly or not) in a set of business-related trade-offs.
The recognition of this was first formally made in a Harvard Business School
Note and built on by others including Schmenner (1984) and myself. The
characteristics reviewed in the former reference are given here as Appendix
El and those of Schmenner as Appendix E.2. The developments I made are
reviewed as part of Chapter 5 to which the characteristics of process issues
relate.
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AN OVERVIEW OF THE HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL NOTE
ON PROCESSES
Characteristics reviewed
Suit-
ability
to
type
of
product
volume
product change
demand variation
market type
task characteristics
capital embodied technology
method of
production
Human
inputs
suitability
labour skills
work environment
labour characteristics
Material inputs raw material inventories
Production
characteristics
material handling
in-process inventories
productivity
production control
capacity control
throughput times
(manufacturing cycles)
Table 1 of HBS Note 9-674-023 also gives an explantion of how each of the
above characteristics differed depending on the process involved. The first
few dimensions above are given on the next page as an illustration but other
details have not been included. However, it can clearly be seen from these
descriptions that the business-related nature of these characteristics is at the
heart of the analysis. The other descriptions contained in the HBS Note are
similar in nature, reinforcing this perspective
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SUITABILITY TO	 LINE
	 JOB SHOP	 PROJECT/UNIT
TYPE OF PRODUCT
Volume
Product change
Demand variation
Market type
Suited for high
volume stand-
ardized product
Change is costly
since entire
process must
be changed or
balanced with
product change
Best suited to
stable demand
without heavy
cyclicality
Standardized
mass marketed
product usually
produced for
inventory
Suited for product
line that has low
volumes of identical
products and
considerable
variety in product
characteristics
Product changes
are easily
accommodated
Lumpy or uncertain
product demand
Production is
usually to order
Suited to large
high-cost
products with
little stand-
ardization
and low
volume
Well suited to
continuous
change -
uniqueproducts
Wide variation
in product
demands are
accommodated
with labour
variations
Production to
customer
Specification
or design
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CHARACTERISTICS HIGHLIGHTED BY SCHMENNER WHEN COMPARING
PROCESSES OF DIFFERENT TYPES
Features reviewed
Product
•	 mix
•	 compete largely on
•	 unlikely to compete on
•	 introductions
Process
•	 pattern
•	 linking to process segments
•	 type of equipment
•	 balance of equipment
•	 capital utilization
•	 typical size of operation
•	 economies of scale
•	 yields
•	 notion of capacity
•	 additions to capacity
•	 speed of process
•	 pacing
•	 bottleneck
•	 nature of process change
•	 place of technoligical change in process
•	 set-ups
•	 run lengths
Management
•	 staff-line needs
•	 degree of corporate influence
•	 means of control
•	 challenges
Materials
•	 requirements
•	 character of
•	 vertical integration
•	 inventories
- raw materials
- work-in-progress
- finished goods
•	 control over suppliers
•	 control over customers
•	 supplier ties
•	 customer ties
Information
•	 order handling and sales
•	 degree of information
coordination
•	 systems within factory
•	 trigger for production
•	 scheduling
•	 quality control
•	 response to cyclicality
of demand
Labour
•	 content percent
•	 job content
•	 importance of labour
standards
•	 worker - payment
- advancement
•	 end of month syndrome
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DEFINITIONS OF THE FIVE CLASSIC PROCESSES
Below are definitions of five classic processes. In many written statements
there is a failure to clarify these essential differences in themselves and a
tendency to list processes (which are, in fact )
 hybrids of these classic options)
as separate processes rather than as derivations of these classic forms. For,
without this clear understanding of the root stock on which a hybrid is based,
then the recognition of trade-off changes will not be appreciated or highlighted.
Project. Companies that produce large-scale, one-off, complex products will
normally provide these on a project basis. Examples include civil engineering
contracts and aerospace programmes. It concerns the provision of a unique
product requiring large-scale inputs to be coordinated, so as to achieve a
customer's requirement. The resource inputs will normally be taken to the
point where the product is to be built, since it is not feasible to move it once
completed. All activities, including necessary support functions, will usually
be controlled in the form of a total system for the duration of the project.
Resources will be allocated to the project and reallocated once their part of
the task is complete, or at the end of the project.
The selection of project as the appropriate process is based upon two
features. The product is a one-off, customer-specified requirement and,
secondly, it is often too large to be moved, or simply cannot be moved once
completed. The latter criterion is such an overwhelming facet of this decision
that products of this nature will always be made using the project choice of
process. However, businesses will also be concerned with determining how
much of the product to make away from site and how best to provide the
parts or sections that go into the structures made on site. These will, in turn,
be produced using a different choice of process than project. These decisions
need to be based upon other criteria, which will become clear in the
descriptions of other choices that follow.
Jobbing, Unit or One-Off. Job shops meet the one-off (ie unique) order
requirements of customers; for example, purpose-built tooling. The product
involved will be of an individual nature and requires that the supplier
interpret the customer's design and specification, while applying relatively
high level skills in the conversion process. A large degree of this
interpretation will normally be in the hands of the skilled employee, whose
experience in this type of work will be an essential facet of the process. A key
difference with regard to project is that the product can now be moved.
In jobbing, once the design has been specified, one or possibly a small number
of skilled employees (if the job is time consuming) are assigned the task, and
are responsible for deciding how best to complete and carry it out. This may
also include responsibility for scheduling, liaison with other functions, and
some involvement with arrangements for outside, subcontracted phases,
where necessary.
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This one-off provision means that the product will not again be required in its
exact form or, if it is, the demand will tend to be irregular, with long time
periods between one order and the next. For this reason, therefore,
investment in the manufacturing process (eg in jigs, fixtures, and specialist
plant) will not normally be warranted.
Batch. When a company decides to manufacture using batch processes, it
does so because it. is providing similar items on a repeat basis, usually in
larger volumes (quantity x work content) than associated with jobbing.
However, companies do manufacture order quantities of one on a batch basis.
In this instance, what underlies their decision as to which process to adopt is
the repeat nature of a product, not the size of an order quantity. Batch
process is chosen to cover a wide range of volumes, as represented in Figure
3.12, by the elongated shape of batch, compared to the other processes. At
the low volume end, the repeat orders will be small and infrequent. In fact,
some companies producing very large, one-off items will adopt a batch,
rather than a jobbing process approach, to their manufacturing. When this
happens, the work content involved will be high in jobbing terms, and often
the order quantity is for a small number of the same but unique items. At
the high-volume end, the order quantities may involve many hours, shifts, or
even weeks of work for the same product at one or more stages in its
designated manufacturing route.
The procedure followed in batch is to divide the manufacturing task into a
series of appropriate operations, which together will make the products
involved. The reason is simply to determine the most effective
manufacturing route, so that the low cost requirements of repeat, higher
volume markets can best be achieved. At this stage, suitable jigs and
fixtures will be identified in order to help reduce the set-up and processing
times involved, the investment in which is justified by the total product
output over time.
Each order quantity is manufactured by setting up that step of the process
necessary to complete the first operation for a particular product. The whole
order quantity is now completed at this stage. Then, the next operation in the
process is made ready, the total order quantity is completed, and so on, until
all the stages required to make a product are completed. Meanwhile, the
process used to complete the first operation for the product is then reset to
complete an operation for this or another product, and so on. Thus, capacity
at each stage in the process is used and reused to meet the different
requirements of different orders.
Examples include moulding processes where one mould to produce an item is
put into a machine. The order for that component or product is then produced,
the mould is taken off, the raw materials may have to be changed, and a mould
for another product is put into the machine, and so on.
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Similarly, in metal maching processes, a machine is set to complete the
necessary metal cutting operation for a product, and the whole order quantity
is processed. When finished, the machine in question is reset to do the
required metal cutting work on another item, while the order quantity of the
first product goes on to its next stage, which is completed in another part of
the process. At times, an order quantity may have more than one stage
completed on the same machine. Here the same principle applies, with the
process reset to perform the next operation through which the whole order
quantity will be passed.
Line. With further increases in volumes (quantity x work content),
investment is made to provide a process that is dedicated to the needs of a
single or normally small range of products. The width of the product range
will be determined at the time of the investment. In a line process, products
are passed through the same sequence of operations. The standard nature of
the products allows for this and, hence changes outside the prescribed range
of options (which can be very wide, for example, with motor vehicles) cannot
be accommodated on the line itself. It is the cumulative volume of the
product range that underpins the investment.
As explained in a later section, it is important to clearly recognize the
fundamental differences in terms of what constitutes "volume". In a car
assembly plant, for instance, customer order quantities are normally small.
The eventual owner of a car orders in units of one, which the dealership
passes onto the assembly plant as an order for a single car, or cumulates with
one or more other orders for single units. In manufacturing terms, however,
all orders for single cars are for products that the production process
interprets as being the same product. Hence, the order quantity of a car
assembly plant comprises the cumulative volume of all orders over a given
period. It is this perspective that constitutes the high-volume nature of this
business, and the choice of line as the appropriate process.
The wider the product range, then normally the higher is the investment
required in the process in order to provide the degree of flexibility necessary
to make these products. Where the options provided are very wide, and the
products involved of high cost or of a bulky nature, then the more likely is
the company to make these on an order basis only. For example, there will
normally be a longer delay when purchasing a motor vehicle (especially if
several options are specified) than say a domestic appliance. The underlying
reason for this is the different degree of product standardization involved.
The motor vehicle will be made against a specific customer order, and the
domestic appliance to stock.
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Continuous Process. With continuous process, a basic material is passed
through successive stages or operations, and refined or processed into one or
more products; for example, petrochemicals. This choice of process is based
upon two features. The first is very high volume demand, and the second is
that the materials involved lend themselves to be moved easily from one part
of the process to another; for example, fluids, gases and foods.
The high-volume nature of the demand justifies the very high investment
involved. The processes are designed to run all day and every day with
minimum shutdowns, due to the high costs of starting up and closing down.
Normally, the product range is quite narrow, and often the products offered
are purposely restricted, in order to enhance volumes within the other
products in the range. For example, UK oil refining companies do not offer
either one or five star petrol, with three star petrol no longer available on all
petrol station forecourts. In this way, companies have restricted the range of
octanes and increased the volumes associated with the grades that are
provided.
In continuous process, the other feature is the nature of the materials being
processed. Whereas in line there are manual inputs into the manufacture of
the products as they passed along, in continuous process the materials will be
transferred automatically from one part of the process to the next, with the
process monitoring and self-adjusting flow and quality. The labour tasks in
these situations are predominantly involved in checking the system.
Source: Hill (1989) pp55-8
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4 DEVELOPING A MANUFACTURING STRATEGY
As explained in the 'Literature Review (Chapter 2) one difficulty I faced was
how to present the available literature given the time span over which the
research had been undertaken. In order to provide an overview of the work
completed by others at the start and the areas of further research which as a
consequence, needed to be investigated in the future then a literature review
split was made to reflect this dual requirement. Chapter 2, therefore,
concentrated on the outcomes at the beginning of this research. What
follows as the first section of this chapter is a review of the work on
manufacturing strategy completed by others during the period of my
research. Its purpose is to provide the necessary background against which
my findings need to be placed.
4.1 STATEMENTS THAT THERE WAS A PROBLEM
Throughout the 1980s a growing voice continuously reinforced the message
that there was a manufacturing problem. Whilst many contributors used
this as part of their opening remarks some validly chose this as their main
statement or as part of a general statement on manufacturing businesses.
Furthermore, the source of statements continued to be widespread - Skinner
(1980), Foster (1981) and Shapiro (1987) in the US, and Foster (1980) and
Pendlebury (1987) in the UK. The more subtantial of these statements are
referenced in the following sections and further illustrate the extent and
growing sources of commentary.
4.2 STATING THE NEED FOR A STRATEGIC APPROACH IN
MANUFACTURING
Linked to the last section, there was an increasing number of statements
recognising the key need for approaching the resolution of improving overall
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performance, in part, through developing a manufacturing strategy.
However, the underlying contribution of these statements was held as the
statement of approach and not what form the approach should take.
Henzler (1982) highlights the way in which functional approaches (including
manufacturing) inhibit the formulation of strategy and emphasises the need
to review the role of production within the business context. Mehl (1983)
quotes John Madden, then coach to the Oakland Raiders, of the need for
businesses to recognises the principle of "the whole, the part and the whole"
and in particular the need to determine the business in which a company
operates and then develop a production function to support these
requirements. Ferdows, Miller, Nakane and Vollman (1986) in this and
many related statements based upon their continuing Globlak Manufacturing
Futures Survey work commenced in 1983, together with Hayes and Jaikumar
(1988) also gave strong support for this facet of the research. In addition,
several others contributed to the growing tenor for developing a
manufacturing strategy statement thus adding to the general swell of
argument which characterised the 1980s (Judson, 1984; Swamidass, 1985;
Hayes, 1985 and Business Week, 1986).
4.3 METHODOLOGY-ORIENTATED CONTRIBUTIONS
Research has different sets of objectives and consequently the output of that
research will reflect the particular emphasis undertaken. The more general
statements of need covered in the last two sections either had this issue as a
central theme or as a part of some other, large statement. As would be
expected, the extent to which a statement detailed the methodologies being
used within the field would similarly differ. To help identify some of these
key differences this section has been split into four sub-sections reflecting
different types of methodology developments.
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4.31 GENERAL STATEMENTS
Building on from the last two sections, other contributors in this period
enlarged on the "need for a strategic approach in manufacturing" (Section
4.2) towards a general statement on methodology. These offered different
levels of detail but in all instances had a methodology orientation in varying
degrees.
Typical of these levels of development is the work of Schmenner (1982),
Booz-Allen Hamilton (1984), Richardson et al (1985), Blois (1986) and
Montgomery and Hausman (1986). Schmenner's work identifies four distinct
multiplant manufacturing strategies in terms of product, market area,
process and general-purpose plants and orientates the reader towards
identifying the roles of plants and the need to assess their appropriateness in
terms of the markets they serve. Booz-Allen and Hamilton (1984, p4)
outline a general approach to the development of a manufacturing mission
and argue that the fundamental task of this statement is to help resolve the
key issues of plant size, plant focus, level of response capability to meet the
changing needs of a market and the location of a plant. The paper later
illustrates general perspectives regarding product/market segmentation and
provides insights into a number of different issues. Building on the work of
others, Richardson et al identify the relevant strategic alternatives as those
between cost, quality, volume, delivery and design and then link choices to
an evaluation of manufacturing performance. Based on this research they fit
the identified "manufacturing task profiles" as being new product centre,
custom innovator, cost-minimising job shop and cost minimiser. Having
previously identified six different corporate missions they argue that the
strategic task is to link these profiles to the relevant corporate mission.
Blois (1986) continues the identification of general statements of
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methodology encompassed in linking flexible manufacturing systems (FMS)
to marketing by listing the classic areas of conflict between the two functions
and uses FMS capabilities to highlight ways of overcoming them. Just as the
latter contribution was provided by researchers with a marketing base, the
final, specific contribution concerns a mix of marketing and manufacturing
researchers. These later contributions were, to some extent, an outcome of
developments in manufacturing strategy in that for the first time they
offered a way of interfacing researchers from both areas of study.
Identifying the market from a similar base provides a common set of
interests and a way of resolving differences. Montgomery and Hausman
specifically identify interfaces. Rank ordering typical manufacturing
objectives relating to cost, quality, reliability, dependability and flexibility
becomes their basis for strategy development. Their article then selects
issues and illustrates the benefits to be derived from this strategic
coordination.
In addition to the more specific contributions within the section, others,
including Bouldon (1981), Fieldman (1988) and Schmenner (1988), also
provide general statements relating to strategic development within
manufacturing and its role and importance within a business.
4.32 PANACEA-RELATED APPROACHES
Other contributors within the field argued for particular approaches as being
universally applicable or adaptable to meet the needs of businesses in
general. Within this theme, one of the principal arguments was for the use
of approaches developed and used with great success by Japanese
companies. Calling for just-in-time, quality circles, total quality
management-type approaches to be used these contributors argued that
these approaches were the essence of a suitable, general manufacturing
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strategy. Cole (1980), Bolwijn and Brinkman (1987) and Boer and
Krabbendam (1987) all advocated these directions as the appropriate
strategic response from manufacturing. Others (Parnaby, 1979, 1985, 1986
and Ferdows and Lindberg, 1986) also included Japanese approaches as part
of their strategic argument. The final contribution in this theme is the
Institution of Production Engineer's book (1986) on manufacturing strategy.
Although later I will argue against panacea related approaches in general,
this latter contribution was an extreme example of the low level of value
which solution-orientated approaches offer. Comprising a number of
superficial statements, it put forward a mixed bag of approaches in an
uncoordinated and incoherent way arguing that these were appropriate
examples of manufacturing strategy formulation.
4.33 STATEMENTS REINFORCING EXISTING APPROACHES
Several contributors provided support for the pre-1980 developments
detailed in Chapter 2. Some (such as Hayes, 1981; Wheelwright, 1981; Hayes
and Wheelwright, 1985 and Skinner 1985 and 1986) were important
reinforcements of their earlier work. The back-to-back articles by Hayes
(1981) and Wheelwright (1981) underlined the deep-seated understanding
of strategy formulation within many successful Japanese companies and the
fact that they paid "a good deal more than lip service to the goal of making
operations and strategy mutually supportive" (Wheelwright, 1981, p69).
However, and more so in the case of Wheelwright, the opportunity was used
to reinforce the approach to manufacturing strategy they provided earlier.
In 1984 they jointly authored a major book in this field. A mix of
production/operations management and manufacturing strategy, this
contribution drew together and built on their earlier work.
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Although as implied by the last statement, their book is a major and
important statement in the field of production/operations management and
manufacturing strategy, this section sets to one side aspects within strategy
which do not relate to methodology issues (for example, long-term capacity
strategies, focus, vertical integration and sourcing and managing changes in
manufacturing's technology and structure, the subject of Chapters 3, 4, 5, 9
and 10 respectively of Hayes and Wheelwright (1984). As mentioned earlier,
the substance of the methdology put forward by them was drawn from their
earlier work. Their additions included a recognition of the need to highlight
importance but their approach still failed to provide a way for an
organisation to gain the level of clarity and insight to enable it to recognise
and build differences. As shown in Appendix G.1 their suggested approach
reviewed all eight differences of manufacturing strategy for each business.
It recognised the need to develop a strategy to reflect each business but the
mechanism of symbols offers too bland an approach for these critical
differences to be identified. Whilst they recognised the need for different
manufacturing strategies for different businesses, they still perceived the
relevant dimensions of a strategy to be the same for all businesses and failed
to provide within their proposed approach a way of clearly separating the
relative importance of each dimension within a company.
Their other notable contribution to methodology concerned identifying four
stages of development in manufacturing's strategic role. Shown in more
detail as Appendix G.2 they outline the stages as
• Stage 1 - minimise manufacturing's negative potential:
"Internally neutral"
• Stage 2 - achieve parity (neutrality) with competitors:
"Externally neutral"
125
• Stage 3 - provide credible support to the business strategy:
"Internally supportive"
• Stage 4 - pursue a manufacturing-based competitive advantage:
"Externally supportive"
As shown in the Appendix, these headings are supported by additional
statements which give further detail.
Although this perspective offers a useful summary of the stages involved, its
contribution is one of a general statement of outcome rather than a specific
statement of process.
At about the same time, Skinner (1985) also published a book within this
field. It was a publication, however, which summarised his position as can
be seen by the fact that of the twenty chapters, fifteen were reproductions of
previously published work. However, of the new contributions, two concern
methodology. Whereas one (Chapter 8) largely restates existing work, the
other (Chapter 7) clearly identifies the need for manufacturing strategy to be
recognised as "an effective, pervasive philosophy of manufacturing."
(Skinner, 1985, p85). To illustrate, he argues that
1 Corporate strategy, marketing, industry technology or industry economics
are not fully studied, thought-through, and incorporated into the thinking of
the manuacturing team and the task statement.
2 Statements of a manufacturing task fail to go beyond a ranking of criteria
for judging manufacturing performance into a set of priorities. For example,
"the highest priority is reduced lead times; second is cost; third is quality..."
126
3 The manufacturing task is excessively general - it does not include specific
objectives or standards and does not identify which of these are going to be
the most difficult to attain.
4 The manufacturing task does not clearly state its implications and its
disclaimers (eg what we will not do). (Skinner, 1985, p86)
From his research he also identified the stages in the development of a
statement of manufacturing task as
• Stage 1 - a collection of goals
• Stage 2 - goals with priorities
• Stage 3 - "musts" with priorities related to the corporation's cricitcal
strategic needs for successfully competing in its industry
and financing its growth
• Stage 4 - the "name of the game" is made explicit
• Stage 5 - the manufacturing task statement (Skinner, 1985, pp88-92)
What Skinner does, therefore, is stress the outcomes of an appropriate
manufacturing approach and in doing so underlines some of the specific
issues which must be addressed.
In addition, there were several contributions which primarily reinforced the
methodologies put forward by Skinner, Hayes and Wheelwright. Kamran
(1981) reinforced the general issues involved and stressed the need to
develop a manufacturing mission from an understanding of the market. He
outlines a "strategic manufacturing process" (Kansan, 1981, p35) but
provides no detail on how to complete this. Stobaugh and Telesio (1983)
stressed the need to identify the market giving the general dimensions of
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cost, product flexibility, volume flexibility, product performance and product
consistency as the means of explaining the manufacturing task. These,
together with explanations of linkage between product strategies and
manufacturing related to and reinforced earlier statements. Similar
reinforcement was also provided by Gudnasson and Riis (1984) and Chase
(1987) which gave a checklist of a number of approaches.
4.34 METHODOLOGY DEVELOPMENTS
Although statements confirming the fact that manufacturing's strategic
contribution was low, those re-stating the need for a strategic approach in
manufacturing and those reinforcing existing approaches to manufacturing
strategy development were important contributions to the area, the
conceptual base of the field of manufacturing strategy was still far from
adequate. In particular, the methodology for developing a manufacturing
strategy had not progressed much further than the early work of Skinner,
Hayes and Wheelwright. Although several of the already-quoted researchers
had added to the aspect of approach, their contributions were usually in the
form of observations or comments.
However, there were some developments which took the methodology a
stage further. In all instances they did not progress the basic concepts
themselves but did provide the important dimensions of clarity and identity.
The first of these was Mayer and Moore (1983) whose paper introduced two
important dimensions in the development of manufacturing strategies
appropriate to business needs*
These, in fact, were part of the work of Booz-Allen and Hamilton, a
management consultancy firm and are also available from other sources
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1 The clear recognition that a company's markets were different, a
fact which should always be developed
2 That not only do the relevant "competitive success requirements"
need to be identified for each segment but the importance of each
had also to be assessed. Their work scored these differences as
'dominant', 'next in importance' and 'least important'.
The other contributors were Cohen and Lee (1985) and Fine and Hax (1985).
Both stressed the need to link the particular dimensions of the market to the
relevant elements of manufacturing. The former built quite clearly on the
work of Skinner, Hayes and Wheelwright. Identifying the "operationally
significant performance measures" as related to "cost, quality, service and
flexibility" they recognised the need to link these to the five important areas
of product, process, facilities, control and organisation and within those
identified twenty-two relevant decision areas (Cohen and Lee, 1985, pp156-
7). This is supported by their "manufacturing strategy paradigm" which
required that first, a company's market segments are to be separated, then
an assessment of these is to be made in terms of their "operationally
significant performance measure" and finally these are to be linked through
to investments in the relevant decision areas referred to above. The work is,
however, theoretical in use but the linkage arguments are clear, providing a
detailed methodology statement.
Fine and Hax (1985) also clearly stressed the important feature of integration
within the development of a manufacturing strategy. This they recognised as
being between the major functions within a business and the need to link
manufacturing strategy to business strategy (Fine and Hax, 1985, pp31 and
57 respectively. They also (as with Mayer and Moore) highlighted the need
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to differentiate between the relative importance of the "external
performance measures" of "cost, quality, delivery and flexibility". This
should be achieved by weighting out of one hundred points which needed to
be supplemented by a "subjective assessment ... of the competitive
performance of each product and its most relevant competitors in each of the
performance criteria". The four categories ranged from Very high weakness'
to 'very high strength'. (Fine and Hax, 1985, p39)
4.4 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE METHODOLOGY FOR
DEVELOPING A MANUFACTURING STRATEGY
In Chapter 3 the methodology outcomes of my research were reviewed.
Before illustrating applications of this approach, it would seem appropriate to
briefly summarise the key perspectives which my research contributed in
terms of the methodology for developing a manufacturing strategy
• Most businesses are different
• It follows, therefore, that manufacturing strategies must reflect these
differences
• As process and infrastructure investments are to be made to support
the needs of a market, then a clear understanding of the dimensions
of each market needs to be established
• As most businesses are different, then the way in which orders are won
will be different. This will involve different order-winners on the
one hand and greater emphasis of a particular criterion on the other
• As the key is distinguishing market differences, then all ways of
helping to achieve this need to form part of the methodology
• Proposing similar dimensions for all businesses, therefore, will
blurr rather than clarify this important facet of the procedure
• Qualifiers, order-losing sensitive qualifiers and weighted order
winners (including non-manufacturing related criteria) are an
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important step in achieving adequate clarity on which to base a
manufacturing strategy and subsequent investments
4.5 OVERVIEW OF APPLICATIONS RE METHODOLOGY AND OTHER
MANUFACTURING STRATEGY RESEARCH ISSUES IN THE PERIOD
1979-1989
During the period of the research I undertook thirty-three plant-based
applications relating to the field of manufacturing strategy. Appendix H.1 gives
details of these while Appendix H.2 summarises them by year and the principal
type of application.
A review of these shows that several aspects within this field of research were
addressed by this range of applications. At the time of writing-up the research
findings, two questions needed to be resolved. Which aspects to include and
which applications to use as the basis for illustrating the research findings
involved.
The decision reached on which aspects to include was based upon the level of
contribution to the particular facet of the area and its perceived importance.
With this in mind I chose the developments in manufacturing strategy
methodology and product profiling. The first was selected because I consider it
to be fundamental to the area itself. The second was selected because of its
level of contribution to new knowledge.
Having made this initial decision then the issue of how best to illustrate these
aspects needed to be addressed. For product profiling the number of
appropriate applications limited the choice for me. In the case of methodology
developments I selected the first application I undertook (HQ Injection
Moulding) and one completed in 1986 which followed the developments I
made by that time and was also a clear example of both methodology
development and segmentation.
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It is opportune to make a final comment about the plant-based applications
and their obvious anonymity. Many companies are more willing to allow the
plant-based research to be written up in one of various forms providing that
the actual company name is not used. This, together with the fact that a plant's
financial and other commercial data is not generally made available (accounts
are published in a consolidated form) then they do not feel as though the issues
can be traced to their origins. For the companies involved, therefore, any
commercial sensitivity is removed while for the researcher the issues and
substantiating data are not restricted. On the contrary, a company is more
willing to provide access to key data under these arrangements.
4.6 DEVELOPING A MANUFACTURING STRATEGY : HQ INJECTION
MOULDING COMPANY*
The final sections of this chapter relate to applications to two different
companies of the framework which I have developed. They illustrate the
essential insights which companies require in order to evaluate strategic
alternatives from a manufacturing as well as a marketing perspective. Only
then is a company able to evaluate which of the strategic directions is best
for the company as a whole.
HQ Injection Moulding had been a major components supplier to the domestic
appliance industry prior to its acquisition in 1966 by one of its customers. At
the time, it had its own range of homeware products and supplied
components to other industries. By the early 1970s, the parent Group
accounted for over 50% of existing capacity (Appendix 1.1 shows the make-up
of machine sizes in 1972 and 1979, the year immediately before the research
in this company commenced). About 1972, the Group was re-structured and
notice was given that the Group requirements on the company
*The Company name has been disguised
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would be phased out over the following two years.
This was not the only problem. The company's homeware range also faced
competition from small firms who were able to compete effectively in this
sector of the market.
The consumer saw the company's homeware products as plastic first and
homeware second". "The traditional image of plastic as a cheap and transient
material dominated, and HQ competed in the market place on price. Thus,
faced with the loss of 50% of its sales revenue, the company had three
strategic options
1 To downsize to some 50 percent of its current size
2 To attempt to grow the sales of its current homeware products to
make up the shortfall
3 To introduce a new range of products to fill the gap
'fhe outcome was that the company evolved a marketing strategy to design,
manufacture and sell ranges of high quality products. This would enable it to
compete in a different sector of the market where price was not the dominant
order-winning criterion. Over the years, the company designed several
ranges of new products and the mould introductions associated with this are
summarised as Appendix 1.2
4.61 MANUFACTURING
A brief outline of the process is shown as Appendix 1.3. Starting with the raw
materials, a moulded product was produced. Certain subsequent operations,
such as removing the sprue (ie excess plastic) from the mould passageways -
by hand, knife or drill, checking the quality of the moulding,
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and first packing operations, were all completed at the machine. The
products were then transported in containers to the work-in-progress storage
area. From there they were withdrawn as required by the Assembly
Department, who completed any sub-assembly operations (eg gluing or
welding components), assembly (eg fit lids to bases and attach labels), and
finally packed into inner and outer cartons, prior to transportation to the
Finished Goods Warehouse. With many of the products from the original
product ranges the assembly and packing was completed during the moulding
process as the work content was relatively small due to the bulk style of
packaging involved.
4.62 RAW MATERIALS
The advent of the new range of products brought with it a significant increase
in raw materials types and colours. In order to support the new product
concept, more expensive materials were introduced and the colour range was
widened. Also the 'old' products had tended to be moulded where close
colour matching was not required and the material specification was less
critical. Moreover, the 'new' products were clustered around a 'matching'
range of products as a strategy to enhance sales with the purchaser having
bought one item for the home would be more likely to buy another item of
the set when next purchasing. This meant that it was necessary to maintain
colour match over a long period of time.
4.63 DESIGN
Over the years, Design had expanded to become a separate function with a
manager and four staff. Their job was to liaise with customers (often large
department stores), agree design detail and then complete the drawings. The
manager of the Tool Room then undertook to make or sub-contract the
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moulds and get them into production. The Tool Room always had one
draughtsman who dealt with mould modifications.
Technical services
In the early 1970s, the technical support to the Mould Shop varied and
included:-
1 Contribute to the design of a mould at the start of the mould-making
process
2 Get new moulds to a production state and establish the settings and
adjustments to be made in all future runs
3 Fine tune a mould at the start of its production run (very important
in terms of productivity)
4 Help to determine the necessary modifications to a mould
Before the switch in product concept, those who provided technical services
would have spent most of their day on task 3, but increasingly, due to the
new product strategy, the technicians spent the majority of their time on the
other three tasks.
In the early 1970s, the priority was to concentrate on thinning product wall
thickness and reducing cycle times because, particularly with the long
production runs associated with the old type products, this kept costs down.
In addition, the mould was made as cheaply as possible and black plastic was
used wherever possible so that re-ground plastic of mixed colours could be
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used. Also, contrasting colours for lids and bases was employed to avoid the
need to colour match - a requirement which could only be consistently
achieved if the lid and base for a product were produced on the same mould:
in turn, this would increase the size of the mould (and hence machine) and
increase overall costs.
The new products changed this. Wall thicknesses were increased to give
products greater rigidity and substance, colour match became critical, lids
and bases were the same colour, quality took precedence over cycle times,
packaging became far more important and quality became the order of the
day. The reprecussions of this on the shop floor were considerable. A new
team had to be trained and pre-moulding treatment of material became
necessary to achieve the necessary colour and quality standards.
Many exisiting machines were old and were often unable to meet or maintain
the new product specifications. Until new machines could be justified,
sanctioned and installed many preliminary operations were necessary to
overcome the inadequacies of the old machines. As an estimate, due to wear
and tear, only some 25% of the machines were up to the technical
specifications required.
On the technical side, the existing fitters also had to be re-trained to set up
moulds with complicated water circuits, heating sub-systems, temperature
controls and complex core-pull and ejection systems. A new class of staff, the
technician, became necessary. Recruitment from outside proved fruitless, and
so the best setters took on this role with the best operators replacing them as
setters.
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4.64 MOULD SHOP
The product changes had brought with them a totally different manufacturing
situation. In the early days of the product change strategy many technical
difficulties had not been foreseen. These ranged from the inadequancies of
many old machines to do the job through to the moulding properties of the
new materials. Jobs had often to be allocated to a larger machine in order to
achieve the required product specification (ie the increased locking pressure
provided was needed to keep the mould closed during machine cycle hence
avoiding 'flashing . ). Also, great difficulties were being experienced with
colour matching especially in the bright, modern' colours now being used.
Over the intervening years, many of these initial difficulties (and many more
besides) were overcome but, in so doing had resulted in a lot of pressure,
effort and cost. At times the company could have upto 7 or 8 of the machines
working on new products which effectively meant no production and a
complete loss of productive standard hours from some 30% of mould capacity.
The problems of trying to complete the tasks of a development unit and a
production unit under the same roof and calling on the same capacities and
skills proved enormous. The pressure of achieving deadlines, particularly
when little or no slack time had been allowed in the plan (the
design/customer agreement phase always absorbed whatever slack there
was), required all management's attention so that normal production had to
"look after itself".
As shown in Appendix 1.1 the available production capacity had shifted
towards larger machines in actual numbers and markedly as a percentage of
the total capacity available. To keep moulding costs down had moved the
argument towards multi-impression moulds whereby every cycle produced a
'shot' with each of the impressions in the formed state (eg two lids or two
137
bodies or two lids and two bodies and so on). Of course, multi-impression
moulds are always much larger and much more sophisticated. These, in turn,
required larger machines and accounted, in part, for the drift away from the
machine mix of the early 1970s. In addition, mould changes and set-ups took
longer. Details of a representative sample of products throughout the current
range is given as Appendix 1.4. Besides the cost advantages inherent in
multi-purpose moulding, particularly with high volume production runs,
another advantage gained was that it facilitated the moulding of a product
which had more than one component and where colour matching was
essential.
Part of the production management's job was to consider ways of reducing
costs throughout the process wherever possible. Some of these suggestions
came from marketing pressure in addition to the continuous flow of ideas
from manufacturing itself with the aid of support services such as Work
Study, Tool Room and Design. Appendix 1.5 gives cost breakdowns for some
representative products from across the current ranges.
The Assembly Department undertook sub-assembly, final assembly and
packing, and was located away from the Mould Shop in a 50,000 square foot
warehouse which also contained work-in-progress and some of the finished
goods stock. The work of this department had increased with the need for
packing and presentation which accompanied the new products. At the other
extreme, any assembly or packing of the industrial products was mainly
carried out at the machine. There were at the time of the research some 17
assembly benches and 3 sub-assembly locations, with 27 full-time and 16
part-time packers, and an indirect staff of three.
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4.65 FINISHED GOODS WAREHOUSE
Although the product quantities had decreased since the early 1970s the
requirement for warehousing was considerably higher. Reasons for this
included:
1 Sub-contract industrial work for the group was moulded on a contract
basis and shipped daily to the various companies.
2 The traditional homewares and industrial products were packed several
together inside a box or polythene bag.
3 Components required to assemble the new ranges of products were
greater.
4 The emphasis on quality meant that components had to be stacked
with greater care.
5 The new products were packed individually in inner boxes which
increased the space requirement at the finished goods stage.
Work-in-progress and finished goods warehousing capacity had been
increased significantly as shown in Appendix 1.6.
4.66 PRODUCTION CONTROL
The new range of products presented a new set of production control
problems. The number of components and the assembly and packing
requirement had increased the complexity of the process - see Appendix 1.4.
In addition, the uncertainty inherent in the mould-testing process, the
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procedure for agreeing packaging, and the need to meet tight launch dates
had added factors which made planning and control far more difficult.
In addition, the Marketing Department often required additional colours in
order to increase sales in existing markets or break into new markets. An
example of such a request is shown as Appendix 1.7. These short runs and
special colours often had target dates which necessitated fitting them in at all
stages of the process at the expense of normal production runs. It proved
most difficult to balance the two sets of priorities.
4.67 MARKETING
The Marketing Department was split into product areas and sub-divided into
home and export. Each sub-division had a sales manager. It was well
recognised that the improvement in the company's performance during the
period (see Appendix 1.8) was a direct consequence of the marketing strategy
decision to go into the high quality product segment. The new product
direction had enabled the company to compete successfully in a new sector of
the market and, not only had it overcome the sales shortfall, but also
underpinned the marked increase in profits. The markets for the two
products the company currently manufactured and sold were very different.
Sates of the old product were normally negotiated on a large volume contract
with call-offs to meet the agreed customer deliveries. In the new markets,
retail outlets hold the product ranges but the mix of products and colours
meant that often the company needed to be able to supply orders within a
few days. For, if the exact product wanted by customers was not available at
the required time then often the sale was lost as the customer would spend
the money on something else altogether.
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4.68 MANUFACTURING STRATEGY REVIEW
The need to rethink the corporate position was an essential task and, a
review of the 1973 to 1979 performance, clearly shows that sales (indexed
on 1973) stood at 318 and profit before tax at 719. The company were
concerned, however, with the increased inventory over the period with 1979
standing at 980 compared to its 1973 index.
The research initiative was, in part, concerned with this inventory position.
However, in order to provide context, an early step was to ascertain the
performance criteria which related to the 'old' and 'new' products,
respectively. Appendix 1.9 provides these insights.
A brief review of the order-winners for the new products shows that, through
many of the actions taken earlier, the company had met the requirements of
product concept, quality and design leadership through its relevant investment
in processes and infrastructure. It also identified that the aspect of delivery
speed had been met by increasingly higher levels of inventory. It was only in
this way that the company could support the quick response times required (ie
the criterion of delivery speed). For 'new' products, therefore, manufacturing
had to take its part in the supply provision to the customer by holding
inventory. The wide range of products and colours made it impossible for a
retail outlet to hold all products in all colours.
4.69 THE IMPLICATIONS FOR MANUFACTURING OF PROVIDING THE ORDER-
WINNERS FOR 'OLD' PRODUCTS
Manufacturing's support for these markets is to provide low-cost
manufacturing. It has done this by concentrating its efforts in the area of
highest costs - see Appendix I.10. It kept costs down as follows-
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• raw materials
• moulding costs
• assemble and packing
- thin sections
- lower grade of raw materials
- limited colour range lead to few colour
changes and associated material losses
- use of black allowed the opportunity to
use mixed colour re-grind
- long production runs with fewer colour
changes and associated production losses
- no colour matching betwee nlids and bases
meant that lids could be run separately
from bases. This, in turn, meant that the
cycle time for lids could be faster (the
mould takes a shorter time to fill and
therefore can cycle at a faster speed)
and need not be tied to the slower cycle
time for bases as with the new products
- multi-impression moulds, with average
production runs of 155 and 276 hours
were eminently sensible as a way to
reduce costs and, more importantly,
release capacity - see Appendix 1.11.
- products were tapered to allow stacking
and associated bulk packing - one outer
(eg a polythene bag) would typically
contain 6 or 12 products
- bulk packaging also provided the
opportunity to pack on the moulding
machines as the packing need was only
once per 6 or 12 cycles - hence no
additional packing costs
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- nesting products inside one another
meant lower space requirements and
associated warehouse costs.
It can be seen, therefore, that the company's manufacturing strategy for 'old'
products supported the relevant order-winner.
410 THE IMPLICATIONS FOR MANUFACTURING OF PROVIDING THE ORDER-
WINNERS FOR 'NEW' PRODUCTS
The new products which were the most difficult for manufacturing to provide
were those which have the following characteristics
a) the lowest product demand in a range
b) the lowest colour demand in a range
This was because these represented very low production volumes especially
compared to the 'old products'. Furthermore, the average volume for new
products was significantly smaller (at 64, 56, 76 and 62 hours) than for old
products (at 276 and 155) hours - see Appendix 1.11. In addition, the
demand for the low-low products would be tiny especially given the
increased mould and colour change times. The trade-offs faced by
manufacturing therefore, have been between loss of capacity and very high
excess costs as shown in Appendix 1.66 which relates manufacturing
performance when moulding very low volumes of sample colours for
marketing and inventory.
Manufacturing's decisions had been to produce inventory. Thus, finished
goods inventory was not only large but it was suspect in terms of potential
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obsolescence in what was a fashion market. This now reflects the extent of
the company's inventory problem. For, if the inventory was suspect, so was
the company's profit and overall performance, a fact which reversed the
company's view of its success in the period.
By going back to the relevant order-winning criteria for 'new products, it
became clear that manufacturing had supported these criteria effectively and
the overall corporate performance was sound. The only problem was the
high level of inventory holding especially given the now apparent slow-
moving/obsolete nature of much of this investment outlined above.
The question facing the company concerned whether there was an
alternative manufacturing strategy for 'new' products to the one currently
pursued which would support the corporate marketing requirement of
delivery speed without the severe disadvantage of creating slow-
moving/obsolete inventory.
Reviewing some of the background factors helps to build a picture of what
had happened
a) the company had pursued a policy of multi-impression moulds, other
than those where there is a colour problem matching lids to bases
b) large moulds need larger machines - hence the machine mix change
between 1972 and 1979 given as Appendix 1.1.
el when a company has large machines it will increase the tendency to
design large moulds in order to create a fit between moulds and machines.
Hence, the move towards large machines is self-reinforcing
144
d) the wide colour range and wider product range philosophy created a
situation of shorter production runs involving more colour changes - see
Appendix 1.4 for production run information and in the increased colours
involved in the company.
e) large moulds resulted in longer set-up and colour changes (see Appendix
1.4). The large moulds and large machine philosophy further emphasised the
inflexibility of the process and the unfavourable ratio between set-up time
and run length. To correct this, manufacturing artificially increased
production volumes by making inventory.
f) this led manufacturing into a finished goods inventory policy as the only
way to support the delivery speed criterion in a situation where small
production volumes created large excesses and loss of effective capacity
through the high levels of down-time incurred with set-ups.
g) similarly, the policy of multi-impression moulding increased mould size
and, more importantly, reduced production run lengths.
h) however, producing a lid and base on the same mould whilst necessary
for colour matching did not decrease the production run length as only one
product would be made per shot.
i) the new products were not price sensitive and moulding costs were not an
important part of total costs.
An alternative manufacturing strategy for new products was, therefore, to
use small, non multi-impression (except for colour matching lids and bases,
but see h) above) moulds and smaller machines. This would reduce set-up
times and enable the company to produce smaller order quantities and hence
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reduce inventory. In addition, this perspective also seeks a review by the
marketing function of its product and colour range strategy in order to check
whether, in overall terms, it would make more business sense to
systematically cull out low selling items.
In reality, the problems facing the company included the fact that it had
already made a sizeable investment and that to move to smaller moulds for
existing new products would require fresh investment in both machines and
moulds. Therefore, the size of investment involved also meant that the
company would need time to reverse this trend.
Following these insights, the company undertook a change in direction with
regard to its machine and mould tool investments. For its 'old' products, it
continued to pursue its policy of designing multi-impression moulds which
often necessitated correspondingly large machines. For its new products it
began to build single impression moulds (except where a product had two or
more moulded parts of the same colour) with an emphasis on fast change-
overs. In turn, this reduced the machine size requirement which needed to
be reflected in its investment policy. In addition, the company also had to
appreciate that much of its high, current finished goods inventory holding
was slow-moving and potentially obsolete.
The outcome of these deliberations was
• a dramatic fall in profits over the following two years due to inventory
write-offs
• a balanced machine investment programme to reflect the needs of the
two different markets. This took five to six years to finalise due to
the heavy investment the company had already made not only in
machines but also in mould tools
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Finally, the outcome of a manufacturing strategy review is to help enable
decisions to be made which embrace relevant functional perspectives. Given
the difficulties faced in manufacturing to meet low volume products in low
colours, then a systematic review of products and colours within existing
ranges was undertaken on a regular basis with the purpose of questioning
the rationale for retaining low selling items as part of the current catalogue.
In this way, what was in the past considered to be a sacrosanct element of
marketing philosophy was rigorously scrutinised and became subservient to
the corporate good.
41 DEVELOPING A MANUFACTURING STRATEGY : PRECISION STEELS
Precision Steel (PSL) **
 sold high-quality sections in a wide range of standard
steel specifications together with customer-specified material requirements.
It was part of Harbridge industries ** , a large group of companies with a
wide range of interests including shipping, civil engineering, electronics,
fabrication and engineering as well as steel processing. PSL was established
in 1932 to roll precision steel sections for the electric motor industry.
Although many aspects of its activities have since changed, PSL's business
still principally constitutes the rerolling of steel sections, using hot and cold
processes, in a variety of steel specifications, and up to a maximum section
height of 250mm. Due to falling demand and subsequent plant closures, PSL
found itself, by the late 1970s (like many of its European counterparts) in a
near monopoly position, as it was now the only supplier based in the United
Kingdom. However, similar businesses in Europe were always keen to export
to the UK, particularly to high-volume (ton) users.
* This research was the first in-company analysis which formed part of a
SERC grant awarded to the author. Detailed data collection was partly
completed by a research assistant.
"The company names have been disguised.
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4.71 PSL's MARKETS
PSL bought steel sections from a limited number of suppliers (principally
British Steel), then sold rerolled precision sections into three market
segments with different characteritics. These were electric motors, stockist
steel sections and customised sections, which are described below.
4.711 Electric Motors
PSL's traditional market was to provide steel sections for electric motors.
While demand for this market had fallen in the last fifteen years it still
accounted for almost 50 percent of PSL's turnover (£s). Steel sections were
rolled, and then subsequently precision machined by the customer. This
market segment accounted for some 50,000 tonnes per year, and details of
current and past sales are given in Appendix J.1.
4.712 Stockist Steel Sections
Sales in this market were for a range of standard sizes and shapes, all rolled
from the one internationally specified steel, known by the company as
PS2000. Both home and overseas customers, therefore, ordered from a
standard catalogue, with items being differentiated only by size and shape.
In order to compensate for the falling sales experienced in the electric motor
market, the stockist steel segment had been built up over the last fifteen
years. The annual volumes processed in 1985 totalled 30,000 tonnes and
details of representative orders are given in Appendix J.2. PSL currently
supplied five major UK stockists and about 50 stockists overseas. In 1984,
PSL had received a major contract from a French Company, Gambert Fabrique
(GF), which yielded orders totalling 8,000 tonnes in the following years.
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Apparently running at a substantial loss in its steel rerolling business, GF
decided in 1983, to close its own rolling mill, having negotiated a contract
with PSI, to supply its standard steel sections, using steel P52000. Gambert
sold a wide range of products and was a large exporter of engineering
supplies and metal sections (steel, brass and aluminium). It distributed these
by a well-developed container service to its own depots and clients
throughout the world.
The negotiations with Gambert resulted in agreed prices and terms for
delivery by PSL to its main distribution centre in Brest, an industrial port in
northern France. Appendices J.3 and J.4 give data to allow a comparison to
be drawn with other products in this segment. Since 1983, PSL initiated
discussions on the possibility of direct supply to some of GF's depots. The
reason for this was that the GF contract was an important part of the
company's customer portfolio. The annual volumes were substantial,
characterised by relatively large order quantities and stable schedules. But,
the trade-off had been low prices. However marketing saw the opportunity
of supplying direct to GF's depots in one or more countries. The direct gains
for Gambert were reduced distribution costs and for PSL an increase in price.
This change was initiated in early 1984, for UK and Denmark depots with
each buying about 450 tonnes per year. Having received permission to
negotiate directly with these two parts of the Gambert organization, PSL was
able to satisfactorily agree higher prices than for similar products, due to the
fact that GF passed on distribution costs to its depots as well as adding its
own margin. PSL was now able, therefore, to take some of that additional
margin, and still offer a favourable price for direct supply (see Appendices
I.3 and 1.4). As a result of this initial success, PSL's marketing policy was to
encourage this, a fact supported by a recent marketing report completed by
an outside consultancy firm, which highlighted this as one of the major
planks on which the company should build.. Marketing, as a result, had
triant if itAri thc /1PVI fArP •AC	 1-tra7i1 1 lli anri WPCt 1nPr glIN7
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4.713 Customised Sections
The decline in overall sales had stimulated the need for PSL to increase sales
in the customised sections segment of its markets. Customised sections
business referred to orders which catered for the specific needs of a wide
range of manufacturing businesses, including automotive components (eg
struts), agricultural machinery and oil rig fabrication, as well as general
engineering. The growth was based on converting customers from using non-
precision, standard steel sections requiring extensive and costly machining
and heat treatment, to purpose-rolled sections to meet their specifications in
terms of dimensional tolerance, steel specification and heat treatment
requirements. PSL's sales force had, over the last few years, developed a
broader technical knowledge in order to help increase PSL's penetration in
these markets. Orders could, however, involve both standard and special
steels, but size and shape would always be specified by, and therefore special
to, each customer. Many customers, however, placed repeat orders for the
same product, often on a call-off or schedule basis. Most requirements could
be met by the hot rolling process * and a representative sample of orders as
given in Appendix j.5.
Sates in this market segment totalled 10,000 tonnes in 1985, 85 per cent of
which went to UK companies, with the remainder sent to all parts of the world.
An important element of this growth came from sales to the oil industry.
4.72 MANUFACTURING
Steel sections passed through a series of processes, which are now briefly
described. Orders differ and whereas all products go through the hot rolling
* Hot rolling was a less expensive process than cold rolling and, therefore,
products were designed, where possible, to be made in a hot-rolled format
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stage, requirements from then on varied in accordance with the specification.
Individual customer orders were cumulated, wherever possible, by input
height (often referred to as billet size) in order to maximise the tonnage
processed through the high-volume, hot mills. The task in the production
planning office, therefore, was to combine together quantities of the same
billet size and programme these through the hot mills in order to minimise
the number of major and minor change-overs (explained later) in line with
customer delivery requirements. Following this initial stage through which
all steel was processed, customer orders were then separated, and followed
the individual process requirements to completion.
4.721 Hot rolling
In 1986, two hot rolling mills were in use. One was installed in 1969 and the
second in 1976 to replace earlier mill capacity, which had gradually been
phased out. While the basic layout for hot rolling was similar, the process
capabilities were different. This difference concerned the height and length
of steel sections which could be processed.
4.722 Hot roll finishing
All products went through the hot roll finishing section. The processes were
simple and the set-up times were short. After initial cooling, the steel
sections were lifted by an overhead crane into the work-in-progress
warehousing area. From this warehousing area, all products followed their
own specified routing, according to the process requirements involved.
4.723 Cold rolling
About one third of all products were cold rolled. The orders were drawn
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from the work-in-progress stock after hot roll finishing. These processes
enabled higher levels of accuracy to be achieved, particularly where the
product specification called for thinner sections. They all required very long
set-up times, and involved expensive tooling. The specialised tooling had a
three month lead time from the suppliers and, therefore, needed very careful
planning. In addition, there was a disproportionate amount of tool wear at
the start of a production run, until fine adjustments could be achieved.
4.724 Other auxilliary processes
There were several additional processes involved, none of which have long
set -up or process times. They included cold roll finishing, heat treatment,
cutting to precise lengths, and specified packing prior to despatch. Not all
products went through all processes.
4.73 LEAD TIME CALCULATIONS
The lead times used by sales in quotations were agreed annually by the sales
and production directors, being occasionally adjusted as necessary by the
production planning office, if overload situations seemed to be arising. As of
February 1986 the following norms were used as a basis for calculating lead
times on which delivery promises were then made: 10 weeks were allowed
for the purchase of non-standard steel, 4 weeks for hot rolling, 1 week for
standard heat treatment and finishing and 4 weeks for cold rolling. Non-
standard, finishing process lead times were calculated for each job on the
basis of an assessment of the complexity involved, and the degree of overall
speed required by the potential customer.
In all markets, where customers required quicker deliveries than the total
based on the above norms, shorter lead times for customer quotations were
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agreed by the manager of the production planning office. This was achieved
by identifying areas of process time reduction, based on current and future
loading, experience and judgment. In all cases, delivery was quoted as "ex-
works" (the standard practice for the industry) and did not, therefore,
include delivery arrangements. See Appendices J.6 to J.8 which give details
of actual deliveries in a representative period.
Standard steels were assumed by the production planning office to be
available from PSL raw material stock holdings, and thus no allowance was
made in sales quotations involving standard steels to cover purchase lead
time. * The stock of each size and specification of standard steel was tightly
controlled by the planning manager, using simple controls, based on average
usage for the last three months, current stock, and estimates of forward
demand. Steel delivery was normally requested and acknowledged by
suppliers as being 10 weeks from the order date. (See Appendices J.9 and
J.10 for information on the delivery performance of PSL's steel suppliers).
4.74 PROCESS YIELDS
Process yield was defined as saleable output, divided by the input of raw
material, and expressed as a percentage. The yields achieved by each
different process were closely monitored every month, and were reported by
the market category. Losses (some of which were unpredictable) arose from
oxidation (scale losses), damage in the process plant, cutting losses in the
finishing section, and quality rejects (dimensional, surface finish and
metallurgical). All losses were closely monitored and investigated. They
were accounted for in the estimation procedure when calculating material
* Most standard steels are kept in stock as explained in the notes to Appendix
J.9
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requirements and order pricing. Yields currently used in these calculations
were based on information gathered over the last 12 months, and averaged
92 per cent for the electric motor and stockist steel sections markets and
about 85 percent for customised sections.
Orders were received in the sales department where they were recorded
before being passed through to the production planning office. Orders were
then collated by input height (ie billet size) required, and loaded onto the hot
mills within a four-week programme.*
This resulted in steel sizes being processed once in each four-week cycle, in
order to maintain agreed target levels of mill utilization. The procedure,
therefore, was to sequence orders so as to minimise size of section changes
and so reduce cumulative set-up times within a cycle. Appendix J.11 shows a
typical hot mill rolling programme.
After the rolling stage, each order would then be routed according to the
necessary finishing process operations to be completed. Due to the varying
order quantities involved, jobs in excess of five tons would have to be split
down after hot rolling, due to the crane lifting limitations detailed earlier.
*Note: thus works orders for the same size (by the input height) of steel (the
material specification was not normally a factor to be taken into account
when compiling hot mill programmes) were grouped together to provide as
large a quantity to be rolled as possible. However, as volumes declined,
programmed quantities in the same period would decline, especially where
the delivery speed element of a market was becoming important. In these
latter situtions, the steel would, of course, have to be programmed into the
hot mills to meet the customer delivery date, rather than to meet the
programming rules used in the planning department. This would lead to
lower production volumes and/or more frequent mill changes. Furthermore,
when cumulative orders for the same steel size had been rolled the
individual orders were then separated to follow their own routing through
the remaining process in line with each product specification.
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The result was that delays occurred in late production stages, when
supervisors from these sections had to re-group part orders prior to
processing, in order to avoid additional set-ups.
4.8 CORPORATE DECISIONS AND FUTURE MARKETS
The company recognised the overall decline in sales volumes but had
sustained sales revenues by growing other segments to compensate for the
decline in electric motor sales. The problem it faced at the time of the
research was to decide on the appropriate future action to maintain its
current business performance level.
One of the keys to this was seen to be in its choice of marketing strategies. It
was partly for this reason that the company had sought advice from an
outside consulting firm. The report gave strong support for two of the
marketing initiatives of recent years -
a) To increase the number of direct delivery arrangements with Gambert
Fabrique
b .) To increase sales in the Customised Section Market and for this to be
the large growth area of the future
4.9 MANUFACTURING STRATEGY REVIEW
Related to the two marketing initiatives detailed above with regard to
Gambert Fabrique and the Customised Sections Market, a review of the
implications for manufacturing was completed.
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4.91 BACKGROUND ISSUES
• Volumes (tonnes)
The total tonnage of processed steel had remained approximately the same
since 1975 although the market segments had changed during this time as
illustrated in Appendix J.12.
However, this was not (as far as manufacturing was concerned) the critical
issue. The change which has taken place was that concerning order size.
Whereas in 1975, 85% of total volumes had an average order quantity of 14.3
tonnes or more, in 1985, 80% had an average order quantity of 7.3 tonnes or
less. The majority of PSL's business, therefore, had an average order quantity
in 1985 of about hall' of what it was a decade before - Appendix J.12 gives
details.
In addition, PSL's decision on hot mill investment would have been made in
line with its perception of market volumes at the time of the decision - Mill C
in 1969 and Mill D which was constructed in 1976 to provide efficient
capacity for the high volume Electric Motors market. Thus, manufacturing
now had the problem of coping with the incremental fall in average order
quantity (tonnes) since the current hot mill capacity had been constructed, a
trend which was expected to continue in the future.
• Delivery reliability
Appendix J.13 reveals that based on this representative sample for all
markets of the 89 orders involved, 33 (or 37%) were one or more weeks late
with almost 5% at four or more weeks behind schedule (the worst example
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being works order number C187 for a special steel Customised Section order
which was seven weeks late). This needs to be set against the order winning
and qualifying criteria analysis provided in Appendix J.14 for the two
marketing strategy initiatives already detailed in section 4.7.
4.92 GAMBERT FABRIQUE
The rationale for the Gambert Fabrique (GF) initiative to deliver direct to its
depots was in order to increase price and margin and in that way reduce the
weighting currently given to price, which Appendices J.14 and J.15 reflect.
However, the trade-off had been a significant reduction in average order
quantities per size from 19.7 to 11.6 tonnes for GF overall with the UK and
Denmark as low as 3.9 tonnes (see Appendix J.16). Furthermore, as the
company cumulated all the same sizes for hot mill processing then as GF and
its depots would order at different times, then processing volumes would be
smaller, and this within a context of the overall volume reduction over the
period 1975-85, as illustrated previously in Appendix J.12. Consequently, if
the marketing strategy to increase direct supply was maintained then it
would lead to further reductions in processing volumes. The knock-on effect
was that the cost structure of current GF work would have to be recalculated
- a fact which would affect the figures given in Appendix J.15. In addition,
this would lead to a further overall decline in processed volumes and the
increase in costs which would result. Manufacturing would, therefore, have to
increasingly strike a balance between cumulating volumes, the impact on
delivery reliability and speed, reduced contribution resulting from lower
average order quantities, and an increased level of inventory.
The policy of market and volume fragmentation was also likely to lead to less
stable schedules overall. Although GF (France) schedule arrangements may
well remain stable in the forseeable future, as order quantities reduced then
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it would increase the instability within GF schedules. With regard to direct
supply to the UK and Denmark then these features were already apparent:
• delivery lead-times were shorter (see Appendix J.17)
• as the scale of each GF depot was considerably smaller than the
original parent operation, then inventory holdings would be smaller and
more susceptable to stock-outs. The result of this would be increased
pressure on schedules, delivery speed and requests for changes
• the outcome would be an increase in overall costs and pressure on
meeting delivery performance
Furthermore, corporate discussion led to the following conclusions concerning
price structures. There was a distinct possibility that the breakdown of the
original GF (France) supply to its dependent depots may well have also
severed the umbilical cord between parent company and dependent outlet.
With classic pressure by organisations on the performance of its subsidiaries,
then it must be anticipated by PSL that their initiative to raise margins may,
in turn, lead to localised competition. GF's subsidiary depots, in order to
improve their own performance, would undoubtedly look to price competition
as a prime source to achieve this. If this happened then it would lead to an
erosion of the higher contributions currently enjoyed. Furthermore,
indigeneous suppliers to GF's depots would also have an inherent
geographical advantage which would work against PSL in terms of delivery
speed and the universal push to reduce inventory levels which GF's
subsidiaries could also well have as part of their own goals.
Although traditional commercial arrangements can be inherently binding,
once the pattern is broken, the domino effects will often take effect. PSL's
marketing initiative would help to bring about this situation which would, in
turn, impact on its volumes and order quantities.
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4.921 The manufacturing implications of market and volume fragmentation
PSL's high volume processes were having to cope with lower order quantities
as a natural part of the development in its markets. The pattern of declining
volumes was characterstic of many manufacturing industries as the changes
took place in markets throughout the world. However, although the initiative
to supply direct to depots may make marketing sense, it would directly
accelerate volume decline in what was now the highest average order
quantity part of PSL's business. Smaller volumes = higher costs = lower
contribution.
This impact, of course, was corporate wide in its consequences and, therefore,
must be reviewed in terms of the business as a whole.
4.93 CUSTOMISED SECTIONS MARKET
This is a. Make to order market which involved the processing of both
standard and special steels. Although average order quantities per size had
fallen from 16.6 in 1975 to 9.4 in 1985, apart from Gambert Fabrique,
Customised Sections had the highest average order quantity. It was not a
price sensitive market (see Appendix J.15) but, as with other markets, placed
delivery reliability as an important, order-losing sensitive qualifier. Delivery
speed was also, for some orders, an order-winning criterion. Given that
qualifiers were universal for all orders in this segment, then the important
dimensions which distinguish order differences were the type of steel and the
issue of delivery speed. The marketing description of this segment (viz
Customised Sections) was based upon customer type. However, from a
manufacturing point of view, this was of little value in trying to determine
the fit between market characteristics and manufacturing's ability to support
these needs. Thus, it was important for the company to recognise that, from a
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manufacturing perspective, this market comprised four different segments as
follows
A Standard steels where delivery speed was not an order-winning criterion
B Standard steels where delivery speed was an order-winning criterion
C Special steels where delivery speed was not an order-winning criterion.
D Special steels where delivery speed was an order-winning criterion.
An analysis of Appendix J.8 needs to recognise that whereas the processing of
orders for standard steel would not normally involve a material delivery
element within the total lead time (as with most orders in the Electric Motors
and Stockist Steel markets), orders involving special steels would. Of the 30
representative orders for which details had been given 14 were for standard
steels of which 4 were required in less than 5 weeks, a fact which was
indicative of the delivery speed element referred to in the case study
narrative.
On three of these four occasions PSL failed to meet the shorter lead time
commitment. With special steels, the gap between the works order being
raised to the required and acknowledged delivery date was much higher at
between 12 and 20 weeks reflecting the steel delivery component of total
lead time.
However, as delivery lead time for special (ie non-standard) steels had an
allowed time of 10 weeks then this element of total lead time needed to be
subtracted from the 12 to 19 weeks delivery gap in order to establish the
extent of the delivery speed nature involved in this category of customer
orders. Such an analysis showed that of the 16 orders for special steels, two
were required in less than 14 weeks (ie 4 weeks less net delivery lead time)
and both were delivered late. Overall then, 6 (or 20%) of this representative
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sample had a delivery speed element within the order-winning criterion for
this market.
4.931 Two tier risk when delivery speed is an order-winning criterion
When companies enter markets in which delivery speed is, or is becoming, an
important order-winning criterion then it is critical that they review their
current or intended marketing strategy if manufacturing's provision of this
delivery criterion involves a two tier risk factor.
This is pertinent to PSL in terms of that segment of its Customised Sections
market which involves delivery speed and special steel. Orders with these
features combine a two tier risk factor associated with special steels within
the time constraints associated with delivery speed as follows:
• uncertainty within the 	 • uncertainty within PSL's
suppliers' manufacturing
	 PLUS	 manufacturing process due
process due to the first-	 to the first-time nature of
time nature of a special steel 	 a special steel
Given the synergy (1+1>2) which would result from these two uncertainties,
then PSL should question a marketing strategy which took them into orders
with these characteristics if delivery speed (or orders where delivery
promises rely on manufacturing meeting the scheduling norms in both
supplier and internal processes) was an order-winning criterion. To do so
would result in a poor delivery performance, a tarnished reputation in the
market and, undoubtedly, excess manufacturing costs.
Consequently, PSL would need its marketing strategy within Customised
Sections to line up with the recognition of two tier risk - Appendix J.18
161
summarises the delivery performance within the four segments of the
Customised Sections market. This anlaysis clearly shows:
- the distinctly worse performance for those two categories where
delivery speed was an order winning criterion (Categories B & D -
see page 149)
- the problems of process uncertainty where special steels were involved
(Categories C & D), and
- the distinctly poor performance where the features of delivery speed
and special steels were brought together (Category D)
4.94 CORPORATE OUTCOMES
The strategic perspectives of functions need to be placed within an
appropriate, corporate context. Only in this way will functional differences
be able to be resolved at the business level and decisions reflect what is best
for a firm overall.
The approach developed and used within this research stresses the iterative
nature of manufacturing stategy within the corporate debate and identifies
this part of the procedure as an integral part of the methodology (pp70-76).
As with the HQ Injection Moulding example, the outcomes for PSL also
illustrate this feature of the approach. The manufacturing and marketing
responses which followed the research application reflected the corporate-
orientated outcomes of the strategic debate which took place.
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4.941 The Gambert Fabrique initiative
Within the context of overall, declining volumes and given the volume
fragmentation which had (and would continue to) occurred, the company
decided not to pursue the strategic option of extending direct delivery to
other Gambert Fabrique depots.
4.942 Customised Sections
Given the growth potential and relatively high margin nature of these orders
it was important for manufacturing and marketing to work together to
increase sales in this segment. Manufacturing's principal task was to reduce
total lead times in order to make delivery speed orders into non-delivery
speed orders. Key manufacturing areas for improvement were
• investing in the hot mills to extend the range of both mills to cover all
sizes and to allow for orders to be cycled on a two, rather than four,
week basis
• holding finished goods inventory for selected, high volume standard
items and "selling" the feature of fast response to customers
• reviewing raw material inventory holding to minimise the investment
on the one hand and to ensure that what was held reflected known/
forecast sales on the other
• reduce lead times in the order processing system down to one day with
reporting on an exception basis
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The key marketing response was to review all incoming, customer orders into
the four segments identified earlier (p159). In this way discussion could be
initiated with the customer and explanations given regarding segment C and,
particularly, segment D. In this way, customers could be advised of the
business-related features embodied in their order and expectations linked to
realistic lead times where orders were placed.
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APPENDIX G
SOME OF THE CONTRIBUTIONS BY HAYES AND WHEELWRIGHT TO
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MANUFACTURING STRATEGY
This appendix gives more details on some of the contributions by Hayes and
Wheelwright on the developments in manufacturing strategy and referred to
in the chapter narrative.
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APPENDIX GA
HAYES AND WHEELWRIGHT'S CONCEPT OF A CORPORATE
MANUFACTURING STRATEGY
Dimensions of a	 Examples of Generic
Manufacturing 	 Individual Business Strategies	 (Corporate-Wide) Policies
Strategy	 Business A°	 Business 13°	 Business C°	 and Guidelines
Capacity"
	
xxxxxx	 xxxxxx	 xxxxxx	 A common set of criteria to be used in developing/present-
000000	 //////	 ++++++	 ing an investment proposal
000000	 //////	 ++++++	 Policies for the economic or competitive conditions required
000000	 //////	 ++++++	 to plan/start/postpone capacity changes
Facilitiesb	xxxxxx	 xxxxxx	 xxxxxx	 Parameters governing the size and location of individual fa-
xxxxxx	 xxxxxx	 xxxxxx	 cilities
xxxxxx	 xxxxxx	 xxxxxx	 Guidelines for permanent reductions in capacity at mature
000000	 //////
	
++++++	 facilities
000000	 //////	 ++++++
Technologyb	xxxxxx	 xxxxxx	 xxxxxx	 Policies for the organization and layout of production pro-
000000	 //////	 ++++++	 cesses
000000	 //////	 ++++++	 Criteria for equipment selection and the levels of automa-
000000	 /11/1/	 ++++++	 tion to be pursued
000000	 //////	 ++++++
Vertical	 xxxxxx	 xxxxxx	 xxxxxx	 Policies for make/buy analysis and changes in backward in-
Integration"	 000000	 //////	 ++++++	 tegration
000000	 //////	 ++++++	 Rules for establishing internal transfer prices
Work force"	 xxxxxx .	 xxxxxx	 xxxxxx	 Establishment of benefit packages and pay scales
xxxxxx	 xxxxxx	 xxxxxx	 Policies on unionization, hiring, promotion, and employ-
xxxxxx	 xxxxxx	 xxxxxx	 ment stability
000000	 ////// •
	
++++++
Quality"
	
xxxxxx	 xxxxxx	 xxxxxx	 Standardized reports, reporting relationships and job defini-
xxxxxx	 xxxxxx	 xxxxxx	 lions
000000	 //////	 ++++++	 Guidelines on performance measures such as the cost of
000000 :r	 //////
	
++++++	 quality, field failures, and expected quality levels
Production planning/	 xxxxxx	 xxxxxx	 xxxxxx	 Parameters for manufacturing system specifications and
Materials controlb	xxxxxx	 xxxxxx	 xxxxxx	 hardware approval
xxxxxx	 xxxxxx	 xxxxxx	 Rules for measuring and evaluating inventory performance
000000	 //////	 ++++++
000000	 //////
	
++++++
Organizationb	xxxxxx	 xxxxxx	 xxxxxX	 Definitions for job classifications and direct/indirect staffing
000000	 //////
	
++++++	 levels
000000	 //////
	
++++++	 Policies regarding manufacturing engineering support levels
and use of outside services
Each column represents the manufacturing strategy (pattern of manufacturing decisions) that complements a specific business strategy.
"Each row represents behavior, practices, and policies in that decision category that are consistent across businesses (indicated by xxxxxx), and those
not consistent across all businesses.
Source: Hayes and Wheelwright (1984) pp36-7, Table 2-3
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APPENDIX G.2
HAYES AND WHEELWRIGHTS STAGES IN THE EVOLUTION OF
MANUFACTURING'S STRATEGIC ROLE
Stage I - Minimize Manufacturing's Negative Potential- "Internally Neutral"
External experts are used in making decisions about strategic manufacturing
issues
Internal management control systems are the primary means for monitoring
manufacturing performance
Manufacturing is kept flexible and reactive
Stage 2- Achieve Parity (Neutrality) with Competitors: 'Externally Neutral"
"Industry Practice" is followed
The planning horizon for manufacturing investment decisions is extended to
incorporate a single business cycle
Capital investment is regarded as the primary means for catching up to
competition or achieving a competitive edge
Stage - Provide Credible Support to the Business Strategy- "Internally
Supportive"
Manufacturing investments are screened for consistency with the business
strategy
Changes in business strategy are automatically translated into manufacturing
implications
Longer-term manufacturing developments and trends are systematically
addressed
Stage 4 - Pursue a Manufacturing-Based Competitive Advantage: Erternally
Supportive"
Efforts are made to anticipate the potential of new manufacturing practices
and technologies
Manufacturing is centrally involved in major marketing and engineering
decisions
Long-range programs are pursued in order to acquire capabilities in advance
of needs
Source: Hayes and Wheelwright (1984) pp36-7, Table 2-3
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APPENDIX H
DETAILS OF THE PLANT-BASED APPLICATIONS
COMPLETED DURING THE PERIOD OF THE RESEARCH
BUT NOT USED HERE AS SPECIFIC EXAMPLES
Appendix H contains details of the thirty three plant-based applications
completed during the period of the research. The details give year, country
and industry in which the plant is based and principal areas of application.
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APPENDIX H.1
OVERVIEW OF APPLICATIONS RE METHODOLOGY AND OTHER
MANUFACTURING STRATEGY RESEARCH ISSUES
FROM 1979-1989
Year Country Industry Principal applications
1979 Injection Moulding* Methodololgy development
1980 UK Electronics Process choice/methodology
1983 Telecommunications
Automotive
components
Focus and methodology
development
Canada Packaging Methodology development
1985
UK Automotive
components*
Product profiling
Canada Packaging Methodology development
Railways Infrastructure
1986 UK Steel* Methodology development/
segmentation
Canada Packaging Methodology development
Packaging Methodology development
UK Chemicals
Aerospace and
1987 Canada Packaging segmentation
Blow moulding Product profiling
UK Aerospace Supplier relations
Packaging Methodology development
172
UK Packaging
Methodology development
France Packaging and
segmentation
UK Aerospace
1988 Canada Packaging*
Product profiling
UK Tobacco*
Canada Packaging Methodology development
,
Packaging Focus
UK Electronics Process choice
Canada Packaging Methodology
1989 Food development
UK
Electronics Focus
US Furniture Methodology development
Service
and
France Packaging segmentation
UK Food Focus
Packaging Methodology development
,
* Used as illustrations in the body of the thesis
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APPENDIX 11.2
SUMMARIES OF THE APPLICATIONS DETAILED IN
APPENDIX 11.1
Year Number of plants
1979 1
1980 1
1983 2
1985 2
1986 4
1987 7
1988 6
1989 10
TOTAL 33
Principal
applications
Number of plants
Methodology development 22
Segmentation 11
Product profiling 4
Focus 4
Process choice 2
Infrastructure 1
, Supplier relations 1
TOTAL 45*
* This exceeds 33 due to occasions when a plant embodied
more than one application
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APPENDIX I
DETAILS OF THE FRAMEWORK APPLICATION FOR
HQ INJECTION MOULDING COMPANY
4
Appendix I contains supporting details for the research work completed in
the first company reported here. In this way it gives the essential data on
which the research application was based and the necessary background
against which the research findings need to be set.
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APPENDIX I.I
DETAILS OF INJECTION-MOULDING MACHINES
Below are details of the number of machines available in each
machine group defined by the company. A typical machine is
given in some detail in Note 2 below.
Machine Group
Number of Machines
1972 1979 New 1
1 29 1
2 15 11 5
3 5 8 6
4 2 2 1
,
Total 51 22 12
Notes
1 Details of the 'new' machines in each group are:
Machine	 Year of Purchase/New Machines
Group	 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1 otal
2	 -	 -	 -	 -	 3	 2	 -	 5
3	 2	 1	 1	 1	 -	 1	 -	 6
4 - - - - 1 1
2 Machine	 Features of an Average Machine
Group	 Cost*	 shot weight	 locking pressure
(£.000s)
	
(ozs)	 (tons)
1	 80
	 10	 200
2	 103
	 45	 450
3	 120
	 60	 600
4	 175
	 150	 600
* cost includes the purchase price of the machine and
installation costs at 1960 prices
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APPENDIX 1.2
SUMMARY OF THE MOULDS INTRODUCED OR PLANNED SINCE 1973
•	 .
Production Range Number
of
Production Range
.	
.,.
Number
of
Moulds
-
Start Date Type Moulds Start Date Type,
Apr 73 C 14 Aug C 2
Jun C 2 Aug E 1
Sep E 4 Sep D 6
Sep C 3 Sep E 18
Sep D 4 Nov E 1
Mar 74 D 18 Mar 77 D 1
Mar B 1 Jun B 1
Jun D 2 Jul B 1
Jun C 6 Sep B 2
Sep E 19 Sep C 1
Sep C 2 Dec C 2
Sep	 • g 2 Dec E 9
Oct A 1 Mar 76 C 1
Oct B 1 Mar D 2
Aug 75 C 2 Mar B 2
Sep C 4 Mar E 1
Oct B 1 Jun B 1
Oct C 3 Sep F 2
Dec A 1 Sep E 9
Dec C 1 Dec B 1
Feb 76 A 5 Dec E 4
Mar C 2 Jun 79 B 2
May C 2 Sep D 12
Jun C 2 Oct E 15
Jun E 6 Feb 80 E 30
Jul B 1
NOTES
1 Product range types A and B belong to the original ( pre-1973)
designs whilst C to F were of the revised ( post-1973) designs.
Further details are given in Attachment 5 under the col umn headed
"Product Range"
2 The number of moulds indicates the number of different products
within each range. However, in many instances, one mould will have
two or more impressions on it so that in every moulding cycle one, two
or more products would be made depending on the number of impressions
on that mould
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APPENDIX 1.3
AN OUTLINE OF THE MANUFACTURING AND ASSEMBLY PROCESS
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APPENDIX 1.4
PRODUCTION SALES AND INVENTORY DETAILS ON SEVERAL
PRODUCTS
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APPENDIX 1.4
PRODUCTION SALES AND INVENTORY DETAILS ON SEVERAL
PRODUCTS
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APPENDIX I.5
COST DETAILS OF REPRESENTATIVE PRODUCTS
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APPENDIX L6
CHANGES IN COMPONENTS/PACKING, WORK-IN-PROGRESS AND
FINISHED GOODS WAREHOUSING FOR THE PERIOD 1973-79
Warehousing Date Size(Sq feet)
Distance
(Miles)
,
1979 Total
(Sq Feet)
,
Components/ 1973 5000 -
packing 1976
-79 5000 - 10000
Work-in- 1973 9000 -
progress 1977
-79 9000 - 18000
,
1973 27000 -
Finished 1974 10000 20
goods 1976 40000 1 87000
1977 (10000) 20
1979 20000 3
Note
The 1979 rented cost of warehousing was about £2.50 per
square foot. All the above was rented at an average of about
£2.00 per square foot. In 1977, the 10,000 square foot finished
goods warehouse taken on in 1974 was sold.
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APPENDIX 1.7
PRODUCTION DETAILS FOR MARKETING SAMPLES IN NEW COLOURS
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APPENDIX 1.8
SOME FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT INFORMATION 1973-79
YEAR ENDED 31 DEC - ALL FIGURES £000s
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
FIXED ASSETS
Plant	 561	 552	 399	 420	 612	 838	 980
Moulds	 102	 130	 170	 180	 320	 584	 620
663	 682	 569	 600	 932 1422 1600
CURRENT ASSETS
Inventory
Debtors
CURRENT LIABILITIES
Creditors
Overdraft
262	 532 1029 1259 1559 2243 2567
483	 798	 842	 817 1321	 963 1373
745 1330 1871 2076 2880 3206 3940
	
626	 532	 628 1134 1774 1744 1765
	
2	 480	 412	 42	 38	 284	 575
FINANCED BY
Share capital
Retained profit
Group indebtedness
Net capital employed
Net sales
Net profit before tax
	
50	 50	 50	 50	 50	 50	 50
	
280	 420	 530	 570	 830 1760 2660
330	 470	 580	 620	 880 1810 2710
450	 530	 820	 880 1120	 790	 490
780 1000 1400 1500 2000 2600 3200
2552 2872 4212 4466 5810 5394 8021
146	 185	 274	 362	 564	 708 1050
NOTES
1 Working capital = current assets - current liabilities.
2 Net assets employed = fixed assets s working capital.
3 Any difference between the net profit for any year and the increase of retained
profits was due to a transfer of profit to the Group.
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APPENDIX 1.9
RELEVANT ORDER-WINNING CRITERIA FOR THE COMPANY'S OLD AND
NEW PRODUCTS
Order-winning
criteria
Products
old' 'new'
***Product concept	 a) product range _
***b) colour choice _
***c) colour matching _
***Quality -
Delivery a) reliability - -
***b) speed _
Price *** -
***Design leadership -
Notes 1 As explained in Chapter 3 "Methodology", the use of 'stars' to
indicate weighting was replaced in later developments due to
the difficulty in identifying relative importance
2 It can also be seen here that, at this time, the failure to
recognise the difference between qualifiers and order
winners led, in this instance, to mixing these two dimensions
of a market
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APPENDIX 1.10
AVERAGE COSTS FOR EACH PRODUCT RANGE
Product	 Raw	 Labour	 Packing and
materials moulding assembly components Total
A 702 60 2 100 864
B 908 54 - 395 1357
C 1128 95 105 600 1928
D 642 118 128 827 1715
E 135 27 30 213 405
F 54 4 8 18 84
t; TOTAL COSTS FOR EACH PRODUCT RANGE
A 81 7 - 12 100
B 67 4 - 29 100
C 59 5 5 31 100
D 38 7 7 48 100
E 33 7 7 53 100
F 64 5 10 21 100
Notes 1 Products A and B are the original product concept
2 Products C to F are the revised product concept
3 Source Appendix
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APPENDIX 1.11
ANALYSIS OF REPRESENTATIVE PRODUCTS
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APPENDIX J
DETAILS OF THE FRAMEWORK APPLICATION FOR PRECISION STEEL
Appendix J contains supporting details for the research work completed in
this second application of the methodology concerning the development of
an appropriate manufacturing strategy statement for a business. As with
Appendix H, it gives the essential data on which the research application
was based and the necessary background against which the research
findings need to be set.
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APPENDIX J.1
PSL's CURRENT AND PAST SALES (TONNES) OF STEEL SECTIONS FOR
THE ELECTRIC MOTOR MARKET
YEAR
Total sales (tonnes)
1975
79600
1979
65300
1983
55500
1984
52000
1985
50400
Average order quantity
(tonnes)
286 205 235 220 190
Average number of sizes
per order quantity
20 20 29 27 26
Notes
1 There were now seven different specifications (ie material propeties) of
steel raw materials (in a different range of sizes) required by this
market. Each specification in all sizes was normally held in stock by PSL.
In 1975 there were only two specifications.
'')
Z. A typical order comprised several sizes of finished precision steel
sections, but usually all of the same steel specification and finishing/heat
treatment requirements. The various sizes would, however, be
processed in separate Hot Mill programmes. Therefore, although
an order may be for (say) 200 tonnes, as far as manufacturing was
concerned it would be similar to (say) 20 different orders (ie one order
per size) as similar sizes (and not one customer order) were processed
through manufacturing.
3 Typical delivery lead times were 6-8 weeks from receipt of order.
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APPENDIX J.2
PSL's CURRENT AND PAST SALES OF STOCKIST STEEL SECTIONS
YEAR 1975 1979 1983 1984 1985
Total sales (tonnes) 15100 17700 19400 28900 29700
Average order quantity
(tonnes)
84 95 105 130 123
Average number of sizes
per order quantity
17 20 24 25 23
Notes
1 The steel specification for this market was P52000 only.
2 There were 140 International Standard Sizes in the stockists range.
3 Gambert Fabrique (France) ordered (once a month) an average of 670
tonnes in 34 standard sizes (minimum 10 tonnes per size) for delivery
6/8 weeks from receipt of an order.
4 Gambert Fabrique (UK and Denmark) each ordered twice a month an
average of 35 tonnes each in 9 sizes (minimum 3 tonnes per size) for
delivery 4/6 weeks from receipt of an order.
5 Current delivery lead times for UK stockists were 6-8 weeks from
receipt of an order.
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APPENDIX J.3
SOME EXAMPLES OF TYPICAL INVOICED RATES PER TONNE -
FEB 86
BILLET
SIZE (mm)	 UTONNE
a) Electric Motor
- XR7 material
b) Stockist Steel
- PSL's UK Stockists
c) Gambert Fabrique
- France
d) Gambert Fabrique
- UK
e) Customised section
- MK 200 steel
	
70	 600
	
110	 500
	
120	 465
	
140	 420
	
190	 425
	
250	 430
	
70	 570
	
100	 490
	
120	 475
	
140	 465
	
170	 470
	
250	 450
	
85	 420
	
110	 340
	
130	 320
	
150	 300
	
190	 300
	
250	 300
	
85	 480
	
110	 390
	
130	 360
	
150	 350
	
190	 340
	
250	 330
	
85	 810
	
120	 680
	
190	 610
	
210	 610
NOTES
1 All prices were corrected to ex-works equivalents.
2 MK 200 was an expensive alloy steel.
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APPENDIX J.4
SUMMARY OF ESTIMATED VARIABLE COST £ PER TONNE IN
VARIOUS MARKETS, AND FOR DIFFERENT TONNAGES PER SIZE,
BASED ON JAN 86 COSTS
INPUT STEEL HEIGHT (MM)
70-85 100-110 120-130 140-150 170-190 210-250
ELECTRIC MOTORS	 5 tonnes 490 411 385 350 355 360
(typical steel	 10 tonnes 460 386 363 330 335 340
specification XR7)	 20 tonnes 445 376 350 320 330 335
STOCKIST STEEL	 5 tonnes 410 336 314 290 295 300
(PS2000 steel)	 10 tonnes 380 316 298 280 285 290
20 tonnes 365 306 290 275 280 285
_
CUSTOMISED
SECTIONS	 5 tonnes 635 550 520 500 490 490
10 tonnes 600 525 500 480 470 470
20 tonnes 580 510 485 460 455 455
NOTE - Variable cost included all direct labour, materials and other direct
costs (eg variable energy costs) and an allowance for size changes between
items on a programme. It also allowed for average yield losses for the
market category.
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APPENDIX J.5
PSL's CURRENT AND PAST SALES OF CUSTOMISED SECTIONS
YEAR 1975 1979 1983 1984 1985
Total sales (tonnes) 4200 9600 18200 18600 20400
Average order quantity
(tonnes)
18.3 16.6 11.2 11.8 12.2
Average number of sizes
per order quantity (note 2)
1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3
NOTES
1 Steel specification, finishing process, and heat-treatments were as
specified by each customer. Some high usage steel specifications
were held in raw material stock at PSL either against known call-offs
or in anticipation of future orders.
2 Most orders were only for one size, but a few were for up to four
different sizes.
3 Call-offs or scheduled requirements (ie orders for a number of deliveries
spread over several months) are treated in this analysis (and by the
planning office and within manufacturing) as individual orders.
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APPENDIX J.6
A REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE OF ORDERS FOR UK ELECTRIC MOTOR
AND FOR THE UK STOCKISTS STEEL MARKETS IN FEB 86
WORKS
ORDER
NUMBER
CATEGORY
KEY DATES - WK NUMBERS
TONNES
ORDERED
delivery
actual
works order
raised
required and
acknowledged
M864 10.0 5 12 11
M866 15.0 5 12 12
M878 8.0 5 12 12
M879 5.0 5 12 13
M880 10.0 5 12 9
M881 Electric 8.0 5 12 12
M910 Motor 6.5 6 13 16
M912 12.0 6 13 13
M913 12.0 6 13 13
M914 15.0 6 13 11
M930 8.0 7 13 14
M936 5.0 7 13 13
M937 10.0 7 13 15
M938 8.0 7 14 14
M939 8.0 7 14 13
S420 4,0 5 10 11
S426 4.0 5 10 11
S427 6,0 5 12 12
S428 5.0 5 12 11
S440 4,0 6 12 10
S441 Stockist 10,0 6 12 12
S443 Steel 4.0 6 12 13
S449 4.0 6 12 11
S479 10.0 6 13 13
S480 4.0 6 13 13
S481 5.0 6 13 11
S503 5.0 7 14 14
S504 5.0 7 13 15
S505 3.0 7 13 13
Notes
1 A separate works order was raised for each size within a customer order.
2 Works order numbers M866, M879, M914 and M939 were also cold rolled.
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APPENDIX 17
A REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE OF ORDERS FROM GAMBERT FABRIQUE
IN FEB 86
WORKS
ORDER
NUMBER
DELIVERY
TO
TONNES
ORDERED
KEY DATES - WEEK NUMBERS
delivery
works order
raised
required and
acknowledged actual
S463 10,0 6 13 12
S464 25,0 6 13 13
5465 25.0 6 13 10
S466 20.0 6 13 13
S467 16.0 6 13 9
S468 28.0 6 13 12
S469 35.0 6 13 13
5470 France 25.0 6 11 10
S471 20.0 6 11 12
S472 20.0 6 11 11
S473 15,0 6 11 13
S474 25,0 6 11 10
S475 10,0 6 11 11
S476 20,0 6 11 13
S477 20.0 6 11 11
5478 15.0 6 11 14
S416 3.0 5 10 12
S417 5.0 5 10 13
S418 3.0 5 3 9
S419 UK 5.0 5 8 8
S492 4.0 7 12 12
$493 4.0 7 12 11
S494 5.0 7 10 11
5412 4,0 5 9 13
S4I3 4.5 5 9 12
S414 5.0 5 9 9
S415 Denmark 4.0 5 9 10
S489 5.0 7 10 10
S490 5.0 7 10 9
S491 3.0 7 10 11
NOTES
1 A separate works order was raised for each size within a customer order.
2 Delivery promise for overseas destinations was acknowledged as the date the
sections left PSL.
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APPENDIX J.8
A REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE OF UK ORDERS RECEIVED IN FEB 86
FOR CUSTOMISED SECTIONS
(HOT ROLLED AND STANDARD FINISHING)
WORKS
ORDER
NUMBER
STEEL KEY DATES - WEEK NUMBERS TOTAL
standard special
ORDERED
TONNES
works delivery
steel
input
saleable
output
order
raised
required &
acknowledged actual
CO26 J 46.0 5 10 9 49.9 45,4
CO52 i 7.5 5 10 11 8.0 7.3
CO53 1 3.0 5 19 22 5.1 4.6
CO57 1 6.0 5 20 20 7.9 6.4
C061 1 10.0 5 12 10 11.0 9.6
C082 I 8.5 5 19 20 8.7 6.9
C092 1 3.0 5 18 26 7.5* 2.2
C094 . / 20.5 5 20 19 23.1 19.0
C099 V 52,0 5 11 10 58.0 53.3
C121 ,/ 10.0 6 10 12 11.0 10.1
C126 ,/ 10.0 6 22 21 13.0 11.1
C128 V 20.0 6 9 10 22.5 20.9
C132 I 75.0 6 12 12 83.5 77.1
C136 V 15,0 6 8 9 15.5 15.0
C150 I 20,0 7 12 14 22.5 19.4
C151 V 3.0 7 21 21 4.0 3,2
C152 1 15.0 7 12 11 17.0 15.3
C160 1 3.0 7 24 21 4.9 4.2
C167 I 10,0 7 26 29 22* 11.5
C169 ../ 3.0 7 21 21 3.8 3,4
C182 I 5.0 7 10 9 5.5 4,0
C186 I 3.0 7 12 14 3.5 3.2
C187 I 10.0 8 22 29 24.0* 12.5
C192 , / 12.5 8 25 23 14.0 13,4
C193 I 3.0 8 12 12 3.5 2.6
C194 1 3.0 8 24 24 3.7 3.1
C204 J 3.0 8 26 32 4.2 2.5
C207 j 16.0 8 25 24 20.3 17.3
C222 J 4.0 8 20 22 4,0 2.6
C231 J 10,0 8 14 12 11.0 8.9
* Two separate rollings were necessary to achieve the required output (all or part of
the first rolling was rejected by quality control).
Note: Works order numbers CO52, C150 and C194 were also cold rolled.
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APPENDIX J.9
A REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE OF DELIVERIES FROM
ENGLISH BILLETS PLC
FOR STANDARD STEEL SPECIFICATION ORDERS
STEEL
SPEC!
FICATION
BILLET SIZE
mm
TONNES
WEEK NUMBER DATE
ORDERED ordered required received
PS 2000 100 250 25 36 44
PS 2000 120 105 25 36 34
PS 2000 130 85 25 36 38
PS 2000 150 80 25 36 35
PS 2000 190 130 25 36 34
PS 2000 250 270 25 36 32
XR 6 100 45 25 36 35
XR 7 110 45 27 37 38
XR 7 120 140 27 37 41
XR 7 140 150 27 37 40
XR 7 230 105 27 37 38
SA 270 70 55 27 37 38
SA 270 85 120 27 37 37
SA 270 100 80 27 37 34
SA 275x 70 40 27 37 42
SA 275x 100 20 27 37 41
SA 275x 120 20 27 37 40
PS 2000v 230 30 27 37 43
PS 2000x 250 35 27 37 41
PS 300 70 10 29 40 40
PS 300 100 40 29 40 38
PS 2000 70 115 29 40 42
PS 2000 85 60 30 40 42
PS 2000 170 40 30 40 43
PS 2000v 100 30 30 40 42
PS 2000v 120 35 30 40 40
XR 7 70 80 30 40 39
XR 7 85 90 30 40 41
XR 7 100 40 30 40 41
NOTES
1 English Billet Plc was PSL's principal raw material supplier,
2 A standard steel was classed as such by PSL if it had been processed previously,
irrespective of the quantity used. This distinction from special steels signalled the
fact that manufacturing would have processing experience of the material which
would, in turn, lead to a reduction in problems and differences associated with one-
off specials. Thus, actual process lead times were more in keeping with the norms
used in lead time calculations.
3 Most (especially the high usage) standard steels were kept in stock by PSL at levels
which related to annual usage. Orders on suppliers to replenish stocks were then
made in the normal way based upon re-order levels.
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APPENDIX J.10
REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE OF DELIVERIES FROM
ENGLISH BILLETS PLC
FOR SPECIAL STEELS ORDERED FOR SPECIFIC JOBS
STEEL
SPECIF
'CATION
BILLET
SIZE
mm
TONNES
ORDERED
WEEK. NUMBER DATE
RECEIVED
TONNAGEorder required received
5Y102 100 28 27 37 40 22.2
SD204 70 4 27 36 36 3.1
BS840 200 32 29 35 40 30.2
DX6DM 170 16 29 35 36 15.8
DN34B 85 4 29 39 36 4.2
DN36 140 32 29 35 39 31.9
Spec 2a 250 100 29 36 40 97.2
DNS 70 8 29 39 40 8.7
PS37 120 6 30 39 37 7.9
804/10 190 12 30 40 37 8.5
DL10 190 32 30 40 40 34.8
SA520 100 16 30 40 44 17.5
DL12 100 4 30 40 36 3.5
Spec 3b 250 16 30 40 38 14.9
DN8D 140 4 30 41 42 5.1
DN474 170 28 31 41 41 29.3
C2138 190 24 31 41 37 23.1
2138 120 20 31 44 46 20.1
MI:200	 230 120 32	 38 37 116.4
550B20
	 120 12 32	 44 45 11.9
D142	 210 4 32	 42 40 3.7
820x	 85 90 32	 42 45 105.0
D1020	 170 4 32	 44 42 4.4
D1020	 130 4 32	 44 42 4.6
540C10
	 70 8 32	 44 42 7.9
DN8D	 210 16 33	 44	 45 15.5
DN36	 100 4 33	 44	 43 4.4
SA862	 100 4 33	 44	 43 2.8
DX6DM	 210 16 33	 44	 40 19.6
NOTES
1 Special steels must be ordered in multiples of 4 tonnes up to 40 tonnes because of
process restrictions (ingot sizes), The effective delivery tolerance on these
orders is 4/- 1 tonne,
2 English Billets Plc was PSL's principal raw material supplier.
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APPENDIX J.11
ROLLING PROGRAMME - JUL 86
DATE
(Jul 86)
BILLET SIZE - INPUT STEEL HEIGHT (MM)
MILL C MILL D
1 250 70
2 150 70
3 150 70
4 140 70
8 140 70
9 110 85
10 110 85
11 120 85
14 130 100
15 130 100
16 130 100
17 190 100
18 140 100
21 140 100
22 150 70
23 150 70
24 170 70
25 170 120
28 250 120
29 230 120
30 210 85
31 110 85
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APPENDIX J.12
REVIEW OF PSL'S MARKETS FOR 1975 AND 1985 IN TERMS OF
TOTAL SALES (TONNES), MARKET SEGMENT CHANGES AND
AVERAGE ORDER QUANTITIES (TONNES)
1 TOTAL SALES (TONNES) AND MARKET SEGMENT CHANGES
1975-1985
Market Segment
1975 1985
tonnes totel tonnes total
Electric Motors 79600 81 50400 50
Stockist Steel 15100 15 29700 30
Customised Sections 4200 4 20400 20
,
TOTAL 98900 100 100500 100
2 AVERAGE ORDER QUANTITY (TONNES) TRENDS 1975-1985
Year Market Segment
070 of
total
Average order
quantity (tonnes)
1975
1985
Electric Motors
Stockist Steel
Customised Sections
Electric Motors
Stockist Steel
Customised Sections
81
15
4
50
30
20
143
4.9
16.6
73
5.3
9.4
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APPENDIX J.13
AN ANALYSIS OF DELIVERY PERFORMANCE IN PSL'S MARKETS
Delivery performance
•	 Market total weeks of lateness
segment number of total
1 2 3
Electric Motors tonnes 140.5 13.0 10.0 6.5 -
orders 15 2 1 1 -
Stockist Steel tonnes 73.0 16.0 5.0 - -
orders 14 3 1 -
France tonnes 329.0 20.0 35.0 15.0 -
orders 16 1 2 1 -
Gambert UK tonnes 29.0 8.0 3.0 5.0 -
Fabrique orders 7 2 1 1 -
Denmark tonnes 30.5 7.0 - 4.5 4.0
orders 7 2 - 1 1
standard tonnes 291.5 30.5 33.0 -
steel order 14 3 3 - -
Customised special tonnes 118.5 8.5 - 17.0 16.0
Sections steel order 16 1 3 3
total tonnes 410,0 39.0 33.0 17.0 16.0
orders 30 4 3 3 3
tonnes 1012.0 103.0 86.0 48.0 20.0
TOTAL
orders 89 14 8 7 4
Note - Source Appendices 16-18
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APPENDIX J.14
RELEVANT ORDER-WINNERS AND QUALIFIERS FOR THE
MARKETING STRATEGY INITIATIVES CONCERNING
GAMBERT FABRIQUE AND CUSTOMISED SECTIONS
Order-winner and
	
Gambert Fabrique*	 Customised
qualifying criteria	 sections
1985	 1986	 1987	 1985	 1986	 1987
Price	 80	 80	 80	 Q	 Q	 Q
Delivery - reliability 	 QQ	 QQ	 QQ	 QQ	 QQ	 QQ
- speed	 50	 60	 60
Quality	 Q	 Q	 Q	 20	 10	 Q
Existing supplier	 20	 20	 20	 10	 10	 20
Meeting new
specifications	 -	 -	 20	 20	 20
*Relates to the main contract with France
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APPENDIX J.15
AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONTRIBUTION PER TONNE AND AS A
PERCENTAGE OF INVOICED RATES FOR TYPICAL ORDERS IN FEB 86
Market
Size
(mm)
Invoiced	 variable
rates	 costs Contribution
£5 per tonne
Es per
tonne
invoiced
rates%
Electric Motor 70 600 490 110 18
XR7 110 500 411 89 18
(5 tonnes) 120 465 385 80 17
140 420 350 70 17
190 425 355 70 16
250 430 360 70 16
UK Stockists 70 570 380 190 33
(10 tonnes) 100 490 316 174 36
120 475 298 177 37
140 465 280 185 40
170 470 285 185 40
250 450 290 160 36
GF (France) 85 420 365 55 13
(20 tonnes) 110 340 306 34 10
130 320 290 30 9
150 300 275 25 8
190 300 280 20 7
250 300 285 15 5
GF (UK) 85 480 410 70 15
(5 tonnes) 110 390 336 54 14
130 360 314 46 13
150 350 290 60 17
190 340 295 45 13
250 330 300 30 9
Customised 85 810 600 210 26
Section MK200 120 680 500 180 26
(10 tonnes) 190 610 470 140 23
210 610 470 140 23
NOTES
1 The variable costs included in these calculations have been chosen to reflect
the order quantities which prevail in these markets,
2 Source - Appendices J.3 and J.4
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APPENDIX J.16
ANALYSIS OF MARKETS IN TERMS OF ORDER QUANTITIES
Attachment
source Market Segment
Average order
quantity (tonnes)
per size - 1985
1 Electric Motors 73
overall 53
2 Stockist excludingSteels Gambert Fabrique 42
France
• France 19.7
Garabert UK 3.93 Fabrique Denmark .39
Overall 11.6
4 Customised Sections 9.4
Notes 1	 Stockist Steels, excluding Gambert Fabrique (France)
Stockist Steels overall
-	 total sales
-	 average order quantity per size (tonnes)
Gambert Fabrique (France)
-	 total sales (12 monthly orders averaging 670 tonnes)
-	 % of total sales
-	 average order quantity per size (670 tonnes + 34 sizes -
see Note 3, Attachment 2)
Overall less Gambert Fabrique (France)
-	 total sales (29700 - 8040)
-	 % of 1985 total sales (100 - 27)
-	 average order quantity per size
8040
Tonnes
29700
5.3
27
19.7
21660
73
4.2
2 Gambert Fabrique - average order quantities
• France - average monthly order = 670 tonnes
•
- average size - 34
= average order size - 670 + 34 - 19.7 tonnes
• UK and Denmark
- average monthly order - 35 tonnes
- average size = 9
= average order size = 35 + P = 3.9
• overall - average monthly order = 670 4 140 (35 x 2 x 2)*
- average size = 34 + (9 x 2 x 2)
= average order size = 810 + 70 = 11.6
* ie Both UK and Denmark order twice per month whereas France
only orders once per month
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APPENDIX J.I7
DELIVERY SPEED AS AN ELEMENT OF GF (UK) AND
GF (DENMARK) ORDERS
Appendix J.7 gave details of Gambert Fabrique orders. As this was part of
the overall Stockist Steel market, then this 5 week process lead time again
prevailed. An analyis of the gap between raising a works order and the
acknowledged and required delivery week showed a 5 to 7 weeks gap for GF
(France) but a very different position for GF (UK) and GF (Denmark), as
illustrated below:
Customer
Number of orders with gap of (weeks)
Total
3 4 5
GF (UK) 3 4 7
GF (Denmark) 3 4 7
Total 6 4 4 14
Therefore, 10 out of 14 of these orders had a gap which was less than that
required by the process lead time norms. Delivery speed was now an issue
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APPENDIX J.18
AN ANALYSIS OF CUSTOMISED SECTIONS BY 'MANUFACTURING
SEGMENT' IN TERMS OF DELIVERY PERFORMANCE
Category
Number
of
orders
Total
tonnes
ordered
Delivery performance -
number of orders
on
time
number of weeks late
1 2 3 4	 5 6 7 8
A
Standard Steels -
delivery speed is
not an order-
winner
9 218.5 6 1 2 - -	 - - - -
B
Standard steels -
delivery speed is
an order-
winner
5 43.0 2 2 1 - -	 - - - -
C
Special steels -
delivery speed is
not an order-
winner
9 85.0 7 - - 1* -	 - 10 - -
D
Special steels -
delivery speed
is an order-
winner
7 34.5 2 1 1 1 -	 - - 1* 1*
Total 30 381.0 17 4 4 2 -	 - 1 1 1
Processing problems as explained in the Note to Appendix 18.
0	 Low yield (60%) although still within the +1-1 tonne convention - could equate
to process problems which would account for the delays besides the low yield.
Note - source Appendix j.8.
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5 PRODUCT PROFILING
Trade-offs in process choice and the increasing recognition of these was
carefully explained in Chapter 3. At this time, the link between these
methodological developments and product profiling was stated but not
explained. Therefore, before examining the evolution of product profiling it is
important to provide essential background against which these developments
should be set as part of the overall business context into which these need to
be placed, and to establish essential linkage to the methodology developments
detailed earlier.
5.1 PROCESS INVESTMENTS : RESTRICTIONS AND REALISM
A company needs to have a comprehensive understanding of the changing
implications to its business as alternative processes are chosen, then use this
concept as a key input into the corporate strategy debate. Chapter 3
described the implications of process choice and contained details of two
important developments which were outcomes of the research (see pp8 1-84).
The first concerned the trade-offs associated with process choice, a factor
already highlighted at the beginning of this chapter. Linked to this is the fact
that several researchers in their explanations of processes singularly failed to
clearly distinguish between the classic forms of process (Hayes and
Wheelwright, 1984; Cohen and Lee, 1985 and Fine and Hax, 1985). The result
was that attempts to apply business/products to processes were
fundamentally inaccurate and the resulting obervations were flawed. The
second concerned the fact that companies rarely make a series of investments
which are tantamount to the process life cycle phenomenon put forward by
Hayes and Wheelwright (1979). In this classic article they argued that there
is a need to link together product and process life cycles in order to achieve
an appropriate level of fit between these two dimensions of a business.
Process choice
Project
Jobbing
Batch
Line
Continuous
process
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Understandably, however, companies do not make (or wish to make) a series
of investments which reflect the volume growth associated with typical
product life cycles. Instead, they choose investments which reflect the
anticipated sales forecasts and associated volume levels in order to avoid
making a series of investments as volumes change. This is as much to do with
lead times associated with process investments as it is to do with the fact that
multiple investments are simply too expensive. Furthermore, as explained in
Chapter 3, the choice of project and continuous processing is also linked to
fundamental characteristics of the product. A project process tends only to be
chosen where the product cannot be moved, while continuous processing can
only be used with products that are easily transferred from one part of the
process to another (eg fluids, chemicals and foodstuffs - see p110. Figure 5.1
attempts to illustrate these dimensions. It first of all shows that project has
no viable link with the other alternatives as explained earlier.
Low	 High
Volumes
This shows four potential volume transitions which typically
may face a business. The first example shows a move from one-off, low-volume
(Al) to repeat order, low-volume demand (A2) for a product of vice versa and the
change in manufacturing process which should ideally accompany this movement.
Examples B1 to B2, Cl to C2 and D1 to D2 show similar demand changes at
different points on the volume scale and requiring similar decisions concerning the
realignment of the process choice.
*One-off is a description of uniqueness, not order quantity.
Figure 5.1 An illustration of the restrictions and realistic phases of process
investments (Hill, 1985, p81 and Hill, 1989, p73)
A2
B2
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Secondly, any additional alternative process choice investments in
manufacturing, not to make a different product but to reflect changes in
volume would normally be limited (see Figure 5.1) to Al and A2 (jobbing to
low volume batch), B1 to B2 (low volume batch to high volume batch) and Cl
and C2 (high volume batch to line). In addition, where volumes decline in
continuous processing situations then these plants are run on the basis of what
is known as campaigning - 3 months running and 3 months stopped (say) as
shown by D2 to Dl.
5.2 PROCESS CHOICE AND ASSOCIATED INVESTMENTS
Fundamentally, therefore, companies make an investment associated with a
level of volume - often, and understandably, reflecting the company's view of
the forecast sales. What they often fail to appreciate is that when they choose a
process (including one of the many hybrids available) then they also choose the
set of business trade-offs associated with that choice, as illustrated in Figure 5.2
Low
	 Al
	
B1
	
High
Volume
Phase 1 which links the market/volume to the process choice.
------• Phase 2 which picks up the corresponding manufacturing and
business implications of the many dimensions which go on the vertical axis
(see pp 84-88). The above diagram shows volumes Al and B. the appropriate
process choice and their corresponding points on the manufacturing and
lu.sin.essironlications dimensiQns A2Ant..132
Figure 5.2 Selecting a process based on volumes and the associated trade-offs
involved (Hill, 1985, p68 and Hill, 1989, p62)
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However, there is also another factor overlooked by many businesses - the
realisation that whereas investments in manufacturing are inherently fixed,
the markets they serve are not. Thus, although market needs change, the
ability of process and infrastructure investments to support these changes
will not be maintained unless there is a deliberate set of decisions to do so.
Assessing how well existing processes fit an organisation's current product
requirements, and making appropriate choices of process to meet future
products, and their associated volumes and order winning/qualifying criteria
are critical manufacturing responsibilities, owing to the high investment
associated with the outcomes of these decisions.
However, as explained earlier, when companies buy processes they often fail
to appreciate the business trade-offs embodied in those investments. The
concept of product profiling offers the opportunity for a company to test the
current or anticipated degree of fit between the characteristics of its
market(s) and the characteristics of its existing or proposed processes and
infrastructure investments (the components of manufacturing strategy - see
Figures 3.2 and 3.3). The purpose of this assessment is twofold. First, it
provides a way to evaluate and, where necessary, improve the degree of fit
between the way in which a company wins orders in its markets, and
manufacturing's ability to support these criteria (ie, manufacturing's strategic
response within a business). The second is to help a company to move away
from classic strategy building, characterised by functional perspectives being
agreed separately, without adequate attempts to test the fit or reconcile
differences in terms of what is best for the business as a whole.
In many instances though, companies will be unable or unwilling to provide
the degree of fit desired, due to the level of investment, executive energy, and
time scales involved. But sound strategy concerns not getting the answers
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right, but improving the level of consciousness a company brings to bear on
its corporate decisions. In such circumstances, however, product profiling will
increase corporate awareness, and allow a conscious choice between
alternatives. It is this level of strategic alertness to which companies have not
aspired in the past.
5.3 THE NEED TO EXPAND THE LANGUAGE BASE IN THE FIELD OF
MANUFACTURING STRATEGY
Part of manufacturing's difficulty has been to find ways to express important
perspectives in a manner that provides for corporate debate and discussion.
Unless it can do this, then other business functions will find difficulty in
embracing the issues on hand and, in turn, being party to their resolution.
lntutition, experience and gut-feel must give way to business-related
concepts and explanations.
Each business will require its own approach and resolution. The examples
described in the following sections met the specific needs of those businesses
to which they relate. In no way is it intended that they should be considered
as universally applicable. However, it is the conceptual base on which these
analyses rest that can be transferred and used to prepare similar analyses,
where appropriate, for other businesses.
5.4 PRODUCT PROFILING
Inconsistency between the market and manufactuirng process capability, in
terms of supporting the business specification of its products, can be induced
by changes in the market or process investments, or a combination of the two.
In all instances, the mismatch is created by the fact that the investments
within manufacturing are both significant and fixed in nature (once a
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company has purchased them, then it will have to live with them for better or
for worse for many years to come). On the other hand, corporate marketing
decisions can often be relatively transient in nature, should a company so
decide. While this allows for change and repositioning, manufacturing
decisions bind the business for years ahead. Thus, linkage between these two
parts of a business is not just a felt need, but a reality requiring strategic
awareness, recognition, and action.
Product profiling is a way to ascertain the degree of fit between the choices of
process, which have been or are proposed to be made, and the order-winning
criteria of the product(s) under review. The sections that follow describe
research undertaken by myself. The applications have been chosen to
illustrate three different causes of manufacturing strategy/market mismatch
which the product profiling approach was able to illustrate and amplify.
In all three illustrations, the approach increased each firm's understanding of
the basic issues involved to the extent that it enabled them to change or
reshape their strategic direction. For one company, the outcomes provided
essential insights into why it should not proceed with a proposed investment.
For the other two applications, the approach highlighted the principal cause of
a poor overall performance in all or part of the business. Based on these
insights, each company was then able to take the necessary corrective action.
5.41 THE PROCEDURE ADOPTED IN PRODUCT PROFILING
The concept of product profiling helps to draw corporate attention to
mismatches similar to those briefly mentioned above and which will form the
core of the three sections which follow. The methodology graphically
represents key marketing and manufacturing differences the cause of which
will differ.
212
As stated earlier, the concept of product profiling is based upon a recognition
of the trade-offs associated with process choice. In particular, it is often most
marked in its application within the choiced of batch processes. As shown in
Figure 3.11, the range of volumes which batch supports is very wide from the
low volumes similar to those in jobbing to high volumes similar to those in
line.
The processes within the three illustrations which follow are all batch. That
is, a process is set up and the required quantity is produced. The process is
then stopped and reset for the next period.
Within this context, the steps to be followed in profiling products onto
processes is as follows-
1 Select relevant aspects of product/markets, manufacturing, investment
and cost and infrastructure. The dimensions should reflect the key
issues involved. However, it is most important in this phase to keep
the number of dimensions to a minimum. Choosing too many will
confuse. The key is to keep the choice small so that the profile which
follows will be clear. Typical choices are provided in the three
examples of product profiling given later in this chapter.
2 Display the characteristics of process choice that would be typical for
each chosen dimension. This provides the backdrop against which the
product or products are profiled.
3 Profile a product (or group of similar products) by positioning it on
each of the implications selected, to test the level of correlation between
the market needs and manufacturing's current or proposed response
to their provision.
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The resulting profile illustrates the degree of consistency between the
characteristics of the market and the business specification of the process and
chosen features of investment, cost and infrastructure. The more consistency
that exists, the straighter the profile will be. Inconsistencies between the
market and manufacturing's inherent ability to meet the product performance
criteria (order-winning and qualifying criteria) will show in the dog-leg shape
that will result.
5.42 INDUCING MISMATCH WITH PROCESS INVESTMENTS:
ONTARIO PACKAGING
As emphasised in the last chapter, when companies invest in processes they
buy a set of business trade-offs, fixed in nature. Thus, if a company invested
in a process that embodied a set of trade-offs inconsistent with its markets,
then, unless it intended to change its markets, it would induce inconsistency,
corresponding to the level of mismatch between process and market, the
relative size and importance of the process(es) involved, and the associated
level of reinvestment.
An example of a mismatch induced in this way is provided by the first
company I researched, Ontario Packaging* which was part of Texet
Industries* , a large group of companies based in Canada but with plants in
Europe and the USA and with diverse interests in food, cosmetics, engineering
and toys, besides a growing stake in retail holdings and other non-
manufacturing businesses. Taken over in 1984, Ontario Packaging was now
one of several packaging companies within the Group but the first within the
Province.
Having given the company time to settle down within the new corporate
structure and allowed the newly appointed managing director to gain an
*Both names have been disguised
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understanding of the business since his transfer from within the Group some
twelve months before, the Executive Group of Texet had recently asked the
company to review its position. The review was to include an assessment of
its current markets and to include any process investment proposals it
thought to be necessary in the future, with an indication of why they should
take place and the anticipated impact on the business as a whole and on the
various return on investment measures used within the Group, in particular.
5.421 Manufacturing
Ontario Packaging produced a wide range of cartons and other forms of
packaging. Its manufacturing capability comprised various forms of printing,
laminating, cutting, creasing, glueing and other auxilliary processes, together
with a whole range of in-house support functions.
As part of a strategy to up-grade its processes (as well as increase its process
capability where appropriate) Ontario Packaging proposed to invest in a state-
of-the-art laminating process, which would replace its existing capacity. At
the time of the research, some 30% of total production volumes (standard
machine hours) were laminated.
At a cost of Canadian $2.5 million, the new laminator would offer significant
savings in direct labour (through reduced manning), lower material costs
within the laminating process and a lower maintenance bill (with, however, a
corresponding increase in depreciation costs).
However, in order to achieve the group payback norm of 4 years, the
company would need to increase its sales of laminated products by about 40%
on current levels. It was this higher volume on which the savings to be made
with the investment proposal had been based.
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The order quantities currently processed averaged about 7 hours and ranged
from 2 to 60 hours. Whilst set-up (or make-ready) times for the new process
were similar to the existing equipment, throughput speeds were more than
twice as fast. Besides the basic gains accruing from the increase in
throughput speed and the reduced material wastage mentioned earlier, the
new process would offer few additional technical advantages other than
improving on the current, reduced performance of existing processes which
were a result of wear and tear with age.
Due to the space restrictions and to maintain the current, sensible flow of
materials through the manufacturing process, it was intended to install the
proposed new process where the existing equipment was positioned. The
existing equipment comprised two machines and was run on a two-shift basis.
It was also proposed to run the single replacement process on a two-shift
basis.
Whilst the utilisation of the current process was less than 60%, the target set
in the proposal for the new investment was 80-85% based on higher volumes
and the reduction from two to one laminating machines.
5.422 Marketing
Over the years, a consistent marketing strategy had enabled the company to
increasingly position itself in the higher quality end of all its markets. The
current laminating facility was able to meet the technical features of the final
carton although it was recognised that the process under review would enable
production to meet these demands more easily.
A marketing survey on the relative importance of different purchasing
criteria to carton users was taken at the time of the research. It revealed that
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in the segment to which this investment proposal related, providing prompt
quotations and samples, together with high delivery reliability and a
willingness to meet schedule changes were critical features and ones which
Ontario Packaging had proved to be better at providing than its competitors.
Discussion on how the company won orders for its current work and the
anticipated order winners for the new work (the 40% uplift in sales referred
to earlier) revealed a significant change. Whilst price was not an important
factor in winning current orders for these products, it would increasingly be
so for the new orders which the company would need to secure in order to
achieve the additional volume called for by the throughput levels
underpinning the process investment proposals being considered.
Current sales were split roughly half-and-half' between those which were not
price sensitive and those where price was an order-winning criterion at some
level. However, the latter orders varied in their degree of price sensitivity.
For two-thirds of this segment, price had been given a weighting of 20 points
or less.
It was recognised that the proposed increase in sales of laminated products of
about 40% of current levels would be achieved in segments where price would
increasingly be the most important order-winner. The company, although
recognising that this would require significant sales effort, had already
identified the segments and customers which were available and considered
the achievement of these higher volumes to be a realistic target within the
required timescales. The company also emphasised the fact that to
compensate for the increased price sensitivity of the new business, it would
be undertaking to process orders which comprised much higher volumes, a
factor which was seen to reinforce the throughput speed gains inherent in the
new process in terms of the cost savings available.
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5.423 Manufacturing strategy review
An overview of the company's markets highlighted particular features
• In the past the company had moved its market position to the higher
quality segments. In addition, the marketing survey had revealed key
features which were important in these markets
- prompt quotations and samples
- delivery reliability performance
- a willingness to meet schedule changes (ie delivery speed)
Finally, price was not an important factor in winning current orders
• For laminated products, which accounted for 30% of current production
volumes (standard machine hours) price had an order-winner weighting
of more than 20 points for only 17% of the products using the laminating
process. In general, however, current laminated products had similar
product characteristics to those above.
To meet Texet's minimum payback norms, the company would have to
increase sales revenue by 40%. This would signal a distinct market change as
all the new business would be price sensitive.
For manufacturing to meet the low cost requirements of the proposed price
sensitive markets the following conditions would need to be provided
• relatively high volume orders
• steady schedules in terms of planned production and the product
specification
• delivery reliability would need to be maintained
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5.424 Manufacturing strategy issues
The important implication of this proposal was that it would result in the
rapid introduction of price sensitive products within the context of a current
marketing strategy which is based on other order-winners.
The price sensitive content of the future sales would be as high as 40% of
laminated produts which equates to 12% of all products. The result would be
the introduction of an ambivalent situation for manufacturing in terms of its
main task. On the one hand it would need to be provided with the conditions
in which to achieve low costs (viz large volumes, fast throughput times and
fixed schedules/call-offs), while on the other it would need to meet customer
schedule change requirements. In addition, the process throughput
improvements which the new laminator would offer resulted in average
production run lengths being approximately halved (from 7.0 to 3.5 hours)
with some reduced to as short as one hour.
The need to increase the utilisation of laminating capacity to 80-85% would
also reduce the opportunity for Ontario Packaging to meet customer-induced
changes without incurring costs and loss of available machine time. Such high
levels of utilisation would increase the need to change schedules as available
"spare capacity" would be significantly lower, all products would now go
through one rather than the existing two laminating machines and the "new"
business would tend to be higher volumes with correspondingly longer run
lengths. Hence, breaking into schedules would happen more often.
The suggested investment coupled with the need to increase sales in the price
sensitive segment of its laminated product markets would, therefore, bring a
substantial conflict in terms of manufacturing's task. The difficulty faced by
manufacturing was how to explain this in a way to which other functions in
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the business could relate.
5.425 The outcome of product profiling
A way of explaining the difficulties faced by manufacturing in a way such that
other functions in Ontario Packaging would relate is provided by product
profiling. The approach facilitates the explanation of the manufacturing
implications of these corporate choices in a way which will enable the
business to debate all the outcomes and arrive at a decision which would be
best for the company as a whole.
Using the methodology outlined in section 5.4 Figures 5.3 and 5.4 illustrate
the outcome of such profiling to reflect the position at Ontario Packaging
described here. Figure 5.3 showed the then current position. Figure 5.4
showed the position which would follow the proposed laminating investment.
This offered the company the chance to clearly see that manufacturing could
not support the characteristics of what would be two different markets. The
straight line (or matched) relationship between markets and manufacturing
which results in Figure 5.3 has been replaced by the dog-leg (or mismatched)
relationship associated with the proposed investment.
Presented with this graphic illustration of the potential outcome for the
business of going ahead with the investment proposal, the directors of the
company were given a medium for debating some of the key issues involved.
One significant feature was that it enabled the discussion to link markets to
manufacturing and in this way created strategic insights based on business
rather than functional perspectives. Recognising the coherent arguments
provided by the manufacturing function's strategic statement, the company
decided against the process investment proposals. Instead, it refurbished its
existing laminators thereby improving the quality of its processes without
incurring the mismatch which the alternative action would induce.
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Some relevant aspects
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Figure 5.3 A product profile illustrating the current position
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Some relevant aspects
Typical characteristics of process choice
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Figure 5.4 profile of the two sets of products showing the distinctly different
requirements
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5.43 APPLYING THE SAME MANUFACTURING STRATEGY TO TWO DIFFERENT
MARKETS : HOFFMAN TOBACCO
The last research example concerned the impact on the fit between a
company's market and its manufacturing capability brought about by
investments in a significant part of its process. Without a well-developed
manufacturing strategy the company was unconsciously driven by other
functional (in this instance, finance) norms and arguments into an
inappropriate, major investment. Failure to recognise that investment
decisions need to be based on strategy and not functional perspectives and
prerequisities, is a common contributor to poor corporate performance.
However, an equally important source of inappropriate investment decisions
is derived from assuming that to meet different corporate requirements a
similar manufacturing strategy approach can be applied. Typically, this
happens where specialists' views form the basis of initiatives, rather than a
manufacturing strategy formulated to the requirements of individual markets.
To help explain these differences, product profiling can again provide a
graphic description of the resulting mismatch. The example which follows is
based on my research work undertaken in the second half of the 1980s.
Hoffmann Tobacco* was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Teison Industries Inc*,
a North American holding company with interests in paper making,
printing and textiles besides the tobacco industry. With its head office based
in Virginia (USA), the Teison Group had subsidiaries throughout North
America. Europe and Australasia. Hoffmann Tobacco, as with other
subsidiaries in the Teison Group, had a high degree of autonomy in terms of
its corporate control and direction. It had two manufacturing plants within
the UK which produced cigarettes for both the home and overseas markets.
*Both names have been disguised
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While imported cigarettes would have some appeal in overseas markets it
was recognised that they would inevitably lose out to other brands
(particularly local products) on the basis of price. In addition, a climate of
falling demand for cigarettes in the UK and other traditional markets added
to the pressure for the company to offer a wider range of products and also to
reduce costs wherever possible.
5.431 Marketing
Due to the growing recognition of the harmful effects of smoking on a
person's health, the level of cigarette sales in many countries had fallen
appreciably. The tobacco industry had, therefore, been forced to rethink
its strategy in order to adjust for the loss of sales revenue and profit
which had resulted.
In addition, the move from shorts to king size cigarettes, the introduction
of cut- price cigarettes from R J Reynolds, Philip Morris, manufacturers in
West Germany and own brand-labels (eg Victoria Wine and Spa Grocers)
added to the pressures for additional investment to meet new brand
requirements and essential reductions in cost.
The company's marketing strategy was to increase its share of the home
market (in an attempt to maintain current domestic sales revenue in what
was recognised to be a declining market) while increasing the total value of
exports abroad. The principal target areas for growth in export sales were
the Middle East, West Africa and the European Duty Free segments.
In broad terms, the company's marketing strategy had four principal
features:
224
• advertising - to target those segments of the market in which people
currently smoked and for whom smoking had some appeal while
emphasising those features of the product which gave the most actual
or perceived benefit.
• product quality - to ensure that the product was manufactured and
presented at the highest level of quality in terms of tobacco blend, feel
and look of the cigarette itself and packaging as a way of maintaining
its position.
• price - the decline in sales had resulted in surplus manufacturing capacity
within the UK cigarette industry as a whole which, together with the low-
priced European cigarette imports mentioned earlier, had placed
significant emphasis on the need for cost reduction.
• product range - in response to the fact that while cigarettes were bought
for many reasons, one of those clearly identified was image. Although this
was in part related to product quality, the need to offer a wide range of
products was a most important way of increasing both Hoffman Tobacco's
share of the UK market and sales in current and future export markets.
One further feature of the UK market also emphasised many of the changes
taking place. The continued growth in sales to multiple retailers (eg Tesco
and Sainsbury) at the expense of the small retail outlets meant an increasing
squeeze on prices similar to that which these retailers had successfully
applied to food and other products in the past. This factor further
emphasised the need to reduce costs in order for the company to remain
competitive within its markets.
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In overall terms, Hoffman Tobacco has fared much better that most of its
competitors. Imperial Tobacco, Rothmans and BAT had all been forced to
reduce capacity in the mid to late 1980s. Imperial had closed sites in Bristol,
Nottingham and Glasgow with a loss of 1700 jobs, Rothmans had shut its
Basildon plant with 1200 job losses and BAT had closed its Liverpool unit with
its associated 1800 jobs. During this period, the company had been able to
increase market share of UK cigarette sales while increasing exports in both
existing and new areas. However, much of this had been due to having the
best brands in the market. In addition, overall corporate performance had
been enhanced by sales of cigars and tobacco for pipe and "roll-your-own"
sales.
5A32 Manufacturing
One part of the total response to declining cigarette sales and increasing
competition had been a productivity improvement drive in the key
manufacturing areas. In this context the company and the Tobacco Workers
Union (TWU) agreed a whole series of changes which needed both worker
cooperation and substantial capital investment. The aim of the programme
was to help the company survive in a competitive market while maintaining
real corporate earnings, especially in future years. The changes were a
combination of restructuring, process investments and changes in working
methods and manning levels and were to be introduced at both the Norwich
and Edinburgh' plants.
• Restructuring
In the context of declining sales for cigarettes, the need to improve the links
between the marketing and production functions was well appreciated, The
The locations have been disguised
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previous structure had formalised the separation of these two parts of the
business and was recognised to be an important cause of liaison,
communication and coordination problems.
In order to improve these important links within the business, a policy
decision was taken to allocate certain products to be made at each plant in
such a way as to achieve greater product identity within the business as a
whole. This orientation also needed to reflect the capacity requirements at
each plant and was undertaken over a period of three years as shown in
Appendix K.1. When completed, it was agreed by all the principal functions
concerned to have brought a significant improvement to the working
relations particularly between the marketing and production functions.
• Process investment
Multi-functional task forces were established in both plants to undertake a
review of the manufacturing and distribution activities. Their broad terms of
reference were to recommend the best process mix, manning levels and
working practices to achieve the required production levels with associated
lower costs. Considerable work was undertaken to identify the technical
suitability of available processes which incorporated the latest designs and
controls and offered significant improvements in terms of throughput speeds.
The principal investment proposals concerned the secondary stage* of the
manufacturing process which involved the making and packing of the
cigarettes themselves. The throughput speeds of cigarette making and
packing machines had increased considerably since the late 1960s. The new
generation of Protos could now run at making speeds of 8,000 cigarettes per
The primary stage was concerned with preparation and blending which
were comnleted nrior to the Reconciary R129PC
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minute (cpm) compared to the current Molins makers which worked at
speeds of 5,000 cpm. In addition, the Molins HLP4 and the GD packers gave
corresponding uplifts in throughput speeds. Finally, the proposals also called
for the introduction of a conveyor/reservoir system with elevator
arrangements which were designed to link a maker and packer together.
With reservoir capacity giving storage space for in excess of 50,000
cigarettes, the system comprised an automatically controlled conveyor which
linked the two parts of the process together. As cigarette makers have much
higher throughput speeds than packers, the basic concept of linking one
maker to one packer could be extended by additional conveyors enabling the
linking together of machines of different speeds in order to acheive desired
levels of matching and the resulting improved overall use of the capital
investments.
The proposed process investments centred around the provision of two major
savings
• high-speed makers and packers which would reduce the number of
machines required for a given production volume and hence reduce the
direct operator, indirect support and overhead requirement throughout
• secondary process investments to allow further reductions in direct and
indirect employees by mechanising certain tasks and reducing the manning
levels involved in taking part-finished products from one process stage to
the next
Appendix K.2 summarises the present product mix characteristics at both
plants while Appendices K.3 and K.4 list the current secondary equipment in
use at Edinburgh and Norwich, the advantages to be gained and the
anticipated reduction in costs.
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5.433 Current position
By involving the employees and trade union representatives at an early stage
and continuing this high level of involvement throughout, the necessary
reorganisation and manpower reductions which had ensued were completed
without any signs of animosity or disagreement from those involved. The
overt and genuine wish to involve those concerned in the rationale for the
proposed changes was built on many years of increasing openness displayed
within the Company. The result was that the relatively complex sets of
arrangements were duly completed on time and the expected reductions in
the 500 strong, factory-based staff were achieved.
However, although the planned labour reduction had been accomplished
within the set time scales, the anticipated profit improvements had only been
achieved at the Edinburgh plant. Given the similarity of investments made
and the gains in labour cost reductions which accrued, it was difficult, at least
from a distance, to understand the success of one application and the relative
failure of the other. At the time of the research, current results confirmed
the significant disparity between the two plants. After discussions, initiatives
and promises, the Norwich plant's performance was still well short of target.
This was in marked contrast to the Edinburgh plant which seemed to go from
strength to strength. The reasons for this difference were not at all apparent.
In fact, the similarity of investments and approaches undertaken at each site
made comparisons the easier to make and contrasts the easier to conclude.
The problem was to identify the fundamental nature of this difference which
was marked in itself and difficult to understand given the circumstances
involved.
Part of an in-depth review of the reasons behind this underpefor mance
provided some additional insights. Over the three years prior to the research,
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the market had changed. Customer lead times were much shorter and as
many of the products were now customised at least in terms of packing there
was increased pressure on meeting agreed delivery dates, particularly so in
export markets and the lower volume end of the company's business.
Ideally, manufacturing needed between 3 and 5 weeks to meet a delivery
depending upon the degree of customisation involved. As higher volume
items were normally met from finished goods inventory, the total lead times
estimated above * were for customised products, including larger volume
orders of an infrequent nature from some overseas countries. A review
revealed that about 65 percent of all orders received were for delivery in less
than 5 weeks while almost 35 percent were for less than 3 weeks. This
pattern was increasingly common throughout the whole of the company's
business. In addition, whereas overall sales (both in terms of revenue (£s)
and number of cigarettes sold) had slightly increased, since the decision to
orientate different products to the two plants the order size for the products
had, if anything, declined. About half the orders received were for 100,000
cigarettes or less with over 75% for upto 500,000. Although many of these
were for the company's higher volume products and were, therefore,
cumulated within the production scheduling system, there were also those
products which experienced a more intermittent pattern of demand as would
be anticipated with lower volume products. Certainly this mix of work
embodied a wider range and spread of volumes than before, particularly at
Norwich.
The review also revealed that the new equipment at the Norwich
plant had experienced some problems (see Appendix K.5). The new
plant had resulted in reducing the capacity requirements (and subsequent
manning levels), the work-in-progress inventory and associated indirect
* The lead times of 3 to 5 weeks quoted here comprised material lead time
nine nenrs•-•co
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labour at both plants. The problem was how to improve the performance at
Norwich up to plan and on a par with that being achieved at Edinburgh.
The decision to provide orientation to its business, in terms of products,
manufacture and markets resulted in a distinct orientation in each plant of
products and associated volumes. An analysis of the collected data in
Appendices K.1 and K.2 showed an enormous difference in terms of cigarettes
made at each plant
Edinburgh Norwich
Used in a typical month
•	 brand types 3 25
•	 packaging 1 15
•	 product codes 65 560
Total brand types 3 27
The spread in volumes across these product types (as shown in Appendix K.1)
also reflects this relatively high volume nature of the products manufactured
in Edinburgh and the lower volume nature at the Norwich plant. As the plant
review above revealed, of the Edinburgh-manufactured brands, 93% were for
Virginia Mild, even though these had different packaging requirements - see
Appendix K.1 for the mix of work at both plants.
Although the orientation of product types had an accepted strategic value, the
problems facing Norwich came from the manufacturing investments made.
The company, assuming similar market characteristics embarked on similar
manufacturing strategies. The data shows how different the tasks were,
especially given the increasingly shorter lead times experienced and the fact
that Norwich (compared to Edinburgh) was less able to supply orders from
finished goods inventory.
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The decision to link together batch processes creates a hybrid which is more
towards the characteristics of line and the change in trade-offs which result
(see Figure 5.5). The ensuing mismatch between the manufacturing strategy
decision and the Norwich requirement (illustrated in part by the downtime
analysis given in Appendix K.5) is in sharp contrast to the matched nature
within the Edinburgh plant.
Trade-offs
associated
with process
choice
Jobbing
Batch
Linked
batch
Line
Low	 High
Volume
Figure 5.5 Linked batch process in relation to batch illustrating the higher
volume related nature of this process choice compared to classic
batch processes
The need in strategy to explain the cause of problems was facilitated in this
situation by the use of product profiling. The resulting profiles (see Figure
5.6) clearly demonstrate the mismatch at Norwich, which is a fundamental
reason for this plant's poor performance. On the other hand, the matched
profile of Edinburgh underpins its favourable results. The use of product
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profiling in this situation offered the opportunity to illustrate the
fundamental cause of the wide discrepancies in performance of two plants in
which similar manufacturing strategies had been followed. For Edinburgh,
the decisions were in line with its market needs whereas in Norwich, they
were out of line as the characteristics of its markets were fundamentally
different to those of the Edinburgh plant and, therefore, required a different
strategic response to meet the low volume, wide product range and short lead
time needs of its customers.
Figure 5.6 illustrated how these changes in manufacturing fitted Edinburgh's
markets, while they led to a significant mismatch for Norwich. The procedure
followed was similar to the one outlined in Section 5.41. Again, the first step
was to describe, in conceptual terms, the characteristics of product/markets,
manufacturing, investment/cost, and infrastructure features pertinent to the
business. The dimensions selected for these two plants are detailed in Figure
5.6. First, the characteristics that reflect the change between jobbing, batch
and line need to be described. Thus, the product range associated with
jobbing is wide, and becomes increasingly narrow as it moves through to line.
Whereas, customer order size is small in jobbing, and becomes increasingly
larger as it moves though to line, and so on. These dimensions represent the
classic characteristics of the trade-offs embodied in process choice.
Edinburgh's profile showed a straight-line relationship between the product/
markets and the manufacturing and infrastructure provision. However, when
the profile is drawn for Norwich it can be seen that a dog leg occured, due to
the difference in markets, compared to the similar process and infrastructure
investments made in each of the two plants.
2 3 3
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this company
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Figure 5.6 The product profiles for the Edinburgh and Norwich plants
5.434 The outcome of product profiling
Whereas the previous example of the usefulness of product profiling
concerned a proposed strategy decision, this last application was to help in
the review of decisions already taken. The full extent of these was
considerable when process investments, redundancy payments, remuneration
agreements, installation costs and the time and management energy involved
were taken into account.
The inappropriateness of the decisions at the Norwich plant as clearly shown
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by the product profile and the subsequent poor performance understandably
became a Teison rather than Hoffman issue. The continued poor performance
at Norwich over the period following the review and the cigarette making
capacity available throughout the Group were major reasons for the decision
to close the Norwich plant. Although in this application the insights only
explained the fundamental reasons for inadequate past performance, it
reinforced need for strategy to be forward-looking in nature. Product
profiling offered clarity in terms of strategic insights but these are not only
obtainable in hindsight. Given the total investments (both process and
goodwill) involved, the Group were not prepared to let Hoffman Tobacco try
again with fresh resources. However, with appropriate strategic insights this
could have been avoided.
5.44 INCREMENTAL MARKETING DECISIONS RESULTING IN A MISMATCH:
NOLAN AND WARNER
The examples of Ontario Packaging and Hoffman Tobacco, though of general
application were more specific in nature. For many companies, changes in
market needs happen over time. These incremental changes are often more
typical of the source of mismatch that exists in a business than those
described in these earlier examples.
Where the market characteristics have changed over time, product profiling
maps the fit between the requirements of the current market and the
characteristics of existing processes and, in this way, provides an important
way of describing these changes and their impact on the business. The key to
identifying these differences lies in the recognition that while the needs of
the market may have changed, the characteristics of the manufacturing
process and infrastructure investments will not. These, as emphasised in
Chapter 3, will remain fixed, unless there is further, appropriate investment.
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The research described in the next section was undertaken in the early part
of the 1980s and led to my developing the concept of product profiling.
Nolan and Warner *
 is a wholly-owned subsidiary of a UK-based automotive
component supplier, the ATMO Group *
 which is involved in other product
areas based on engineering, electronics, chemicals and construction.
The fall-off in demand for cars together with the world recession experienced
in the late 1970s and early 1980s had put much pressure onto the company's
markets and sales. Appendix 5.6 shows the main product ranges of the
business and also the annual unit sales during the period 1978/83.
5.441 Marketing strategy
The company's marketing strategy during this period had been expressed as
trying to minimise the reduction in sales revenue (Es) in real terms in an
attempt to hold its market share so as to enable the company to expand
based on the UK, European and world-wide growth in demand anticipated in
late 1983 through the rest of the 1980s. Appendix 5.7 shows that following
the sales revenue (Es) drop between 1978 and 1979, the company just about
kept actual sales (Es) steady (with 1983 showing improvement on 1981 and
1982) although still 15% below the 1978 figure. Given the overall economic
climate, the company considered that it had performed well in terms of
minimising the revenue fall in terms of real sales.
A core aspect of the company's marketing strategy through this period was to
increase the product range and also the number of products within each range.
The RU400 range was introduced in 1981, and 1983 was patently the best
* These names have been disguised
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year to date. Total unit sales of the AC200 range was also higher than at any
time, but as shown in Appendix L.1 these were the exceptions in that unit
volumes (especially in high selling ranges) had declined substantially.
Over the five years to 1983 markets were very difficult and price
competition was very severe. In order to minimise the drop in total sales
revenue the company's policy was expressed as attempting to meet all the
demands of its customers, where possible. Although its willingness to chase
business was recognised as taking the company into smaller volume products,
it was also acknowledged as representing additional sales revenue.
Minimising the revenue fall in real sales (Es) resulted in the need for
increased efforts throughout the company from design and production
engineering as well as marketing and manufacturing.
5.442 Manufacturing
The manufacturing processes were in three distinct production units. The
first two units involved machining and other processes primarily laid out on a
process or functional basis. In addition to the traditional areas such as
grinding and turning, there were also departments with processes to provide
all or most of the operations necessary to manufacture similar components
for the complete range of products. On the non-machining side, the facilities
Included heat treatment, de-greasing and other prepartory and finishing
processes. Although some of the components were bought-in from outside
suppliers, the policy had been, and still was, to manufacture internally
wherever possible. In more recent years, the plant and process investment
which had taken place had been largely to meet the requirements of new
products or for specific process improvement (for example, see Note 2,
Appendix L.3). The third production unit concerned sub-assembly, final
assembly and test. This involved sub-assembly and assembly lines for the
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higher volume products and bench layouts to meet low volume requirements.
Information on some representative products in each of the three production
units is given in Appendices L.4-L.8 inclusive. At the time of the research,
the manufacturing task was seen to be supporting the introduction of new
products within an existing range and also the need to reduce manufacturing
costs throughout the process. Over the last year there had also been
substantial pressure to reduce inventory, in order to improve the cash flow
situation. Due to the wider product range and the need to respond quickly to
customers changes in call-offs, this had proved to be difficult. However,
reducing inventory was seen to be a high priority in the future and would
form part of an essential strategic review of the manufacturing function.
Since the mid to late 70s there has been a stringent check on process
investment. This corporate restriction had meant that, apart from that
necessary to meet new product requirements, investment has been difficult
to come by. In fact, only where process cost savings could be achieved had
any investment been forthcoming. Consequently, the company was, by and
large, running in 1983 with the processes bought some 6 or more years
before.
5.443 Manufacturing strategy review
The essence of the Company's marketing strategy had been to maintain sales
revenue levels in order to retain the organisational structure and market
presence on which to base its future prosperity in line with the forecast sales
growth in the mid and late 1980s. However, the company was facing a major
problem at the time of this new era. Manufacturing could not support the
new mix of sales and make adequate profits. A review of Appendix L.3
shows that profits had fallen dramatically (even ignoring inflation) from more
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than £2.9m to less than £.0.5m in the five years from 1978 to 1982 with a
corresponding decline in return on investment.
The principal reason for this was that manufacturing was attempting to
support a significant decline in volumes with little change in its processes or
infra- structure provision. As shown in Appendices L.8 and L.9 the decline in
unit volumes had been dramatic. The only increases were in fact in low unit
volume ranges which would do little to redress this mismatch between the
characteristics of its orders and manufacturing's ability to support these
levels and make adequate profits. Furthermore, as shown in Appendix L.9,
manufacturing had artificially maintained shop floor volumes in an attempt
to protect its high volume processes from the decline in customer order size/
call-offs, a fact, which had contributed to the increase in total inventory
levels by some 40%.
Furthermore, the disparity between the high volume nature of its
manufacturing processes and the low volume markets at the time of the
research was compounded by its corporate investment rationale. Apart from
capital allocations to purchase new process technologies, the investments in
the last few years had been made to reduce manufacturing costs (see Note 2,
Appendix L.3). This outcome was supported by an analysis of the process
time reductions in the period 1978-1983 for one high volume component as
shown in Appendix L.I0.
The strategic task facing manufacturing was to provide a means of
demonstrating this such that the business could review the cause of the
present difficulties which had resulted in a severe reduction in overall profit
performance. Such a way was afforded by product profiling.
In the instance of Nolan and Warner the basis for comparison was to
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illustrate the incremental nature of market change. Whereas the current
year of the research was one point, the other was not the previous year (as is
the usual comparison made by most companies) but the year in which the
company had made its major investments, ie 1978. For, this is the year
which would represent the nature of the market needs the support for which
the process investments had been made. The resulting profile is given as
Figure 5.7 and clearly shows the outcome.
5.444 The outcome of product profiling
The company's failure to redress its manufacturing strategy in line with its
changing markets was the root cause of the 1983 profile. Unless, therefore,
investment was made to realign manufacturing in terms of its new markets
and to test whether changes to its marketing strategy would not be to the
overall benefit of the company, then the poor level of corporate performance
would continue.
In the event, the ATMO Group allocated investment on the basis of ROI
performance. Nolan and Warner was now towards the bottom of the Group's ROI
league table and did not, therefore, have the credentials to attract the necessary
investment allocation. ATMO had, in fact, (without fully realising it) condemned
Noland and Warner to fail. By starving it of investment (based on financial
criteria) it had made the strategic decision that this business would not recover.
Thus, it is important that investment decisions are based firstly on strategy and
secondly on financial criteria and not solely on the latter.
However, ATMO would not be persuaded otherwise. Nolan and Warner, therefore,
- changed its marketing strategy and deliberately stopped going for low
volumes
Invest-	 level of
ment &	 inventory
cost
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- negotiated price increases for low volume demand items. One customer
however, refused to go along with this proposed increase and notified
Nolan and Warner that it would place its business elsewhere. Eighteen
months later this customer came back to Nolan and Warner. It had
found that aspects of support (technical back-up, delivery speed and
willingness to meet schedule changes) were an essential feature of
their own needs and ones that Nolan and Warner had supplied in the
past but which it had failed to recognise were part of Nolan and Warner's
provision - the price, therefore, needed to reflect this
• shed much of its very low volume requirements to a small volume
manufacturer within the ATMO group set-up
• sub-contracted a significant amount of additional manufacturing work
• shed its labour and overheads (eventually by two-thirds) with this
process positioning change
• survived - it is currently mak
5.5 USING PRODUCT PROFILING: SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
The examples given in the previous section illustrate the role product
profiling may play in helping a company to check its existing product and
process choice relationship, and allow, where relevant, comparisons to be
made between similar applications, or to measure trends over time.
However, although two of the applications are based on hindsight, the
purpose of strategy is to be forward-looking. When a company is able to
illustrate current positions and future alternatives, it then becomes possible
to discuss alternatives, and determine which strategic direction best meets
the needs of the business. It is this role that gives the concepts of product
profiling its strategic orientation, and that companies find useful in helping to
determine the business perspectives of manufacturing.
ing a more acceptable return on investment
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However, where companies are, for whatever reason, experiencing a
mismatch between their current market needs and existing manufacturing
processes and infrastructure, they face a number of alternative choices. They
can:
I Live with the mismatch.
2 Go some way to redressing the profile mismatch, by altering the
marketing strategy.
3 Go some way to redressing the profile mismatch, by investing in and
changing manufacturing and its infrastructure.
Alternative 1 affords companies the opportunity to consciously make a
decision on the trade-offs involved. It does not in any way imply this to be
an incorrect strategic choice. What it does do is to bring a company's
expectations more in line with reality, makes it aware of the real costs of
being in different markets, changes the measures of performance by
distinguishing between those based upon business-related decisions and
those based upon functional achievement, and raises the level of corporate
consciousness about the overall consequences of maintaining product profile
status quo, or the decision to improve or widen any mismatch that may exist.
Furthermore, future decisions concerning new products are now more able to
incorporate these essential perspectives and thus help arrive at decisions
which reconcile the diverse functional perspectives under the mantle of what
is best for the business.
Alternatives 2 andj concern ways of straightening existing - or consciously
avoiding the creation of new - mismatches, which may be taken
independently or in unison. Alternative 2 represents the influencing of
corporate policy through changes or modifications to existing or proposed
marketing strategies. In this way, the implications for manufacturing of
marketing decisions are addressed and included as an integral part of the
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corporate strategy debate. Thus, manufacturing is able to move from the
reactive stance it currently takes to a proactive mode, so essential to sound
policy decisions.
Alternative 3 involves a company in the decision to invest in the processes
and infrastructure of its business, to either enable manufacturing to become
more effective in its provision of the order-winning criteria and support in
the market place for existing products, or to establish the required level of
support for future products. As in Alternative 2 it enables manufacturing to
switch from making a reactive to make a proactive response to corporate
marketing decisions. Thus, by receiving pertinent inputs at the strategic
level, the business now become mores fully aware of the sets of implications
involved, and is able to arrive at strategic options, based upon the relevant
and comprehensive inputs necessary to make sound judgments at the
strategic level.
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APPENDIX K
DETAILS OF THE PRODUCT PROFILING APPLICATION
FOR HOFFMAN TOBACCO
Appendix K contains supporting details of the research work completed at
Hoffman Tobacco. In this way it gives the essential data on which the
research application was based and the necessary background against which
the research findings need to be set.
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APPENDIX K.I
PERCENT OF THE VOLUME OF PRODUCTION BY BRAND TYPE
AT EACH FACTORY OVER THE THREE YEAR TRANSITION PERIOD
Factory
location Brand type
Percent Product by volume each year
1 2 3
Virginia Mild - UK 33 47 61
- Europe
Duty Free ( ' ) 10 21 32
Edinburgh Hoffmann Special 20 14 7
Hoffmann Special (Plain) 25 15 -
Other brands(2) 12 3 -
Total 100 100 100
Virginia Mild - UK 35 17 10
- Europe
Duty Free(1) 18 10 -
Hoffmann Special lOs 15 18 19
Hoffmann Special 16 15 17
Norwich Hoffmann Special 50s 3 4 3
Gold Tip 6 10 14
Hoffmann Mild ( 3 ) - 3 3
Hoffmann Special (Plain)
- 9 16
Mild Leaf - 3 4
Other brands(4) 7 11 14
Total 100 100 100
Notes (1) These were packed in both 200s and 300s
(2) This category at Edinburgh totalled 6 brand types in Year 1
(3) This brand was produced as both a plain and tipped cigarette
(4) This category at Norwich totalled 17 brand types in Year 3
(5) Year 3 above was the current year in which the research was
undertaken
(6) Brand names and other figures have been disguised but the
relationship between the years has been retained in order to
maintain the relative nature of the contrasts involved
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APPENDIX K.2
OVERVIEW OF CURRENT BLENDS, BRANDS, PACKING SIZES
AND PRODUCT CODES AT EACH FACTORY LOCATION
The current range of products reflects its need to increase the number of cigarette
types as part of its competitive response in both home and export markets. In the
normal way, a product code was allocated wherever there was a difference in
blend, brand, length of cigarette or packing specification from one requirement to
another. Thus, export orders often required packing and insert changes, the
number of cigarettes per pack would differ to facilitate the use of slot machines
(see Note 1) and different packs are used to meet the perceived needs of
customers. Below is a summary of the differences currently required at each plant
Number of specifications used
in a typical month Edinburgh Norwich
blends 3 12
Average brands 3 25
product codes 65 560
70 - 4
Number of
different
packings per
cigarette size
(mm)
80
84
95
-
1
-
2
5
2
100 - 2
Notes 1 Slot machines refer to the coin-operated, dispensing machines
Increasingly used in clubs, restaurants, airports and other public
places where customers serve themselves through inserting the
appropriate amount of cash required
2 The different packings used included hinged lid, shell and slide,
soft cup, box and drum
3 The cigarette size above (for example 70, 80, 84) referred to the
length of a cigarette in mm
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APPENDIX K.3
PRINCIPAL SECONDARY EQUIPMENT AT THE EDINBURGH AND NORWICH
PLANTS BEFORE AND AFTER THE CAPITAL INVESTMENTS HAD TAKEN
PLACE
Equipment category
Edinburgh Norwich
before after before after
Filter rod makers 6 6 6 6
makers 2 - 4 6
Free-standing plain
packers 2 - 4 6
makers 30 8 34 7
Free-standing filter
packers 40 10 42 8
Linked makers and packers - filter - 15 - 20
Notes 1 Filter rod makers are the machines used to make the filter tips -
see Attachment 2
2 The equipment for making and packing plain (or non-filter tip)
cigarettes which was originally sited in the Edinburgh plant was
transferred to Norwich when these products were also re-sited
3 The investments involved to meet these changes (new equipment,
reorganisations and compensation payments) totalled over £40m
for both plants. About 80 percent of this was spent on new
equipment and the re-organisation of existing equipment (including
linking the making and packing processes) both within and between
the two plants
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APPENDIX K.4
RATIONALE SUPPORTING THE CAPITAL INVESTMENTS SUMMARISED IN
APPENDIX 5.3 AND THE REDUCTIONS IN LABOUR WHICH RESULTED
The rationale supporting the capital investments in both plants was principally for
the following reasons -
The linking of a maker and packer required a conveyor and reservoir facility
which provided an automatic feeding system from one process to the next.
Previously (and currently with free standing equipment) indirect labour was used
to transport cigarettes from the makers to the packers. This would necessitate the
movement of cigarettes loaded onto trolleys often from one floor to another and
usually involving lengthy distances.
In order to decouple the maker from the packer the total holding of made
cigarettes in a conveyor and reservoir system was in excess of 50,000. Thus, this
afforded the two processes a practical level of independence within the linked
system.
The advantages offered concerned a significant reduction in indirect labour
together with small (but significant in terms of actual costs) savings on direct
materials, particularly tobacco and is explained in more detail below.
The principal gains which accrued from these changes were
I Direct labour cost reduction - the introduction of higher speed makers and
packers, together with the increased efficiency of the new equipment*,
resulted in a reduction in direct labour requirements
2 Direct material cost reduction - the new equipment and concept of linked
processes resulted in a reduction in material loss/waste from lower levels
of rejects and damaged product in the process
3 Indirect labour reduction - the linked process concept reduced the need
for indirect support in several ways, including -
• movement of product
• storage
• administrative support
• maintenance/technical support for the equipment
The expected results of these improvements were a 20% reduction in factory-
related staff and an anticipated 1% reduction in material costs. Over 90% of this
planned labour reduction was achieved by the introduction of linked processes in
the two plants.
* Efficiency in this context referred to actual output achieved compared to the
expressed or standard output and came from reduced downtime and the
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APPENDIX K.5
DOWNTIME ANALYSIS EXPERIENCED ON THE LINKED PROCESSES
AT THE NORWICH PLANT
Downtime as a percent of
Reasons for stoppage 	 total observations
Making machine
Conveyor/reservoir fault 2.1
Related directly Reservoir full 3.3
to linked
process
Need to empty reservoir
on a changeover/end of
18.6
a shift 9.4
Other 3.8
Unrelated to Maker fault 14.2
linked process Other 2.5 16.7
Total for the making machine 35.3
Packing machine
Conveyor/reservoir fault 2.7
Related directly
to linked process
Reservoir e mpty/waiting
on a changeover/start of
17.7
a shift 12.9
Other 2.1
Unrelated to Packer fault 16.1
linked process Other 2.8 18.9
Total for the packing machine 36.6
Note The conveyor/reservoir faults given for both the makers and packers
were independent of each other as they were related to the feed into and
out of the reservoir
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APPENDIX L
DETAILS OF THE PRODUCT PROFILING APPLICATION
FOR NOLAN AND WARNER
Appendix L contains supporting details of the research work completed at
Nolan and Warner. In this way it gives the essential data on which the
research application was based and the necessary background against which
the research findings need to be set.
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APPENDIX Li
ANNUAL UNIT SALES BY PRODUCT RANGE IN THE PERIOD
1978 - 1983
Product Range
1978
Unit sales for the year ended 31 Dec
1979	 1980	 1981 .	 1982 1983
VR100 105650 74500 72880 58400 51790 45600
VR150 74600 44850 45950 31250 30880 36040
AC200 3110 3290 3120 3270 2650 4160
A250 52620 34560 42360 28350 28520 37100
NT300 25750 23170 22200 16630 15440 12610
RU400 170 110 250
Total 261730 180370 186510 138070 129390 135760
NOTES
1 The above are in terms of units sold and all figures have been rounded. As the
unit price varies and has changed over time, it is not relevant to relate these unit
volumes to the sales turnover (Es) levels given in Attachment 2.
2 Figures for only the first 8 months of 1983 are available, and these have been
increased on a pro rata basis.
3 Each product range above comprises a number of general products each at a
different stage in its own life cycle.
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APPENDIX LA
Product
range
7.; Total Manufacturing
Costs
materials labour overhead total
VR100 40 13 47 100
VR150 39 13 48 100
AC200 33 16 51 100
AC250 42 14 44 100
NT300 35 16 49 100
RU400 43 15 42 100
,
Notes
1 Overhead recovery rates were based on direct labour
hours
2 The percentages given above were based on three
products in each range which were made for original
equipment sales but reflected the spread of volumes
associated with the product range reviewed
3 Original equipment (OE) sales referred to orders for
products which go onto vehicles currently in production
at customer's assembly plants. When vehicles were
no longer being built the orders for products reverted
to sales to meet. the demand for spares or service only.
Where a vehicle had been made for some years then
demand for products would comprise both OE and spares
or service sales
256
APPENDIX L.5
AVERAGE MONTHLY CALL-OFFS FOR TYPICAL COMPONENTS
WHICH GO INTO THE ASSEMBLY OF ONE OR MORE PRODUCTS
WITHIN THE FOUR PRODUCT RANGES, TOGETHER WITH THE
ORDER QUANTITIES ISSUES IN THE FIRST PRODUCTION
UNIT IN THE PERIOD 1980/53
Product information Monthly avra g e	 all-ffs
and typical
e
 orderc
	 o
quantities
,
range component issue details 1980 1981 1982 1983
,
VR108/ call-off 2600 2520 1970 1490
1426 order quantity 4750 4250 3250 3500,
VR111/ call-off 50 - - -
3276 order quantity 255 - - -
VR100
VR115/ call-off 2500 2500 2500 1500
1002 order quantity 2500 2500 2500 2500
VR116/ call-off 800 240 140 200
2614 ' order quantity 800 800 440 400
,
VR151/ call-off - 400 1200 900
VP 151 1214 order quantity - 600 1200 1200
,
VR164/ call-off 15 16 12 -
1019 order quantity 25 25 25 -
VR150 VR170/ call-offs - - 600 300
2630
,
order quantity - - 200 100
VR171/ call-offs - 5 10
,
3
2710 order quantity - 10 10 10.
AC215
,
call-off 100 70 50 25
AC200 1816 order quantity 100 100 100 75
AC255/ call-off 400 300 300 400
4914 order quantity 400 400 400 400
AC250 4C270/ call-off 20 10 10 20
5300 order quantity 20 20 20 20
Notes 1 A call-off was the monthly delivery requirement to the customer
2 The order quantity was the number of components issued to and
processed through the First Production Unit - also known as batch
size. These were not issued each month but only as required
3 Vhere order quantities exceeded the call-off requirement this
implied that manufacturing produced, for instance, two month's
sales at a time.
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APPENDIX L.6
AVERAGE ORDER QUANTITIES FOR TYPICAL COMPONENTS
WHICH GO INTO THE ASSEMBLY OF ONE OR MORE PRODUCTS
WITHIN THE CURRENT PRODUCT RANGES, AND PLACED ON
THE SECOND PRODUCTION UNIT DURING THE PERIOD
1978/83
Product Information
,
Average order quantities
range component 1978 1980 1983
,
VR 102/1069 10000 5000 2000
VR.1 00
VR111/2178 750 500 150
VR151/3009 1250 500 500
VR150 VR164/2721 100 100 100
VR168/5014 80 50 30
AC200 AC215/2748 25 100 25
AC255/5134 250
,
400 400
AC250
A0270/5863 10 10 20
f.41-300
NT306/7010 250 250 100
NT314/7477 150 100 50
RU400 RU405/2828
,
-
,
- 25
Notes 1 An order quantity was the number of components
issued to and processed through the second
Production Unit - also known as the batch size.
2 In all instances, the order quantities were taken as
the average of the actual issues during the year.
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APPENDIX L.7
SUMMARIES OF TYPICAL COMPONENT ROUTINGS THROUGH
THE FIRST PRODUCTION UNIT INCLUDING MACHINE
CATEGORY, PRODUCTION TIMES AND CHANGE-OVER TIMES
Cumulative total standard
Number of machines time
used in each category
_
change over time
to complete all the process time (standard hours)
operations for 7 (standard
typical components minutes) per
component
different like
-
A 5 C D items
6 5 4 5 126.6 39.0	 27.5
7
..; 7 2 2 29.2 34/5	 18.0
6 4 3 4 55.5 30.0	 11.0
7 5 3 3 47.4 28.0	 100
6 4 2 3 64.5 21.5	 14.0
-)4 2 3 2 120.1 21.0	 15.0
6 4 3 1 162.1 21.5	 12.5
, ,
Notes
1 Machine categories were
A General-purpose machines
B Machine dedicated to one of the product range (eg VR100)
C Machine dedicated to part of a product
range (eg part of VR100 range)
D Machine dedicated to one operation on one component by a
fixture (eg can onl y complete one operation on component
VP 106/1426)
2 The operations do not i ncl ude i n- process testi no
3 All machi nes were laid out by function or process
4 The 7 components shown above were representative of the range
of work involved
• Tne cumulative total standard ti me col umns mean that, for
the first component, the total process ti me of 126.6 standard
minutes per component using 20 different machines from
categories A to D inclusive with a cumulative set- up ti me
for these 20 machines of between 27.5 to 39.0 hours
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APPENDIX L.8
ANNUAL UNIT SALES BY PRODUCT RANGE 1978-83
Product_
• Annual Call-offs in
range 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
VP actual 105650 74500 72880 58400 51790 45600
100 index 100 71 69 55 49 43
VP actual 74600 44850 45950 31250 30880 36040
150 index 100 60 62 42 41 48
AC actual 3110 3290 3120 3270 2650 4160
200 index 100 106 100 105 86 134
AC actual 52620 34560 42360 28350 28250 37100
250 index 100 66 81 54 54 71
NT actual 25750 23170 22200 16630 15440 12610
300 index 100 90 86 65 60 49
RU actual - - - 170 110 250
400 index - - - 100 65 147
Notes
1 All figures have been indexed on 1978 except the RU 400 range, which has
been indexed on 1981
2 Source - Appendix 5,6
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APPENDIX L.9
REVIEW OF CALL-OFFS AND ORDER QUANTITIES IN THE FIRST
PRODUCTION UNIT IN 1980-83
COMPONENT 1980 1981 1982 1983
VR 108/1426 call-off 2600 2520 1970 1490
index 100 97 76 57
order quantity 4750 4250 3250 3500
index 100 89 68 74
VP 111/3278 call-off 50 - - -
index 100
order quantity 255 - - -
index 100
VP 115/1002 call-off 2500 2500 2000 1500
index 100 100 80 60
order quantity 2500 2500 2500 2500
index 100 100 100 100
VP 116/2614 call-off 800 240 140 200
index 100 30 18 25
order quantity 800 800 440 400
index 100 100 55 50
VR 151/1214 call-off - 400 1200 900
index 100 300 250
order quantity - 600 1200 1200
index - 100 200 200
VP 164/1019 call-off 15 16 12
index 100 107 80
order quantity 25 25 25 -
index 100 100 100 -
VP 170/2630 call-off - 600 300
index - - 100 50
order quantity - - 200 100
index - - 100 50
VP 171/2710 call-off 5 10 3
index - 100 200 60
order quantity 10 10 10
index 100 100 100
AC 215/1816 call-off 100 70 50 25
index 100 70 50 25
order quantity 100 100 100 75
index 100 100 100 75
AC 255/4914 call-off 400 300 300 400
index 100 75 75 100
order quantity 400 400 400 400
index 100 100 100 100
AC 270/5300 call-off 20 10 10 20
index 100 50 50 100
order quantity 20 20 20 20
index 100 100 100 100
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APPENDIX L.10
PROCESS TIME REDUCTIONS IN THE PERIOD 1978-83
FOR ONE HIGH VOLUME COMPONENT ON ITS ROUTE
THROUGH THE SECOND PRODUCTION UNIT AND PLANT
UTILIZATION CHANGES IN THE SAME PERIOD AND SAME
UNIT
Aspect 1978 1980 1983
Total standard minutes 8 3 6 3 47
per component
average 64 44 34
Plant
utilize
tion	 ',I's
,
14 4 3
range
low
,
high gg 85 82
Note
Although the plant utilization figures given above relate
to the Second Production Unit i they were also typical of the
plant utilization changes in the other two Production Units
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6 CONCLUSION
By the late 1970s/early 1980s, prominent contributors had effectively
established a recognition of the need for research in the field of
manufacturing strategy and pointed the way in terms of identifying
important areas in which further work needed to be undertaken. At the
outset of the research period, therefore, the stage was set. The research
questions identified at the end of Chapter 1 proposed that a manufacturing
strategy methodology would need to recognise that
a) the 'market-related inputs to manufacturing strategy formulation
are more relevant to this process when expressed in manufacturing,
rather than conventional marketing terms
b) invesments in manufacturing will embody different sets of trade-offs
between major process and infrastructure characteristics (for example,
process flexibility, inventory levels, manufacturing planning and
control systems and capacity increases)
c) strategy formulation is more effective when the process recognises that
whereas markets are inherently dynamic, manufacturing investments
are inherently fixed. Thus, relevant process and infrastructure
investments today may not adequately support the markets of tomorrow
The direction of the research described here has been to test whether the
above questions are meaningful in themselves and pertinent to businesses in
terms of providing relevant manufacturing perspectives. The purpose of this
concluding section is, therefore, to review the reported research in line with
these questions.
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At the outset it would be of benefit to consider the content and purpose of
manufacturing strategy. Its role is to provide a functional input into the
corporate strategy debate. However, manufacturing typically provides
products which are sold into various market segements which themselves
comprise both a technical (eg dimensional) and business (eg qualifier and
order-winner) perspective. The underlying rationale for doing this is to
make acceptable profits and meet other corporate objectives over time.
a) Marketing and manufacturing perspectives of markets
Based on this premise it is necessary, therefore, to review markets from a
manufacturing as well as marketing viewpoint. Why is this so?
• marketing's view of the market provides essential insights into
sector characteristics, consumer behaviour, appropriate advertising
campaigns, product technical dimensions and customer procedures and
expectations (eg those relating to government departments)
• naanufacturing's view of the market has nothing to do with these
perspectives. Yet typically most companies do not re-express their
markets, thereby accepting these perspectives of their market as the
only relevant view. But, without understanding the manufacturing
view of its markets, a company is unable to develop an appropriate
manufacturing strategy. The key step in formulating a manufacturing
strategy then is looking at markets from a new perspective. In essence,
it involves asking questions about the market requiring manufacturing
answers. Once this has been accomplished then the rationale under-
pinning manufacturing process and infrastructure investments is
established. It is then the establishment of appropriate direction which
is the essence of manufacturing strategy
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• the methodology developed both highlighted and met this essential
feature in manufacturing strategy development. The perspectives of
order-winners and qualifers provide important new insights in that these
refined perspectives express/explain essential and critical differences
from a manufacturing point of view
The two company illustrations, HQ Injection Moulding (HQIM) and Precision
Steel, illustrate these essential factors. HQIM's failure to identify the relevant
qualifers and order-winners relating to its new markets was directly
responsible for its inappropriate machine (and consequently mould)
investment programme. This aspect is again illustrated by Precision Steel.
The initial (and proposed continuation of) volume fragmentation of the
Gambert Fabrique sector of its Stockist Steel market is a further illustration
of the failure to identify market differences. Similarly, reviewing its
Customised Sections segment as a single market obscured essential
manufacturing differences. From marketing's viewpint the segmentation was
relevant in that differences were identified between these customers and
those in its other two segments of Electric Motors and Stockist Steel.
However, from manufacturing's perspective, Customised Sections was, in fact,
four segments. Only with this insight was the company able to respond to
the different requirements of each segment and improve its chances of
continuing to grow this important and profitable part of its overall business.
b) and c) Trade-offs and the dynamic nature of markets and fixed
nature of manufacturing
Manufacturing investments are large and fixed. Whilst these characteristics
in process investments are easily recognised the same is also so for many
infrastructure investments. For example, manufacturing planning and
control systems can typically cost £2.5 millions and take 2 to 3 years to
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introduce. Also, once investments have been made firms will be reluctant,
(both in terms of expectation and willingness) to repeat these large
investments. Given this phenomenon it is essential that companies
appreciate the trade-offs embodied in these significant investments. Several
important examples of these were given in the illustrations in Figures 5.4, 5.6
and 5.7. In terms of manufacturing this concerns, for example, the level of
flexibility, associated volumes, key feature of utilization and the nature of
capacity changes. However, it is important for companies to recognise not
only the significance of the trade-offs themselves but have a clear
appreciation of the fact that these will not change without further and
appropriate investment.
For example, high volume processes are not able to effectively support low
volume markets. In such circumstances a company could be forced to invest
in inventory (and associated costs) or incur higher process (including set-up)
costs and subsequent loss of capacity if it was unable or unwilling to invest in
new or modify existing processes appropriate to the characteristics of its
current markets. The same problems arise for comanies which have invested
in manufacturing planning and control systems which it finds too
unresponsive and inventory heavy or has existing payment systems which
are based on (say) volume achievement in times when market volumes are
declining.
Couple this with the inherent dynamic nature of markets (declining volumes,
shorter product life cycles and widening product ranges) then the inherent
lack of fit between these two critical parts of a firm becomes apparent.
Product profiling's contribution is to provide a way of presenting these issues
such that it illustrates the nature and extent of change whilst affording the
opportunity to discuss causes and ways to improve fit and hence overall
business performance. The examples given earlier in Chapter 5 show the
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actual or potential erosion of fit between a company's marketing and
manufacturing strategies. In this way, it highlights the dynamic nature of
markets and the fixed nature of manufacturing in terms of the trade-offs
which are embodied in its investments.
The findings which are at the core of the work presented here are some of
the outcomes of the research I undertook in this period. These are now well
documented in papers and books which, in turn, form the basis for
manufacturing strategy teaching programmes in the UK, Europe and North
America. In addition, they have stimulated both company applications and
further academic research in different parts of the world.
